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Abstract
Today mobile computing has become a necessity and we are witnessing explosive
growth in the number of mobile devices accessing the Internet. To facilitate con-
tinuous Internet connectivity for nodes and networks in motion, mobility protocols
are required and they exchange various signaling messages with the mobility infras-
tructure for protocol operation. Proliferation in mobile computing has raised several
research issues for the mobility protocols. First, it is essential to perform cost and
scalability analysis of mobility protocols to find out their resource requirement to
cope with future expansion. Secondly, mobility protocols have survivability issues
and are vulnerable to security threats, since wireless communication media can be
easily accessible to intruders. The third challenge in mobile computing is the pro-
tection of signaling messages against losses due to high bandwidth requirement of
multimedia in mobile environments. However, there is lack of existing works that
focus on the quantitative analysis of cost, scalability, survivability and security of
mobility protocols.
In this dissertation, we have performed comprehensive evaluation of mobility
protocols. We have presented tools and methodologies required for the cost, scala-
bility, survivability and security analysis of mobility protocols. We have proposed a
dynamic scheduling algorithm to protect mobility signaling message against losses
due to increased multimedia traffic in mobile environments and have also proposed
a mobile network architecture that aims at maximizing bandwidth utilization. The
analysis presented in this work can help network engineers compare different mobil-
ity protocols quantitatively, thereby choose one that is reliable, secure, survivable
and scalable.
xvii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Next generation networks are gradually converging towards the all-IP networks
which can enable true global mobility and Internet connectivity to mobile devices.
Today mobile computing has become a necessity, and we are witnessing the explo-
sive growth in the number of mobile devices accessing the Internet. This has been
possible due to the advance of wireless access technologies and miniaturization of
mobile devices, driven by people’s desire to get connected to one another anytime
anywhere through online social networking or other means of communication.
1.1 Introduction
Internet Protocol (IP) is the underlying communication protocol that allows an end
host to get connected to other hosts over the public Internet. However, IP cannot
work in mobile environment since the IP address of a mobile device changes with
the change of its location, and such a change of IP address causes the termination of
an ongoing connection. Therefore, to facilitate continuous Internet connectivity for
mobile nodes, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) proposed Mobile IPv6 [1], an
IP-based mobility protocol.
Collection of IP-enabled devices, such as laptops, PDAs, IP-cameras or networks
of sensors (deployed in vehicles) moving together in a bus, train, aircraft, ship can
1
form mobile networks and the mobility management can be performed in an aggre-
gated way, rather than by each mobile device of the mobile network. This aggregated
mobility management can significantly reduce signaling requirement and power con-
sumption. Only one of the components in a mobile network, therefore, needs to
be equipped with high-power transceivers to manage mobility of all the nodes of
the mobile network. IETF standardized NEtwork MObility (NEMO) [2] to provide
mobility support to multiple IP-enabled devices in a mobile network.
However, Mobile IPv6 [1] and NEMO basic support protocol [2] suffer from the
high latency, packet loss, inefficient routing resulting in degradation of the over-
all performance. To address the above mentioned drawbacks of Mobile IPv6 and
NEMO, SIGMA [3] and SINEMO [4], Seamless IP-diversity based host and network
mobility protocols, were proposed by the researchers at the Telecommunications and
Networks Research Lab (TNRL) of the University of Oklahoma with collaboration
of NASA. SIGMA [3] and SINEMO [4] are suitable for providing seamless mobility
support for terrestrial and space networks.
1.2 Motivation and Problem Statement
In a mobile computing environment, a number of network parameters (such as net-
work size, mobility rate, traffic rate) influence the signaling costs related to mobility
management. With the rapid growth and popularity of mobile and wireless net-
works, increasingly larger number of IP-enabled mobile devices now require support
from the mobility management entities, many of which were not initially designed
to handle such enormous signaling load. This ever-increasing load on mobility man-
agement entities may result in the performance degradation of mobility protocols.
Hence, mobility protocols are required to be analyzed with respect to the signaling
overhead on its key entities to find out their resource requirement for their smooth
operation.
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Mobility protocols have their applications in buses, trains, aircrafts, military
vans, satellites. The increased load on the critical (infra-structural) components
of mobility protocols may sometimes lead to serious consequences, especially for
critical applications, such as in-flight communications for air traffic signaling in a
commercial aircraft or in a battlefield where continuous connectivity with peers is
crucial. Therefore, it is essential to choose a mobility protocol that is scalable with
respect to the future growth of networks and user demands. Thus, it is essential to
analyze the scalability of mobility protocols and its key components with respect to
various system parameters.
Another challenge in mobile computing is the protection of control messages
from being ignored due to excessive amount of audio-video streaming data in mobile
environment. Today more people are surfing the Internet and accessing multimedia
data from their mobile devices. Due to such high data traffic, the access networks
are often overloaded with packets of different priorities. The access routers have to
act quickly enough to avoid loss of connection of mobile nodes’ (or mobile networks’)
ongoing sessions. Therefore, it is important to have a dynamic scheduling algorithm
in the access routers to facilitate such priority scheduling of the control messages,
thereby improving the performance of mobility protocol.
Survivability of mobility protocols is another important issue. Survivability is a
crucial aspect for any kind communication. A survivable network has the ability to
withstand malicious attacks and to continue to work properly even in the presence of
natural or man-made disturbances. Wireless and mobile networks have the challenge
of survivability, since users are mobile and the communication channels are accessible
to anyone. Mobility signaling message is the crucial control message for a mobility
protocols and if these messages are intercepted or get lost, it may lead to complete
outage of the system, leading to serious consequences for critical applications, such
as air-traffic control system or in military battlefield. Hence, it is essential to analyze
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the survivability of mobility protocols and employ improved survivability measures
for critical applications.
Finally, mobility protocols can be vulnerable to security threats. This is because
the communication media is wireless (therefore, easily accessible by attackers) and
the mobility protocols require data to be delivered to a node which are moving and
can have multiple point-of-attachments. These special features in mobile computing
have introduced several security issues. Any malicious agent can try to fool mobility
agents by sending spoofed control messages and redirecting traffic away from the
victim nodes, hijacking ongoing sessions, or even modifying the contents if proper
protection mechanisms are not enforced. Therefore, it is very important to identify
possible security threats for mobility protocols and analyze defense mechanisms to
prevent or mitigate these threats.
1.3 Objectives of this Research
The objectives of this research are as follows:
• The first objective of this research is to perform a comprehensive cost and
scalability evaluation of the host and network mobility protocols. The idea is
to investigate how much signaling overhead is imposed on different components
of the network that are responsible to ensure IP-connectivity to mobile devices.
Moreover, we intend to investigate their scalability as mobile computing is
proliferating.
• The second objective of this research is the quantitative evaluation of surviv-
ability of the mobility infrastructure and the associated components. We want
to improve survivability of mobility protocols by protecting the crucial mobility
signaling packets over bulk real-time data, thereby ensuring improved avail-
ability of the mobile device and the mobile network. To achieve this goal, we
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have proposed multi-homed NEMO architecture and performed survivability
analysis both through simulations and experimental test-bed.
• The third objective of this research is to protect control or signaling messages
of mobility protocols from being ignored as a consequence of excessive amount
of audio-video streaming data in mobile Internet. We intend to propose a
dynamic scheduling algorithm for wireless access networks to facilitate priority
scheduling of the control messages, thereby ensuring their faster response for
mobility protocols.
• The fourth objective of this research is to protect mobility protocols from secu-
rity threats. Since mobile devices are connected through the wireless networks
which are more vulnerable to attacks by malicious agents, we focus on identi-
fying potential attack scenarios and propose protective mechanism to prevent
or mitigate such attacks on mobility protocols.
• Finally, mobility protocols require a realistic mobility model that can mimic
the movement pattern of nodes in motion. Our fifth objective is to derive all
the stochastic properties of a realistic mobility model for nodes roaming in
vehicles around the city.
1.4 Contributions of the Dissertation
The contributions of the dissertation are summarized as follows:
• Perform entity-wise cost evaluation of host and network mobility protocols.
• Perform quantitative scalability analysis of host and network mobility proto-
cols.
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• Perform multi-class queuing analysis and propose a dynamic scheduling algo-
rithm to protect crucial control messages (of mobility management) against
losses.
• Propose a multi-band mobile router architecture for NEMO to ensure maxi-
mum utilizations of available bandwidth.
• Perform survivability analysis of mobility protocols and propose a seamless
NEMO architecture with improved performance.
• Identify security threats for mobility protocols, critically analyze defense mech-
anisms, and propose an effective security measure for SIGMA.
• Develop a mathematical model to derive various stochastic properties of a
realistic mobility model for mobile networks (onboard a vehicle).
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of
host and network mobility protocols. Chapter 3 presents entity-wise cost analysis of
different mobility protocols, followed by their scalability analysis in Chapter 4. In
Chapter 5, we perform multi-class queuing analysis to measure various performance
metrics for different classes of data and signaling traffic in the access router. In
Chapter 6, we propose a multi-band mobile router architecture for NEMO to en-
sure maximum possible utilizations of the available bandwidth. Chapter 7 presents
survivability analysis for NEMO, followed by the experimental evaluation of a pro-
posed multi-homed NEMO architecture in Chapter 8. In Chapter 9, we explain
with illustrative examples all the major security threats and critically analyze exist-
ing defense mechanisms for IP-mobility protocols, along with security solutions for
SIGMA protocol. In Chapter 10, we present a mathematical model to derive various
stochastic properties of a realistic mobility model for the mobile network (onboard
6
a vehicle) and apply the model in mobility protocol analysis. Finally, Chapter 11
has the concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Mobility protocols are required to facilitates Internet connectivity to nodes or net-
works in motion. In this chapter, a review of different host and network mobility
protocols is provided to help readers better understand the rest of the dissertation.
2.1 Mobility Protocols
Next generation networks are gradually converging towards the all-IP networks
which can enable true global mobility and Internet connectivity to mobile devices.
Though IP is the underlying communication protocol to get connected to the public
Internet, it cannot work in mobile environment. This is because the IP address of
a mobile device changes with the change of its location, and such a change of IP
address causes the termination of an ongoing connection. Therefore, to facilitate
continuous Internet connectivity for mobile nodes, IETF proposed Mobile IPv6 [1],
an IP-based mobility protocol to maintain session continuity during handover.
Collection of IP-enabled devices, such as, laptops, PDAs, IP-cameras moving
together in a bus, train, aircraft, ship can form mobile networks and the mobility
management can be performed in an aggregated way, rather than by each mobile
device. This aggregated mobility management can significantly reduce signaling re-
quirement and power consumption. Only one of the components in a mobile network
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can, therefore, be equipped with high-power transceivers to manage mobility of all
the nodes of the mobile network. IETF standardized NEtwork MObility (NEMO) [2]
to provide mobility support to multiple IP-enabled devices in a mobile network.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we explain different
host mobility protocols. In Section 2.3, we explain the NEMO architecture and
review two network mobility protocols. Finally, we conclude in Section 2.4.
2.2 Host Mobility Protocols
The objective of this type of mobility protocols is to provide mobility support to a
single mobile node. In this subsection, we explain briefly four host mobility proto-
cols: Mobile IPv6, Hierarchical MIPv6 (IETF standard protocols), and SIGMA and
Hierarchical SIGMA (proposed by the TNRL lab).
2.2.1 Mobile IPv6
IETF proposed Mobile IPv6 [1] which aims at solving two problems at the same
time. First, it allows transport layer sessions (TCP or UDP) to continue even if the
underlying hosts are roaming and changing their IP addresses. Second, it allows a
host to be reached through a static IP address (home address).
The architecture of Mobile IPv6 is shown in Fig. 2.1. Each Mobile Host (MH)
has a home network where it is registered with a router called the Home Agent (HA).
Each MH has a static Home Address (HoA) by which it is identified, regardless of
its current point of attachment to the Internet.
While away from its home, an MH is also associated with a Care-of Address
(CoA), which provides its current location information. Whenever an MH acquires a
new CoA from a foreign network, it must inform its HA about this new CoA through
a Binding Update (BU). The HA accepts the BU and updates it binding cache (a
table maintained by the HA for all its MHs), and sends a binding acknowledgement.
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Figure 2.1: Mobile IPv6 architecture.
In Mobile IPv6, every data packet destined to an MH’s HoA is intercepted by
the HA. The HA checks its binding cache to obtain the MH’s CoA and forwards the
data packet to the new location using IPv6 encapsulation. Data packets from the
Correspondent Node (CN) follows an un-optimized route to the MH (CN –> HA
–> MH) (as shown in Fig. 2.1) instead of direct route (CN –> MH). This degrades
the performance of Mobile IPv6, introducing large handover delay and packet loss.
2.2.2 Hierarchical Mobile IPv6
For high mobility of nodes, location information are sent very frequently to the HA,
resulting in bandwidth wastage and possible network congestion. Moreover, the
CN might get stale information about the MHs current location if the HA is far
away from the MH, resulting in possible connection termination. Therefore, it is
very important to reduce the delay of time-critical handover process of the MH to
10
Figure 2.2: Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 architecture.
improve its performance. Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) [5], an enhancement of
MIPv6 [1], aims at reducing handover delay by introducing a new network element,
called Mobility Anchor Point (MAP) in addition to the HA.
HMIPv6 is designed to reduce the signaling cost of the base MIPv6 and it has
the lowest signaling cost in all versions of MIPv6 enhancements. The architecture of
HMIPv6 is shown in Fig. 2.2. Each MAP is essentially a local HA and covers several
subnets under its domain. Upon arrival in a new MAP-domain, an MH discovers
MAP’s global address that is stored in the Access Routers (AR) and communicated
to the MH via router advertisements. The MH then updates the HA with an address
assigned by the MAP, called Regional Care-of-Address (RCoA), as its current loca-
tion. The MAP intercepts all packets sent to the MH, encapsulates, and forwards
them to the MH’s current address. While moving within a MAP-domain, the MH
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Figure 2.3: SIGMA architecture.
is not required to send updates to the HA, rather it uses the Local Care-of-Address
(LCoA) within a MAP-domain. Thus, HMIPv6 reduces signaling requirement of the
MH by introducing a local mobility agent (MAP).
2.2.3 SIGMA
SIGMA (Seamless IP-diversity based Generalized Mobility Architecture) [3] was
designed to resolve the major drawbacks of Mobile IP (which has a large handover
latency and packet loss). SIGMA exploits IP-diversity (i.e., having multiple network
interfaces) of the MH to achieve seamless handover.
The architecture of SIGMA is shown in Fig. 2.3. The Location Manager (LM) is
responsible for keeping up-to-date location information of the mobile hosts. When-
ever any CN wants to send data to a MH, it must first send a query message to the
LM to obtain its current IP address.
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The main difference of SIGMA with MIPv6 protocol is the decoupling of data
communication from location management. Unlike MIPv6, data packets between
CN and the MH are not routed through the LM in SIGMA. After getting IP address
from the LM, the CN sends data packets directly to the MH. In every handover,
the MH must update its new IP address (after acquiring it from the new access
network) to the LM. At the same time, the MH needs to send binding update to the
communicating CN so that any subsequent packets of the ongoing session between
MH and CN can be sent directly to the new address of the MH after the handoff.
Thus, the LM is not responsible for data traffic to be routed to the MH from the
CN, resulting in less overhead on the LM as well as the the complete system.
SIGMA achieves seamless handover by using the multi-homing feature of Stream
Control Transport Protocol (STCP) [6] and uses make-before-break strategy. This
means that the MH in SIGMA protocol obtains a secondary IP address from the new
Access Router (AR2) when it approaches to the overlapping area of two access routers
(see Fig. 2.3). As the result of having two IP addresses (multi-homing approach) in
the SCTP association, the MH can continue with the data transmission without any
disruption, even though one of the access network (AR1) becomes unreachable just
after the handover. This is making a connection with the new AR2 before breaking
the existing connection with the old AR1. Thus, the use of IP-diversity and make-
before-break strategy results in the least handover delay and packet loss for SIGMA
protocol [7].
2.2.4 Hierarchical SIGMA
Hierarchical SIGMA (HiSIGMA) [8] is an extension of SIGMA that promotes local-
ized mobility approach. In SIGMA, the LM might be far away from the MH which
may increases the delay between sending binding update and receiving binding ac-
knowledgements. Hierarchical approach can relax the requirement of sending every
binding updates to the LM (which might be located at a distant place).
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Figure 2.4: Hierarchical SIGMA.
Fig. 2.4 shows the Hierarchical SIGMA architecture where location management
is done in multiple levels. A local location manager, namely Anchor Zone Server
(AZS) is introduced in the hierarchy to keep records of movement within an AZS-
domain which covers several subnets. This entity is similar to the MAP in HMIPv6
architecture. However, the main difference between this new mobility entity, AZS
with HMIPv6’s MAP is that AZS does not deal with any data packet destined
to the MH since HiSIGMA decouples location management from data transmission.
Similar is the case for the Home Zone Server (HZS) which deals with macro-mobility
of MHs.
When the MH moves within an AZS-domain, there is no need to send signaling
traffic outside of the AZS-domain, thereby reducing signaling requirement with the
external networks over the bandwidth-limited air interface. For movement across
AZS-domains, BU is sent to the HZS to keep record of the new AZS where the MH
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has recently moved. This hierarchical approach of location management reduces
the handover latency and packet loss while improving the accuracy of the location
management [8].
It can be noted that DNS can be used as the location manager of SIGMA [9]
where domain name is used for the identification of MH. Therefore, location query
(for the MH) in HiSIGMA can be processed in an approach similar to hierarchical
DNS lookup. When CN wants to set up a new association with MH, CN sends a
query message (with MH’s domain name) to the root name server which replies with
HZS’s IP address. The CN then queries the HZS which replies with the IP address
of current AZS where MH resides. Finally, the CN queries the AZS which replies
with the current IP address(es) of MH.
2.3 Network Mobility Protocols
In this section, we briefly explain two network mobility protocols: NEMO (an IETF
standard protocol) and SINEMO (TNRL proposed protocol).
2.3.1 NEMO architecture
Mobile networks can be formed with IP-enabled devices including laptops, PDAs,
IP-cameras or networks of sensors deployed in vehicles, such as aircrafts, buses, and
trains, etc. Fig. 2.5 shows the architecture of a mobile network. Mobile Router
(MR) acts as the gateway for the nodes inside the mobile network, each of which is
called a Mobile Network Node (MNN). Different types of MNNs are: Local Fixed
Nodes (LFN) that do not move with respect to MN, Local Mobile Nodes (LMN) that
usually reside in MN and can move to other networks, and Visiting Mobile Nodes
(VMN) that get attached to the MN from another network. LMNs and VMNs are
MIPv6 capable. The MR attaches to the Internet through ARs. A mobile network is
usually connected to a network called the home network where an MR is registered
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Figure 2.5: NEMO architecture.
with a router called the Home Agent. The HA is notified of the location of the MR
and the HA redirects packets sent by the CN to MNNs.
2.3.2 NEMO BSP
IETF proposed NEtwork MObility Basic Support Protocol (NEMO BSP) [2] to facil-
itate continuous Internet connectivity of hosts moving together. In NEMO BSP [2],
the MR ensures connectivity of all hosts inside the mobile network when the MR
changes its point of attachment to the Internet while moving from a home network
to a foreign network. An MR has its unique IP address and one or more Mobile
16
Network Prefixes (MNP) that it advertises to the hosts attached to it. MR estab-
lishes a bidirectional tunnel with the HA of MHs to pass all the traffic between its
MHs and the CNs. When MR changes its point of attachment, it acquires a new
care-of-address from the visited foreign network. It then sends a binding update
to its HA which creates a cache entry (a mapping of the MRs home address to its
care-of-address) and creates a bidirectional tunnel between HA and MR. When a
CN sends a packet to a host, the packet is routed to the HA of the corresponding
MR. HA looks at its cache entry and forwards the packet to the MR using the bidi-
rectional tunnel. Finally, MR receives the packet, decapsulates it, and forwards it
to the host inside the MN.
2.3.3 SINEMO architecture
Fig. 2.6 shows the architecture of SINEMO [4]. SINEMO is based on the concept
of SIGMA and exploits IP-diversity feature of the MR. This implies that the mobile
network consists of a multi-homed Mobile Router which can be connected to two
wireless networks exploiting IP-diversity. The MR acts as a gateway between the
hosts and the ARs for Internet access. A CN sends traffic to an MNN. A Central
Location Manager (CLM) maintains the IP addresses of MR in a mobile network.
A Local Location Manager (LLM), usually co-located with the MR, is used to keep
the IP addresses of the hosts inside the MN. When an MN moves into one subnet,
MR obtains its own public IP address and one or more address prefixes. MR pro-
vides and reserves an IP address for each host which only uses private addresses for
connectivity.
In SINEMO, the hosts are not aware of their public IP addresses; they use only
the private IP addresses for connectivity. After handover, only the public addresses
are modified at MR; the private IP addresses of the hosts remain unchanged. MR
thus hides mobility from the hosts. The readers can refer to [4] for more details of
SINEMO handover and location management.
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Figure 2.6: SINEMO architecture.
2.4 Summary
Host and network mobility protocols are required to provide Internet connectivity
to nodes and networks in motion. In this chapter, we have reviewed the IETF
standard host and network mobility protocols: MIPv6, HMIPv6 and NEMO basic
protocol. We have also explained the architecture and protocol operations of SIGMA
and SINEMO, two seamless IP-diversity-based host and network mobility protocols,
respectively, proposed in the TNRL lab. In the next chapter, we perform cost
analysis of these mobility protocols to measure the amount of resources needed for
each mobility management entities for protocol operation.
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Chapter 3
Cost Analysis of Mobility Protocols
Host and network mobility protocols are required to provide Internet connectivity
to nodes and networks in motion. With the rapid growth and popularity of mobile
and wireless networks, increasingly larger number of IP-enabled mobile devices now
require mobility support. However, mobility protocols were not initially designed to
handle such enormous signaling load. This ever-increasing load on mobility infras-
tructure may result in its performance degradation. In this chapter, we perform a
comprehensive cost evaluation of the host and network mobility protocols to mea-
sure the amount of resources needed for their operations. This work can help us in
choosing a mobility protocol that incurs the least cost on the mobility infrastructure.
3.1 Introduction
Mobility management protocols are used to facilitate delivery of data packets to hosts
and networks that are in motion. IETF proposed Mobile IPv6 [1] and Hierarchical
Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) [5] to support host-mobility and NEtwork MObility Basic
Support Protocol (NEMO BSP) [2] for networks in motion. But these protocols
have high handover latency, packet loss, and inefficient routing path, giving rise
to deployment issues. To address these drawbacks, SIGMA [3] and SINEMO [4],
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Seamless IP-diversity-based host and network mobility protocols were proposed with
reduced handover delay and packet loss.
In a mobile computing environment, a number of network parameters (such as
network size, mobility rate, traffic rate) influence the costs relating to mobility.
These include costs incurred in updating location manager about the change of lo-
cation, sending updates to hosts with ongoing communication, and processing and
lookup costs by various mobility agents, etc. With the rapid growth and popularity
of mobile and wireless networks, increasingly larger number of IP-enabled mobile
devices now require support from the mobility management entities (e.g., location
manager, home agent, and mobile router, etc.), many of which were not initially
designed to handle such enormous load. This ever-increasing load on mobility man-
agement entities may result in the performance degradation of mobility protocols.
Hence, mobility protocols are required to be analyzed with respect to the overheads
(on various mobility management entities) to measure the amount of resources re-
quired for its operations. This can help in choosing a mobility protocol that incurs
the least cost on the mobility infrastructure.
There have been earlier attempts for cost analysis [10–15] of mobility protocols.
Xie et al. [16] performed cost analysis of Mobile IP to minimize the signaling cost
while introducing a regional location management scheme. Fu et al. [10] analyzed
the signaling costs of SIGMA and HMIPv6. Reaz et al. [11] performed the signaling
cost analysis of SINEMO but did not consider all possible costs of all the entities.
Makaya et al. [12] presented an analytical model for the performance and cost anal-
ysis of IPv6-based mobility protocols. Munasinghe et al. [13] presented an analytical
signaling cost model for vertical handoffs in a heterogeneous mobile networking en-
vironment. Lee et al. [14] analyzed the performance of Proxy Mobile IPv6 in terms
of signaling cost and packet delivery cost. Xie et al. [15] analyzed various handoff
scenarios for a dual stack mobile node roaming in a mixed IPv4/IPv6 environment.
However, the above studies [10–15] did not consider all possible costs for mobility
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management, e.g., costs related to query messages by CN, refreshing binding up-
dates, messages required to secure ongoing sessions, etc. Moreover, they did not
compute the costs for various mobility management entities of the protocol. Hence,
those analyses are incomplete.
The objective of the work presented in this chapter is to perform a comprehen-
sive cost analysis of mobility entities of SIGMA, HiSIGMA and SINEMO, compare
them with IETF standard protocols (HMIPv6 and NEMO BSP, respectively). We
have chosen HMIPv6 in our analysis (to compare it with our lab-proposed SIGMA
and HiSIGMA protocols) because HMIPv6 is designed to reduce the signaling cost
of the base MIPv6 and it has the lowest signaling cost in all versions of MIPv6 en-
hancements. On the other hand, NEMO was chosen since it is the IETF-proposed
base network mobility protocol [2].
The contributions of the work presented in this chapter are: (i) developing math-
ematical models to estimate total costs and efficiencies of various mobility manage-
ment entities of HMIPv6, SIGMA, HiSIGMA, NEMO and SINEMO, and (ii) an-
alyzing the impact of network size, mobility rate, traffic rate, and data volume on
these costs and percentage overhead on the mobility entities.
The analytical cost models developed in this chapter covers all possible costs
required for mobility management and will help in estimating the actual resources
(bandwidth, processing power, and transmission power) required by key entities
of the network. We have performed entity-based scalability analysis for the host
and network mobility protocols since these entities are the key components and are
subject to resource limitations in a mobility environment.
Our results show that SIGMA, HiSIGMA and SINEMO incur much lower over-
head on their key entities and yield higher efficiency than HMIPv6 and NEMO,
irrespective of session lengths, network size and mobility rate. This is because un-
like HMIPv6 (and NEMO), SIGMA and SINEMO use an optimal route in data
delivery between the mobile node and its correspondent node.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. First, the assumptions, notations
and traffic model are listed in Section 3.2. Analytical cost models for HMIPv6,
SIGMA, HiSIGMA, NEMO and SINEMO are presented in Sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.5,
3.6, and 3.7, respectively. In Section 3.8, we define two novel performance metrics
for the mobility protocols and mobility management entities. In Section 3.9, we
present numerical results. Section 3.10 has the concluding remarks.
3.2 Modeling Preparation
The assumptions, notations and arrival traffic model are explained in the following
subsections.
3.2.1 Assumptions
Following are assumptions for cost analysis:
• Session arrival rate for each mobile host is equal.
• Each session length (data file size) is equal.
• Costs relating to standard IP switching are ignored.
• Uniform distribution of mobile hosts over the region of the network is assumed.
• Binary search is used to search location database.
The above assumptions are similar to the assumptions made by previous works [14,
15] and they make the model analytically tractable.
3.2.2 Notations
The notations used in this chapter are listed in this section.
Nm Number of Mobile Hosts,
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Nc Average number of CNs per MH,
Nf Number of LFNs in the mobile network,
δQ Per hop transmission cost for query message,
δR Per hop transmission cost for registration message,
δL Per hop transmission cost for location update,
δB Per hop transmission cost for Binding Update,
δAL Per hop transmission cost for aggregated location update message,
δD Per hop transmission cost for DHCP request/reply message,
δDP Per hop transmission cost for average data packet,
δDA Per hop transmission cost for data Ack packet,
δRR Per hop transmission cost for Return Routability (RR) message,
hp Average number of hops between Internet to arbitrary CN or CLM or AR,
hin Average number of hops in the Internet,
σ Proportionality constant of wireless link over wired link,
ψ Linear coefficient for lookup cost,
Tr Subnet residence time,
Tlf Binding entry lifetime,
λs Average session arrival rate for each mobile host,
κ Maximum transmission unit,
α Average session length (in file size),
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ξ Encapsulation cost,
βP Processing cost at an entity P ,
δTH Transmission cost for extra IP header used in tunneling,
k Number of access routers under a MAP or AZS,
m Number of MAPs (HMIPv6) or AZSs (HiSIGMA), where m = xy/k,
Υ Cost term for HMIPv6,
Γ Cost term for SIGMA,
Φ Cost term for HiSIGMA,
Λ Cost term for NEMO,
∆ Cost term for SINEMO.
3.2.3 Traffic Model
We assume that session arrival follows Poisson process [14, 15] with the following
probability distribution function:
fsa(n) =
e−λsλns
n!
. (3.1)
In other words, the inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed. The session
length process that denotes size of data (file) in each session follows Pareto distri-
bution. The mean session length is assumed to be α.
3.3 Cost Model for HMIPv6
In this section, we have performed entity-wise cost evaluations for different key
mobility entities of HMIPv6: Home Agent, MAP, MH, and the complete system.
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Figure 3.1: Hierarchical network structure for HMIPv6.
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The cost terms for HMIPv6 protocol is influenced by the number of regional
registration that happens in every move out of a MAP region. Let us first find out
the expected number of moves causing an MH regional registration. In the topology
(shown in Fig. 3.1), there are xy ARs in the foreign network. The MH can move
from the coverage area of one AR to any other in one move. As each MAP covers
k ARs, the probability that the mobile host will be within the coverage area of the
previous MAP after a movement is p = k
xy
. Conversely, the probability that MH
will reach a new AR is q = 1− p = xy−k
xy
. So the probability that the MH moves out
of a MAP domain in ith movement is Pi = p
i−1q. Hence, the expected number of
moves for a MAP domain move-out can be obtained as follows:
M =
∞∑
i=1
iPi = q(1 + 2p + 3p
2 + 4p3 + ...)
=
1
1− p =
xy
xy − k .
(3.2)
We now derive the expressions for the total cost on the MAP, the HA, and the
complete network for HMIPv6. Each MH communicates with a number of CNs and
each such active communication period is termed as a session.
3.3.1 Mobility Anchor Point
The total cost on the MAP is due to exchange of RCoA and LCoA registration
messages, RR messages and tunneling of packets from HA to MH, and vice versa.
LCoA registration messages: Every subnet crossing by the MH (that happens
every Tr sec) within a MAP region, triggers an on-link CoA (LCoA) registration
message to the MAP. This involves transmission cost of 2δR and the processing cost
of βMAP for each MH. Hence, the cost incurred at MAP is as follows:
ΥLCMAP =
Nm
m
× 2δR + βMAP
Tr
. (3.3)
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Return routability messages: In order to ensure that binding update message
is authentic and is not originated from malicious MH, RR procedure is performed
before each BU. This process makes use of four messages: Home Test Init (HoTI),
Home Test (HoT), Care-of Test Init (CoTI) and Care-of Test (CoT) [17]. Therefore,
the cost incurred at the MAP for RR messages is as follows:
ΥRRMAP =
Nm
m
× 4δRRNc
MTr
. (3.4)
RCoA registration messages: The MAP receives registration requests from ev-
ery MH entering the MAP domain. Since there are m MAPs and the MHs are
uniformly distributed, there will be Nm/m MHs under an MAP on the average.
The MAP processes the request and assigns an RCoA to the MH. This involves the
transmission cost of 2δR and the processing cost of βMAP for each MH at an MAP.
Each MH sends such RCoA registration requests in every MTr seconds.
ΥRCMAP =
Nm
m
× 2δR + βMAP
MTr
. (3.5)
Data delivery cost: MAP acts as a local HA for the MH, receives all packets
on behalf of the MH from the HA, decapsulates the packet, and then encapsulates
it to forward it to MH’s current location using the translation table of RCoA to
LCoA. Thus, for every packet sent from CN to the MH, transmission and processing
costs are incurred at the MAP. As the average session length is α, and maximum
transmission unit is κ, there will be ⌈α
κ
⌉ number of packets, and the packet rate can
be obtained by ⌈α
κ
⌉×λs. The transmission cost for each packet is (δDP +δDA) due to
the data packet and corresponding acknowledgement. As we have assumed a uniform
distribution of MHs in the network, the number of MHs under an MAP-domain is
Nmk
xy
. The cost for IP routing table (with entries of k ARs) lookup is proportional
to log2 k. Thus, the packet tunneling cost at MAP is given by
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ΥDDMAP =
Nm
m
×Ncλs
⌈α
κ
⌉(
(δDP + δDA) + ψ log2
(Nmk
xy
)
+ ψ log2 k + 2ξ
)
. (3.6)
Total cost on MAP: Thus, the total cost on each MAP can be obtained by
adding Eqns. (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6):
ΥMAP = Υ
LC
MAP +Υ
RR
MAP +Υ
RC
MAP +Υ
DD
MAP . (3.7)
3.3.2 Home Agent
The total cost on the HA is due to the exchange of location query messages with
CNs, RR messages, RCoA registration messages with MH and MAP, refreshing BU
message with the MHs and tunneling of packets from CN to MAP, and vice versa.
Query messages: For each association between MH and CN, query and reply
messages are exchanged between CN and HA. The HA has to search a database of
size proportional to the number of mobile hosts under its domain and the lookup
cost is ψλs log2(cNm). Here we assume that the HA has a total of cNm number of
hosts under its domain. Hence, the cost on HA for query messages is as follows:
ΥQRHA = NmNc(2δQλs + ψλs log2(cNm)). (3.8)
Return routability messages: Before each BU message, RR messages are ex-
changed among the MH, HA and CN. The HA receives the Home Test Init (HoTI)
message sent by the MH and forwards it to the CN. It also receives the Home Test
(HoT) message sent by the CN and sends it back to MH. This happens for every
MTr seconds and for every MH-CN pair under the HA. Therefore, the cost on HA
for RR messages are as follows:
ΥRRHA = NmNc ×
4δRR
MTr
. (3.9)
28
RCoA registration messages: For every region crossing between MAPs (hap-
pens every MTr seconds), MH needs to register the RCoA with HA. Therefore,
ΥRCHA = Nm
2δR + βHA
MTr
. (3.10)
Refreshing updates MHs send periodic refreshing updates to the HA so that
the binding entries are not removed from the location database after the binding
lifetime. Let the lifetime of the entries in the location database be Tlf . Therefore,⌊
Tr
Tlf
⌋
refreshing updates are sent to HA within time Tr. Thus, the frequency of
sending periodic refreshing updates is ηr =
⌊
Tr
Tlf
⌋
/Tr. Therefore, the cost on the HA
for refreshing BU packets are as follows:
ΥRBHA = ηrNm
(
2δB + βHA
)
. (3.11)
Data delivery cost: For every packet sent from CN to MH, transmission and
processing costs (for location database lookup and encapsulation) are incurred at
the HA. These costs are similar to that incurred at MAP, except that HA does not
have to decapsualte the packet from the CN. Thus, the cost on the HA due to packet
tunneling is as follows:
ΥDDHA = NmNcλs
⌈α
κ
⌉(
(δDP + δDA) + ψ log2(cNm) + ξ
)
. (3.12)
Total cost on HA: Thus, the total cost on each HA can be obtained by adding
Eqns. (3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.11), and (3.12):
ΥHA = Υ
QR
HA +Υ
RR
HA +Υ
RC
HA +Υ
RB
HA +Υ
DD
HA . (3.13)
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3.3.3 Mobile Host
The mobility signaling overheads on each MH are due to the exchange of RCoA and
LCoA registration request/reply messages with MAP and HA.
RCoA Registration Messages: Each MH entering a MAP domain receives
router advertisements and registers with a MAP sending (receiving) RCoA regis-
tration request (reply). This event happens every MTr seconds. So the overhead on
each MH associated with these registration events is given by
ΥRCMH =
2σδR
MTr
. (3.14)
LCoA registration messages: Every subnet crossing by the MH (happens every
Tr sec) within a MAP region triggers an LCoA registration message to the MAP.
Therefore,
ΥLCMH =
2σδR
Tr
. (3.15)
Return routability messages: RR messages are exchanged among the MH, HA
and CN before the MH informs HA about its moving out of a MAP-region. This
happens for every MTr seconds and for every MH-CN pair. Therefore, the cost on
MH for RR messages is as follows:
ΥRRMH = Nc ×
4δRR
MTr
. (3.16)
Refreshing updates MHs send periodic refreshing updates to the HA to keep
its binding entry valid. Therefore, the cost on the MH for sending refreshing BU
packets is as follows:
ΥRBMH = 2ηrδB. (3.17)
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Packet delivery cost: Each MH communicates with Nc correspondent nodes
through MAP and HA. If in a session, a file of size α is transferred from the CN
to the MH, then the total number of packets in a session is
⌈
α
κ
⌉
. If the average
number of retransmission of each data (and Ack) is χ, there will be (χ+1) attempts
of transmission for each data (and Ack) packets. Hence, the packet delivery cost for
each MH per second is:
ΥPDMH = Nc
⌈α
κ
⌉
σλs(δDP + δDA). (3.18)
Total cost on each MH: Thus, the total signaling overhead on each HA can be
obtained by adding Eqns. (3.14), (3.15), (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18) as follows:
ΥMH = Υ
RC
MH +Υ
LC
MH +Υ
RR
MH +Υ
RB
MH +Υ
PD
MH . (3.19)
3.3.4 Complete network
In order to compute the total cost on the network, we have considered resources
(bandwidth, processing power, etc.) consumed due to HMIPv6 protocol.
Query message: As each MH has an average of Nc CNs, the total number of CNs
for all the MHs is NmNc. The CN and HA are hw ( = hp + hin + hp ) wired-hops
away. The transmission cost for all the query and reply messages towards the HA
is NcNm(2hwδQ)λs. The searching cost in the HA is NcNm(ψλs log2(cNm)). Hence,
the cost of the network for the query messages from the CNs is as follows:
ΥQRNet = NmNcλs(2δqhw + ψ(log2 cNm)). (3.20)
LCoA registration messages: Every subnet crossing by the MH within a MAP
region triggers an LCoA registration message to be sent to the MAP. Let the distance
between MH and MAP be one wireless hop and hp − 1 wired hops. Hence, LCoA
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registration involves transmission cost of 2δR in each of the hp − 1 wired hops and
one wireless hop. Due to frame retransmissions and medium access contentions at
the data link layer of wireless links, transmission cost of a wireless hop is higher than
that of a wired hop; we denote this effect by a proportionality constant, σ. LCoA
registration also incurs processing cost at MAP. So
ΥLCNet = Nm
2δR(hp − 1 + σ) + βMAP
Tr
. (3.21)
Return routability messages: The RR messages are sent every MTr second by
the MH to HA which forwards them to CN. The HoTI message follows the path
between MH and HA which is of hw(= hp+hin+hp) hops with one wireless hop and
the path between HA and CN which is of hw wired hops. Similar cost is incurred for
each HoT message. Each CoTI message is sent directly to CN from the MH which
uses hw hops that include one wireless hop. Therefore, the cost on the network for
RR messages is:
ΥRRNet =
NmNc
MTr
2δrr
(
3hw − 2 + 2σ
)
. (3.22)
Refreshing binding updates To keep binding entry valid in the binding cache,
MHs send periodic refreshing updates to the HA. Since the MH is hw hops (including
one wireless hop) away, the cost on the network for refreshing BU packets is:
ΥRBNet = ηrNm
(
2δB(hw − 1 + σ) + βHA
)
. (3.23)
RCoA registration messages: The MAP processes the RCoA request and as-
signs an RCoA to the MH. As the MAP is hp hops (that include one wireless
hop) away from the MH, this RCoA registration incurs a transmission cost of
2δR(hp− 1+σ) and a processing cost βMAP at the MAP. The MAP informs the HA
about this new RCoA registration that requires a transmission cost of 2δRΦmh and a
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processing cost of βHA at the HA. Thus the RCoA registration cost for the network
is
ΥRCNet = Nm
2δR(hp − 1 + σ) + βMAP
MTr
+Nm
2δRhw + βHA
MTr
. (3.24)
Data delivery cost: CN sends every data packet to MH through HA and then
MAP. The cost required for the data packet to reach HA is δDPhw. Similar cost
of δDAhw is required for each ACK packet. The HA receives the data packets,
encapsulates them and sends them to the MAP. Thus the cost of (δDP + δDA)hw +
2ξ is required for this. The MAP receives the data packet on behalf of the MH
from the HA, decapsulates the packet, and then encapsulates it to forward it to
MH’s current location using the translation table of RCoA to LCoA. Hence, it costs
(δDP + δDA)(hp − 1 + σ) + 4ξ for each data and Ack packet. In addition, the visitor
list lookup at MAP costs ψ log2
Nmk
xy
, and the IP routing table lookup costs another
ψ log2 k. So tunneling each data packet and corresponding ACK packet from MAP
to the MH costs (δDP + δDA)(hp−1+σ)+4ξ+ψ log2 Nmkxy +ψ log2 k. Since the total
number of MHs in the network is Nm and we have assumed a uniform distribution
of MHs in the network, the number of MHs under an MAP-domain is Nmk
xy
. Thus,
the cost related to data delivery is given by
ΥDDNet = NmNcλs
⌈α
κ
⌉((
(δDP + δDA)hw + (δDP + δDA)hw + 2ξ
+ (δDP + δDA)(hp − 1 + σ)
)
+ 4ξ + ψ log2
Nmk
xy
+ ψ log2 k
)
.
(3.25)
Total cost on the network: Therefore, the total cost on the complete network
due to HMIPv6 protocol can be obtained by adding Eqns. (3.20), (3.21), (3.22),
(3.23), (3.24), and (3.25):
ΥNet = Υ
QR
Net +Υ
LC
Net +Υ
RR
NetΥ
RB
Net +Υ
RC
Net +Υ
DD
Net. (3.26)
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3.4 Cost Model for SIGMA
In this section, we perform cost analysis of different mobility management entities
of SIGMA: Location Manager, Mobile Host, and the complete network.
3.4.1 Location Manager
The total cost on the Location Manager is due to the location update messages sent
by the MHs, and the query message about the current location of the MH exchanged
with CNs.
Location updates: In SIGMA, every subnet crossing (that happens every Tr
seconds) by an MH triggers a location update message to be sent to LM. The LM
receives each LU message, processes (updates) the corresponding entry, and sends the
acknowledgement back to the MH. Thus, each location update requires transmission
cost (2δL) and processing cost (βLM) at LM. Hence, the cost on the LM due to
location updates is as follows:
ΓLULM = Nm
2δL + βLM
Tr
. (3.27)
Refreshing updates MHs send periodic refreshing updates to the HA to keep
its binding entry valid. Therefore, the cost on the MH for sending refreshing BU
packets is as follows:
ΓRBLM = Nm(2ηrδB + βLM). (3.28)
Query message: For each association between MH and CN, a query message
about the current location of MH is sent to the LM and the LM sends the reply to
that query after looking up the table. This involves transmission cost and lookup
cost. The LM has to search a database of size proportional to number of mobile
hosts. Since the session arrival rate is λs, each association lookup cost is ψλs log2Nm.
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Now for all the sessions between the MHs and CNs, the signaling load on the LM is
as follows:
ΓQRLM = NmNc(2δQλs + ψλs log2Nm). (3.29)
Total cost on LM: The total cost on the LM can be obtained by adding Eqns.
(3.27), (3.28) and (3.29).
ΓLM = Γ
LU
LM + Γ
RB
LM + Γ
QR
LM .
3.4.2 Mobile Host
The signaling costs on the mobile host are due to the query messages exchanged
with ARs, binding update messages exchanged with CNs, and location update and
refreshing update messages sent to LM, and packet delivery.
DHCP message: When the MH approaches the radio coverage area of a new
AR, it acquires a new IP address (IP2) from that AR by exchanging DHCP re-
quest/reply messages that involve transmission cost of 2σδD through the wireless
media. Therefore, the cost incurred at the MH for query message is as follows:
ΓDHMH =
2σδD
Tr
. (3.30)
Binding update message: After acquiring the IP address, the MH notifies CN
about the availability of the new IP address through SCTP address dynamic recon-
figuration option [18] whose transmission cost is 2σδS. When MH moves further
into the radio coverage area of the new AR, it sends ASCONF message [18] to CN,
using which CN sets its primary destination (for MH) to IP2 (cost of 2σδD). The
MH also updates its local routing table to make sure that future outgoing packets
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are sent through new AR and this requires processing cost of βAR. Therefore, the
cost incurred at the MH for BU message is as follows:
ΓBUMH = Nc
2σδS + 2σδS + 2σδS + βAR
Tr
. (3.31)
Location update message: Every MH in SIGMA is required to send a location
update message (costing 2σδL) to LM after each subnet crossing. These LU and BU
messages are transmitted through the wireless media. When the MH moves further
and goes away from the coverage area of the previous AR, it sends another ASCONF
message to CN to delete the previous IP address (IP1) which costs 2σδS. Therefore,
the cost incurred at the MH for location update message is as follows:
ΓLUMH =
2σδL
Tr
. (3.32)
Refreshing updates MHs send periodic refreshing updates to the LM to keep
its binding entry valid. Therefore, the cost on the MH for sending refreshing BU
packets are as follows:
ΓRBMH = 2ηrδB. (3.33)
Data delivery cost: Each MH communicates with Nc correspondent nodes. If
in a session, a file of size α is transferred from the CN to the MH, then the total
number of packets in a session is
⌈
α
κ
⌉
. Hence, the packet delivery cost for each MH
per second is:
ΓDDMH = Nc
⌈α
κ
⌉
σλs(δDP + δDA). (3.34)
Total cost on MH: Thus, the total cost on each MH can be obtained by adding
Eqns. (3.30), (3.31), (3.32), (3.33), and (3.34) as
ΓMH = Γ
DH
MH + Γ
BU
MH + Γ
LU
MH + Γ
RB
MH + Γ
DD
MH
=
2σδD
Tr
+Nc
6σδS + βAR
Tr
+
2σδL
Tr
+ 2ηrδB +Nc
⌈α
κ
⌉
σλs(δDP + δDA).
(3.35)
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3.4.3 Complete network
In order to compute the total cost on the network as a whole, we will consider
resources (such as bandwidth, processing power, etc) consumed due to the SIGMA
mobility protocol.
Query message: For each association between MH and CN, query messages are
exchanged between CN and LM. Each MH has an average of Nc number of CNs;
therefore, total number of CNs for all the mobile hosts are NmNc. As the session
arrival rates for each MH are assumed to be equal (λs), the transmission cost for
all the query messages towards the LM is NcNm(2hwδQ)λs. The searching costs for
the query messages are NcNm(ψλs log2Nm). Hence, the cost of the network for the
query messages from the CNs is,
ΓQRNet = NmNcλs(2δQhw + ψ log2Nm). (3.36)
Location update message: Each subnet crossing by the MH triggers location
update message to be sent to LM which processes the message and sends back
acknowledgement to MH. The location update cost is proportional to the distance (in
hops) between the MH and LM (note that there is one wireless link, and transmission
cost in wireless link is higher than that of wired link by a factor of σ). Therefore, the
resources (bandwidth and processing cost) used in the network for location updates
are as follows:
ΓLUNet = Nm
2(hw − 1 + σ)δL + βLM
Tr
. (3.37)
Refreshing binding updates: To keep binding entry valid in the binding cache,
MHs send periodic refreshing updates to the LM. Since the MH is hw hops (including
one wireless hop) away, the cost on the network for refreshing BU packets is as
follows:
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ΓRBNet = ηrNm
(
2δB(hw − 1 + σ) + βLM
)
. (3.38)
DHCP message: Whenever a MH comes within the coverage area of a new AR,
DHCP request message is sent to the AR, which processes the request, and sends
back the DHCP reply. So the costs associated with these messages are
ΓDHNet = Nm
2σδD + βAR
Tr
. (3.39)
Binding updates: After each subnet crossing of each MH, binding updates (AS-
CONF message with Add IP, Set primary, Delete IP messages) are sent to all the
correspondent nodes. The binding update is proportional to the distance (in hops)
between the MH and CN.
ΓBUNet = NmNc
6(hw − 1 + σ)δS + βCN
Tr
. (3.40)
Data delivery cost: After getting the IP address of the MH from the LM, the CN
send data packets directly to the MH through hw−1 wired hops and one wireless hop.
So the transmission cost for each data packet is (hw−1+σ)δDP , and a transmission
cost of (hw−1+σ)δDA for each acknowledgement packet. Hence the packet delivery
cost for all the communications in the network can be obtained using the following
equation:
ΓDDNet = NmNcλs
⌈α
κ
⌉
(δDP + δDA)(hw − 1 + σ). (3.41)
Total cost on the network: Thus, the total cost on the complete network due
to SIGMA protocol can be obtained by adding Eqns. (3.36), (3.37), (3.38), (3.39),
(3.40) and (3.41):
ΓNet = Γ
QR
Net + Γ
LU
Net + Γ
RB
Net + Γ
DH
Net + Γ
BU
Net + Γ
DD
Net. (3.42)
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3.5 Cost Model for HiSIGMA
In this section, we present entity-wise cost analysis for HiSIGMA. Specifically, we
analyzed total cost for AZS, HZS and the whole network. The AZS and HZS – two
key mobility components of HiSIGMA – have been chosen for entity-wise evaluation
since resource consumptions at these entities are expected to be high, and may affect
the performance of the whole network.
3.5.1 HiSIGMA network structure
Figure 3.2 shows the two dimensional environment where xy number of ARs are
arranged in a way similar to that of HMIPv6 (see Fig. 3.1). There are m AZSs,
each of which covers k subnets (let). The HZS is responsible for keeping location
information of all the MHs moving in this environment though the number of MHs
under HZS-domain is assumed to be higher.
The expected number of moves that causes MH’s AZS-domain move-out can be
obtained as M = xy
xy−k using similar approach used in Eqn. (3.2).
3.5.2 Anchor Zone Server
As mentioned earlier in Sec 2.2.4, the AZS only deals with location management (not
data transmission). The main tasks of AZS are processing 1) query messages from
CNs, and 2) registration messages from MHs. The following paragraphs estimates
the cost terms of AZS.
Query-lookup cost: Each association between MH and CN (that happens in
every 1/λs sec) requires query message and corresponding reply to be exchanged
between CN and AZS (see Fig. 2.4). On the average, each AZS has Nm/m MHs
under its domain. So each lookup cost is proportional to log2(Nm/m). Therefore,
cost on AZS for query message is as follows:
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Figure 3.2: Network structure for HiSIGMA.
ΦQRAZS = λsNc
Nm
m
(
2δQ + ψ log2(Nm/m)
)
. (3.43)
Registration cost for micro and macro mobility: In HiSIGMA, an MH does
not need to register with the HZS until the MH moves out of the region covered
by an AZS, instead it only registers with the AZS. Therefore, every subnet crossing
within a AZS (happens every Tr seconds) will trigger a registration message (and
corresponding ACK) message to (from) the AZS, which incurs transmission cost of
2δD) and processing cost (βAZS) at each AZS. Moreover, in case of the availability
of multiple IP addresses, the MH should notify AZS with the primary IP address
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through dynamic address reconfiguration message which incurs transmission cost of
δa at AZS. Since all the MHs are uniformly distributed among the m AZS domains,
each AZS will have Nm/m number of MHs. Therefore, cost at AZS for registration
message due to micro-mobility can be obtained as follows:
ΦRG1AZS =
Nm
m
× 2δL + βAZS + 2δD
Tr
. (3.44)
For every region crossing between the AZSs, transmission and processing costs
are incurred (for registration request-reply messages) at the AZS which is given by,
ΦRG2AZS =
Nm
m
× 2δL + 2βAZS
MTr
. (3.45)
Total cost on AZS: Therefore, the total cost on each AZS can be obtained by
adding Eqns. (3.43), (3.44), and (3.45):
ΦAZS = Φ
QR
AZS +Φ
RG1
AZS +Φ
RG2
AZS. (3.46)
3.5.3 Home Zone Server
In HiSIGMA, the HZS mainly processes 1) query messages from the CN, 2) registra-
tion messages due to MH macro-mobility, and 3) return routability test messages.
Query-Lookup cost: For each association (that happens in every 1/λs sec) be-
tween MH and CN, query message (and corresponding reply) about the current
location of MH are exchanged between CN and HZS (see Fig. 2.4). The HZS replies
with the IP address of the AZS which replies with the MH’s current IP address(es).
This incurs transmission cost at the HZS along with looking up a table whose size
is proportional to number of MHs it (HZS) covers. Therefore, query-lookup cost on
the HZS can be computed as follows:
ΦQRHA = λsNmNc
(
2δQ + ψ log2(cNm)
)
. (3.47)
where, c is the ratio of number of MHs under HZS to Nm.
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Registration cost for macro-mobility: For the inter-region movement of the
MHs, transmission and processing costs are incurred at the HZS which is given by,
ΦRGHZS = Nm ×
2δL + βHZS
MTr
. (3.48)
Refreshing updates MHs send periodic refreshing updates to the HZS to keep
its binding entry valid. Therefore, cost on the HZS for refreshing BUs are as follows:
ΦRBHZS = Nm(2ηrδB + βHZS). (3.49)
Return routability messages: To avoid session hijacking, RR messages are ex-
changed among the MH, HZS and CN before MH sends BU message to the CN. The
Home Test Init (HoTI) and Home Test (HoT) messages are sent through the HZS
for RR procedure. This happens for every MTr seconds and for every MH-CN pair
under the HA. Therefore, the cost on HZS for RR messages is as follows:
ΦRRHZS = NmNc ×
4δRR
MTr
. (3.50)
Total cost on the HZS: Thus, the total cost on the HZS can be obtained by
adding Eqns. (3.47), (3.48), (3.49), and (3.50):
ΦHZS = Φ
QR
HZS +Φ
RG
HZS +Φ
RB
HZS +Φ
RR
HZS. (3.51)
3.5.4 Complete network
To compute the total cost on the whole system, we will consider resources consumed
due to HiSIGMA protocol. These include transmission, lookup and processing costs
incurred in the whole network along the route of various mobility protocol messages
as well as the data packets. These costs are explained in the following paragraphs.
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Query-lookup cost: The transmission cost for all the query and reply mes-
sages towards the HZS is NcNm(2δQhw)λs. Per entry searching cost at HZS is
ψλs log2(cNm). Similar estimation can be done m AZSs of the network structure.
Hence, the cost of the network for the query messages is given by,
ΦQRNet = NmNcλs
(
2δQhw + ψ log2(cNm) + 2δQhw + ψ log2(Nm/m)
)
. (3.52)
Registration costs for macro and micro mobility: As the MH only require
to register with the HZS only if it moves out of the AZS-region. Otherwise, in every
Tr sec, MH registers with the AZS which is hp hops away that includes one wireless
hop. MHs also exchange address reconfiguration messages with the AZS during this
micro-mobility. Hence, the cost incurred at the network for MH’s micro-mobility is
as follows:
ΦRG1Net = Nm ×
2(δL + δD)(hp − 1 + σ) + βAZS
Tr
. (3.53)
On the other hand, for every region crossing (in every MTr sec), MH registers
with the HZS which is hw hops (that includes one wireless hop) away from the MH.
This incurs transmission and processing costs at the HZS, and processing cost at
the AZS(s). Since there is only one location update per subnet crossing, no matter
how many CNs an MH is communicating with, the number of CNs does not have
any impact on the location update cost. Therefore, the cost incurred at the network
for the macro-mobility of all the MHs can be obtained as follows:
ΦRG2Net = Nm
2δL(hw − 1 + σ) + βHZS
MTr
+Nm
2δL(hp − 1 + σ) + 2βAZS
MTr
. (3.54)
Refreshing binding updates: To maintain valid binding entry, MHs send peri-
odic refreshing updates to the HZS. As the MH is hw hops (including one wireless
hop) away from the HZS, the cost on the network for refreshing BU packets are as
follows:
ΦRBNet = ηrNm
(
2δB(hw − 1 + σ) + βHZS
)
. (3.55)
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Return routability messages: The RR messages are sent every MTr sec by
the MH to HZS which forwards them to CN. The HoTI message follow the path
between MH and HZS (which is of hw hops with one wireless hop) and the path
between HZS and CN of hw wired hops. Each HoT message incurs similar cost.
Each CoTI message is sent directly to CN from the MH which uses hw hops (that
includes one wireless hop). Therefore, cost on the network for RR messages is as
follows:
ΦRRNet =
NmNc
MTr
2δRR
(
hw + hw + hw − 2 + 2σ
)
. (3.56)
Binding update cost: For each CN communicating with an MH, the MH needs
to send a binding update after each handover. Therefore, the binding update cost
per second in the whole system can be calculated by multiplying the number of
MHs, the average number of communicating CNs per MH, and the average cost per
binding update as follows:
ΦBUNet = NmNc
2(hw − 1 + σ)δB
Tr
. (3.57)
Packet delivery cost: Similar to the analysis in [16], we have considered data
packet transmission cost while estimating the total cost on the whole system. HiSIGMA
is free of packet encapsulation or decapsulation. Packets from CN to MH follows
direct route with hw hops including one wireless hop. As the average session length
is α, and maximum transmission unit is κ, there are ⌈α
κ
⌉ number of packets, and the
packet rate can be obtained by ⌈α
κ
⌉×λs. The transmission cost for data packet and
corresponding acknowledgement are (δDP + δDA). Thus, the packet delivery cost of
the whole network can be expressed as:
ΦPDNet = NmNcλs
⌈α
κ
⌉
(δDP + δDA)(hw − 1 + σ). (3.58)
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Total cost of the network: The total cost on the network due to HiSIGMA
protocol can be obtained by adding Eqns. (3.52), (3.53), (3.54), (3.55), (3.56),
(3.57), and (3.58) as follows:
ΦNet = Φ
QR
Net +Φ
RG1
Net +Φ
RG2
Net +Φ
RB
Net +Φ
RR
Net +Φ
BU
Net +Φ
PD
Net. (3.59)
3.6 Cost Model for NEMO
In this section, we present the analytical cost model for NEMO and its mobility
entities: HA, MR and complete network. It can be noted that in a mobile network,
LMN, VMN and MRs are mobile nodes and MIPv6-capable. Thus, number of mobile
nodes inside the mobile network is sum of number of LMN, VMN and MRs.
3.6.1 Home Agent
In NEMO, the HA keeps the location database of the mobile network. In fact, the
location information of MR, LFNs and LMNs are kept in the HA whereas that of
VMNs are kept in corresponding HAs since they belong to some other networks.
The main tasks of HA are processing 1) query messages from CNs, 2) LU messages
from MRs, 3) RR test messages, 4) BU messages to CNs, and 5) data delivery cost.
Query message: Every CN send query message to the HA at the beginning of
every session. This requires a lookup at the HA which is proportional to the log-
arithm of the number of entries in the lookup table. So the lookup cost at HA is
ΨLKHA = ψ log2(Nf +Nm). In addition, transmission cost is incurred for query-reply
messages at the HA. Hence, the cost relating to query messages at HA is given by
the following equation:
ΛQRHA = Nc(Nm +Nf )λs
(
2δQ +Ψ
LK
HA
)
. (3.60)
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Location update messages: When the mobile network crosses subnets, MR
sends LU message to the HA and the location database is modified by the HA which
sends back acknowledgement to LU message. This happens in every Tr seconds. In
addition, MRs and mobile nodes send periodic refreshing updates to the HA so that
the entries are not removed from the the location database after the binding lifetime
and the total frequency of sending LU and refreshing LU is ηt =
(
1 +
⌊
Tr
Tlf
⌋)
/Tr,
Each LU and corresponding Acknowledgement messages exchanged with HA
incurs transmission and processing cost. The LU messages from mobile nodes go
through one level of encapsulation which cost additional transmission cost of δTH
and a processing cost of γt whereas the LU messages from the MR goes without
encapsulation. In both cases, a lookup cost of ΨLKHA is required. So the cost related
to the LU and refreshing LU messages can be computed as follows:
ΛLUHA = ηt
(
2δL +Ψ
LK
HA
)
+ ηr
(
2(δL + δTH + γt) + Ψ
LK
HA
)
. (3.61)
Return routability messages: NEMO employs RR test before sending BU to
the HA similar to the mechanism employed in route optimization of MIPv6 [17].
Before each BU message, RR messages are exchanged among the MR, HA and CN.
The HA receives the Home Test Init (HoTI) message sent by the MR and forwards
it to the CN. HA also receives the Home Test (HoT) message from the CN and
sends it back to MR. This happens for every Tr seconds. The HA receives these RR
messages for all CNs that are communicating with LMN. Therefore, the cost on HA
for RR messages is as follows:
ΛRRHA = Nc(Nm +Nf )
4δRR
Tr
. (3.62)
Binding updates to CNs: To continue ongoing sessions with the CNs, mobile
nodes inside the mobile network sends refreshing BUs to the CNs by tunneling them
through the HA. The HA has to lookup the table, tunnel and transmit those BUs.
Hence, cost incurred at the HA due to these BUs is given by,
ΛBUHA = 2Nc(Nm +Nf )ηr
(
δB + δTH + γt +Ψ
LK
HA
)
. (3.63)
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Data delivery cost: In NEMO BSP, all data traffic to the mobile network are
transmitted through the HA. In each session between the CN and MNN, an average
of ⌈α
κ
⌉ data packets are sent from the CN to MNN or vice versa. The successful
reception of each data packet is confirmed by a corresponding ACK packet from the
receiver. Therefore, the packet arrival rate is λp = λs⌈ακ ⌉. As all the data traffic goes
through the HA, it costs transmission cost data and ACK packets, extra IP-header
processing and transmission cost as well as lookup cost. Therefore, the data delivery
cost on the HA is given by,
ΛDDHA = Nc(Nm +Nf )λp
(
δDT + δDA + 2
(
δTH + γt +Ψ
LK
HA
))
. (3.64)
Total cost on HA: Thus, the total cost of the HA can be obtained by adding
Eqns. (3.60), (3.61), (3.62) (3.63), and (3.64):
ΛHA = Λ
QR
HA + Λ
LU
HA + Λ
RR
HA + Λ
BU
HA + Λ
DD
HA . (3.65)
3.6.2 Mobile Router
In NEMO, the main tasks of the MRs are 1) IP address and prefix acquisition, 2)
sending LU messages to HA, 3) sending binding updates to the CNs, 4)processing
RR messages, and 5) processing data (ACK) packets to and from MNNs,
Acquiring IP address and prefixes: MRs acquire IP address from access router
in the foreign network during each handoff by exchanging DHCPv6 request-reply
messages through the wireless media which costs the following:
ΛAcqMR =
2σδDH
Tr
. (3.66)
Location updates: After each handoff, each MR sends a LU message to the HA.
In addition, periodic refreshing updates are also sent by the MRs and the mobile
nodes through MR. Thus the cost on the MRs due to LU messages is as follows:
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ΛLUMR = 2σηtδL + 2ηrNm
(
σ(δL + δTH) + γt
)
. (3.67)
Binding updates to CNs: Mobile nodes send periodic refreshing BUs to the
CNs through the MR updating the current address to continue ongoing sessions.
This requires transmission of BU message through the wireless media with extra
IP-header (encapsulation), and processing cost due to tunneling. Thus, the cost on
the MRs for these BU messages is as follows:
ΛBUMR = 2ηrNc(Nm +Nf )
(
σ(δB + δTH) + γt
)
. (3.68)
Return routability messages: To ensure that the ongoing session is not hijacked
by some malicious agent, before sending binding updates to the HA, it is essential
to perform RR test to verify that the node can actually respond to packets sent to a
given CoA [17]. Thus, the MR have to process and transmit RR messages on behalf
of the mobile nodes under its domain which incurs the following cost:
ΛRRMR =
4σNmδRR
Tr
. (3.69)
Data delivery cost: Data packet delivery incurs transmission cost through the
wireless media (with extra IP-header), and processing cost for the MR. Therefore,
the data delivery cost at the MRs is given by,
ΛDDMR = λpNc(Nm +Nf )
(
σ(δDT + δDA + δTH) + γt
)
. (3.70)
Total cost on the MR: Therefore, total cost of each MR can be obtained by
adding Eqns. (3.66), (3.67), (3.68), (3.69), and (3.70),
ΛMR = Λ
Acq
MR + Λ
LU
MR + Λ
BU
MR + Λ
RR
MR + Λ
DD
MR. (3.71)
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3.6.3 Complete network
In order to compute the signaling load on the network as a whole, we consider all
the resources (such as, bandwidth, processing power, etc.) consumed in all network
entities. The cost of the network due to the operation of NEMO BSP include query
messages exchanged between HA and CN, RR messages, location update messages,
binding updates to CNs, and data delivery to CN.
Query message: At the beginning of each session between a MNN and a CN,
query messages are exchanged between CN and HA. As the session arrival rates for
each MNN are assumed to be equal (λs), the transmission cost for all the query and
reply messages towards the HA is 2Nc(Nm+Nf)(hp+hin+hp)δQλs. Let us assume hw
( = hp+hin+hp ). The searching cost in the HA is Nc(Nm+Nf)ψλs log2(Nm+Nf).
Hence, the cost of the network for the query messages from the CNs is,
ΛQRNet = λsNc(Nm +Nf )
(
2hwδQ + ψ log2(Nm +Nf )
)
. (3.72)
Return routability messages: The RR messages are sent every Tr second by
the MRs (on behalf of the MNNs) to HA which forwards them to CN. The HoTI
message follow the path between MR and HA which consists of hw wired hops with
one wireless hop (between the MR and the AR). The path between HA and CN
contains hw wired hops. Similar cost is incurred for each HoT message. Each CoTI
message is sent directly to CN from the MR which uses hw wired hops and one
wireless hop. Therefore, cost on the network for RR messages is as follows:
ΛRRNet =
Nc(Nm +Nf )
Tr
× 2δrr
(
(hw + σ) + hw + (hw + σ)
)
. (3.73)
Location updates: After each handoff, the MRs and the mobile nodes send LU
to the HA informing the newly acquired IP address and prefixes. As the HA is
(hw + 1) hops (including hp wireless hop) away from the MR, each LU from MR
(and corresponding Ack) message incurs a transmission cost of δL(hw + σ), and a
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lookup cost of ΨLKHA at the HA. The LU messages from LMNs (or VMNs) travel
one more wireless hop than the MR with additional transmission cost for tunneling
header and corresponding processing cost. Thus, the cost of LU messages on the
network is given by,
ΛLUNet = 2δLηt(hw + σ) + 2Nmηr
(
(δL + δTH)(hw + 2σ) + γt
)
+ (ηt + ηrNm)Ψ
LK
HA.
(3.74)
Binding updates to CNs: To maintain continuous connectivity with the CNs
that are communicating with the mobile nodes, binding updates informing the care-
of-address are sent to the CNs. These BU messages goes through and hw wired hops
and two wireless hop, on the average, to reach a CN. Thus, cost required to send
BUs to CNs is given by,
ΛBUNet = 2Nc(Nm +Nf )ηr
(
(hw + 2σ)(δB + δTH) + γt
)
. (3.75)
Data delivery cost: All the data and corresponding Ack) packets, that is, goes
through HA. The path between a MNN and the HA contains hw wired links and
2 wireless links whereas the path between HA and CN contains hw wired links. In
addition, data packets incur table lookup in the HA. Thus, the costs related to data
delivery and processing by the network are given by
ΛDDNet = λpNc(Nm +Nf )
((
(hw + 2σ) + hw
)
(δDT + δDA + 2δTH) + 2γt + 2Ψ
LK
HA
)
.(3.76)
Total cost of the network: Therefore, the total cost of the complete network due
to NEMO protocol can be obtained by adding Eqns. (3.72), (3.73), (3.74), (3.75),
and (3.76):
ΛNet = Λ
QR
Net + Λ
RR
Net + Λ
LU
Net + Λ
BU
Net + Λ
DD
Net. (3.77)
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3.7 Cost Model for SINEMO
In this section, we perform an entity-wise cost analysis of SINEMO protocol. We
have chosen CLM and MR, the two crucial entities of SINEMO. This is because CLM
is involved in every session between a CN and a MNN, and all communications with
the mobile network are carried out through the MR.
3.7.1 Central Location Manager
The CLM is an important mobility management entity for SINEMO as it is respon-
sible for recording up-to-date location information of the mobile network. The total
cost on the CLM should be excessive which may result in unavailability of several
MNNs or the whole network.
In SINEMO, the CLM keeps the location database of the mobile network and
has the tasks of 1) processing LU messages from MRs, 2) processing query messages
from CNs, 3) searching the location database, 4) processing refreshing BU messages
and 5) processing RR messages.
Query message: At the beginning of every session between CNs and MNNs,
query (and corresponding reply) messages exchanged between CLM and the CNs.
This incurs transmission cost of 2NcδQλs. In addition, a table lookup at CLM is
required that is proportional to the logarithm of the number of MNNs, that is,
log2(Nm +Nf ). Therefore, cost on CLM for query message is as follows:
∆QRCLM = 2Nc(Nm +Nf )δQλs +Ncψλs log2(Nm +Nf). (3.78)
Return routability messages: We assume that SINEMO employs RR test to
prevent session hijacking similar to the mechanism employed in route optimization
of MIPv6 [17]. This test verifies that the node (sending BU) can actually respond to
packets sent to a given CoA. Before each BU message, RR messages are exchanged
among the MR, CLM and CN. The CLM receives the Home Test Init (HoTI) message
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sent by the MR and forwards it to the CN. CLM also receives the Home Test (HoT)
message from the CN and sends it back to MR. This happens for every Tr seconds
and for every MH-CN pair under the MN. Therefore, cost on CLM for RR messages
can be obtained as follows:
∆RRCLM = Nc(Nm +Nf)
4δRR
Tr
. (3.79)
Location update messages: When MN crosses subnets, MR acquires new IP
address from the foreign network and notifies the CLM using LU message. The LU
contains the new address of the LLM and the public addresses of the MHs inside
the MR’s domain. The MR sends such aggregated LU to the CLM requiring a
transmission cost of δAL and the CLM sends back the acknowledgement requiring a
transmission cost of δL. The CLM has to process the LU message and update the
location database of all the nodes inside the MN. Thus, the cost (transmission and
processing) on the CLM due to the LU messages is given by,
∆LUCLM =
(δAL + δL) + βCLM
Tr
. (3.80)
Refreshing update messages: During the subnet residence time, the MR sends
refreshing BU to the CLM and all the CNs so that the binding entry is not expired.
Thus, the cost of CLM is as follows:
∆RBUCLM = ηr(δAL + δL). (3.81)
Total cost on the CLM: Thus, the total cost of the CLM can be obtained by
adding Eqns. (3.78), (3.79) (3.80), and (3.81):
∆CLM = ∆
QR
CLM +∆
RR
CLM +∆
LU
CLM +∆
RBU
CLM . (3.82)
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3.7.2 Mobile Router
In a mobile network, the MR is the default gateway of all the MNNs. All the essential
mobility management signaling go through this entity. Therefore, we evaluate the
total cost incurred at the MR.
In SINEMO, the main tasks of each MR are 1) IP address and prefix acquisition,
2) updating the public IP addresses in the Network Address Translation (NAT)
table, 3) sending updates to the CNs, 4) sending LUs to the CLM, 5) registration of
MHs, 6) sending refreshing BU messages, 7) processing data (ACK) packets to and
from MNNs, and 8) processing RR messages.
Acquiring IP address and prefixes: The MR acquire IP addresses and prefixes
from the AR in the foreign network during each handoff by exchanging DHCPv6
request-reply messages through the wireless media. After acquiring the IP addresses
for the nodes inside the MN, MR reserves public IP addresses for the MNNs and
modifies the NAT table whose size is proportional to (Nm +Nf ). Since each entry
of the NAT table will be updated after each handoff, the cost is proportional to
(Nm +Nf) log2(Nm +Nf). Therefore,
∆AcqMR =
2σδDH + ψ(Nm +Nf ) log2(Nm +Nf )
Tr
. (3.83)
Return routability messages: To prevent session hijacking RR messages are
exchanged through MR. The cost on the MR associated with the RR message can
be obtained as follows:
∆RRMR =
4σ(Nm +Nf )NcδRR
Tr
. (3.84)
Updating sessions table and sending BU to CNs: To maintain continuous
connectivity with the CNs that are communicating with the MNNs, the MR keeps a
table known as Sessions table that records the CN-MNN pair of the ongoing sessions.
Each entry of the sessions table is a triple with CN’s IP address, MNN’s current
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public address and MNN’s private IP-address. After acquiring the IP address and
prefixes at each handoff, the MR uses the newly assigned public addresses (to the
MNNs in the NAT table) to modify the session table of size proportional to number
of sessions. If we assume, each CN has one ongoing session with a MNN, then number
of sessions is equal to Nc(Nm + Nf). Thus updating the session table have a cost
proportional to Nc(Nm + Nf) log2Nc(Nm + Nf )
)
. In addition, the MR sends BUs
to (and receive binding acknowledgement from) the CNs and the transmission cost
associated with these BUs is 2σδBNc in every handoff. Therefore, the cost on the
MR regarding the update of the session table and transmission of the BU messages
is given as:
∆BUMR =
Nc(Nm +Nf ) log2Nc(Nm +Nf) + 2σδBNc(Nm +Nf)
Tr
. (3.85)
Location updates to CLM: After each handoff, the MR sends LU to CLM
informing newly acquired IP address and prefixes. This is done by using one LU
message containing the domain name (identification) and Care of Address (CoA)
tuples of the MR as well as all the MNNs under its domain. Thus, the cost of the
MR to transmit such LU message is as follows:
∆LUMR =
σ(δAL + δL)
Tr
. (3.86)
Refreshing update messages: MR sends refreshing BU to the CLM and the
CNs with a frequency of ηr which costs the following for the MR:
∆RBUMR = σηr(δAL + δL)
(
1 +Nc(Nm +Nf )
)
. (3.87)
Data delivery cost: In every CN-MNN session, ⌈α
κ
⌉ data packets are sent along
with corresponding ACK. Total data/Ack packet arrival rate to a MR is λp = λs⌈ακ ⌉.
Each data packet arriving from the CN is intercepted by MR which modifies the des-
tination address by private IP address searching the NAT table of size proportional
to (Nm+Nf). The opposite is done for reverse path, that is, private IP is replaced by
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public IP address looking up the NAT table. Moreover, transmission cost is incurred
through the wireless media. Therefore, data delivery cost at the MR is given by,
∆DDMR = λpNc(Nm +Nf )
(
ψ log2(Nm +Nf) + σ(δDP + δDA)
)
. (3.88)
Total cost on the MR: Therefore, the total cost of the MR can be obtained by
adding Eqns. (3.83) through (3.88):
∆MR = ∆
Acq
MR +∆
RR
MR +∆
BU
MR +∆
LU
MR +∆
RBU
MR +∆
DD
MR. (3.89)
3.7.3 Complete network
In order to compute the total cost of the network as a whole, we consider all the
resources (such as, bandwidth, processing power etc) consumed in all network enti-
ties. This includes cost incurred for query messages exchanged between CLM and
CN, local registration of MHs, RR messages, LU messages, BUs to CNs, and data
delivery cost.
Query message: At the beginning of each session, query messages are exchanged
between CN and CLM which incurs transmission and lookup costs. The CN and
CLM are hw ( = hp+hin+hp ) wired hops away. Therefore, the transmission costs for
the query-reply messages between CN and CLM are Nc(Nm+Nf )(2hwδQ)λs whereas
the lookup cost in the CLM is Nc(Nm +Nf )ψλs log2(Nm +Nf ). Hence, the cost of
the network for the query messages from the CNs is,
∆QRNet = 2λsNc(Nm +Nf )hwδQ + ψλsNc(Nm +Nf) log2(Nm +Nf). (3.90)
NAT translation: In a foreign network, the MR acquires IP address for the MNNs
and reserves public IP addresses for the MNNs and modifies the NAT table whose
size is proportional to (Nm +Nf). This happens at every handoff. Therefore,
∆NATNet =
ψ(Nm +Nf ) log2(Nm +Nf )
Tr
. (3.91)
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Return routability messages: The RR messages are sent every Tr second by
the MRs to CLM which forwards them to CN. Each HoTI and HoT messages follow
a path of hw wired hops and one wireless hop between MR and CLM whereas the
path between CLM and CN contains hw wired hops. Similar cost is incurred for
each HoT message. Each CoTI message is sent directly to CN from the MR which
contains hw wired hops and one wireless hop. Therefore, cost for RR messages is as
follows:
∆RRNet =
Nc(Nm +Nf)
Tr
× 2δRR
(
(hw + σ) + hw + (hw + σ)
)
= 2Nc(Nm +Nf)δRR(3hw + 2σ)/Tr.
(3.92)
Location updates: After each handoff, the MR send LUs to the CLM informing
the newly acquired IP address and prefixes. As the CLM is hw wired hops and one
wireless hop away from the MR, each LU and corresponding ACK message incurs a
transmission cost of (δAL + δL)(hp + hin + hp + σ), and a processing cost βCLM at
the CLM. Thus, the cost of the network for LU message is given by,
∆LUNet =
(δAL + δL)(hw + σ) + βCLM
Tr
. (3.93)
Binding updates to CNs: To maintain continuous connectivity with the CNs
that are communicating with the MNNs, BUs informing the newly assigned IP ad-
dress are sent to the CNs by the MRs. BUs by the MR go through one wireless
hop, and hw wired hops to reach a CN. In addition, processing cost of Nc(Nm +
Nf) log2Nc(Nm+Nf) are incurred at the MR. Moreover, the MR sends ηr (= ⌊ TrTlf ⌋)
refreshing BUs to CLM and all CNs in every Tr. Thus, cost for BUs and refreshing
BUs to CNs is given by,
∆BUNet =
1
Tr
×
(
2δBNc(Nm +Nf)(hw + σ) +Nc(Nm +Nf) log2Nc(Nm +Nf )
)
+
ηr
Tr
×
(
(σ + hw)(δAL + δL + 2Nc(Nm +Nf )δB
)
.
(3.94)
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Data delivery cost: In SINEMO, CN sends every data packet to MNN using
direct route unlike NEMO. The data and ack packets travel directly through hw
wired and one wireless hops to reach the MR which updates destination address and
forward it to MNN. Thus, the data delivery cost is as follows:
∆DDNet = Nc(Nm +Nf)λp
(
ψ log2(Nm +Nf) + (hw + σ)(δDP + δDA)
)
. (3.95)
Total cost on the network: Therefore, total cost on complete network due to
SINEMO protocol can be obtained by adding Eqns. (3.90), (3.91), (3.92), (3.93),
(3.94) and (3.95):
∆Net = ∆
QR
Net +∆
NAT
Net +∆
RR
Net +∆
LU
Net +∆
BU
Net +∆
DD
Net. (3.96)
3.8 Performance Metrics
Since no performance metrics of mobility protocols exists in terms of signaling costs,
we define two performance metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the protocols.
They are normalized signaling overhead and efficiency.
3.8.1 Normalized overhead of an entity
Normalized overhead of any mobility entity can be defined as the percentage over-
head per unit (net) data transmission cost. This can be computed by the ratio of
total cost of any entity per unit data transmission cost.
The net data delivery cost does not include overhead and can be computed as follows:
ΨNet−DD = NmNcλs
⌈α
κ
⌉(
δDP + δDA
)
. (3.97)
Therefore, normalized overhead of a mobility entity can be computed by dividing
its total cost with ΨNet−DD.
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3.8.2 Efficiency of mobility protocols
We define another performance metric to evaluate the efficacy of mobility protocols
in terms of signaling costs as there exists no such metric. Efficiency of a mobility
protocol is defined as the ratio of data delivery cost (when an optimal route is used)
to the total cost (that includes signaling and data delivery costs) required for the
mobility protocol.
3.8.2.1 Host mobility protocols
For the host-mobility protocols, the net data delivery cost of the network is as
follows:
ΨHostNet−DD = NmNcλs
⌈α
κ
⌉
(δDP + δDA)(hw − 1 + σ). (3.98)
Therefore, the efficiency of a host protocol can be obtained by dividing ΨHostNet−DD
with the total cost of the whole system. For example, the efficiency of HMIPv6
protocol can be computed as follows:
ηHMIPv6 =
ΨHostNet−DD
ΥNet
. (3.99)
3.8.2.2 Network mobility protocols
The net data delivery cost of NEMO/SINEMO can be obtained as follows:
ΨNetworkNet−DD = (Nm +Nf )Ncλs
⌈α
κ
⌉(
δDP + δDA
)
(hw + 2σ). (3.100)
Hence, efficiency of a network mobility can be computed by dividing ΨNetworkNet−DD
with the total cost of the whole system. For example, the efficiency of SINEMO
protocol can be computed as follows:
ηSINEMO =
ΨNetworkNet−DD
∆Net
. (3.101)
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Table 3.1: Values of parameters used in the numerical analysis.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Nm 400 Nc 5
Nf 100 k 12
x 51 y 34
δL 0.6 δB 0.6
δQ 0.6 δR 1.4
δDP 5.72 δDA 0.6
δRR 0.6 δR 0.6
σ 10 ψ 0.3
ξ 0.4 δTH 0.4
Tr 70 sec Tbe 90 sec
α 10240 bits κ 512 bits
hin 10 hp 2
λs 0.01 c 10
βCLM 0.3 βAR 0.30
βCN 0.3 βHA 0.30
βMH 0.3 βMR 0.30
βAZS 0.3 βHZS 0.30
βMAP 0.3 βLM 0.30
3.9 Results
In this section, we present numerical results demonstrating the impact of network
size, mobility rate, traffic rate and data volume on the total cost of host and net-
work mobility protocols and its entities, along with the comparison between their
efficiencies and normalized overhead.
The parameter values used in numerical analysis are derived using approaches
similar to those used in [10, 15, 16]; each cost metric is a relative quantity and is
based on the specific packet size (unit cost for 100 bytes [15, 16]). For example, if a
signaling packet is 60 bytes long, the corresponding transmission cost is 0.6.
The values of parameters are listed in Table 3.1. In order to obtain the general
trend/impact of different network parameters, we have varied their values in a wide
range. For example, we varied number of MHs between 200 to 700; number of CNs
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per MH between 1 to 10; session arrival rate between 0.01 to 0.1; average session
size between 10 Kb to 100 Kb; Session to Mobility Ratio (SMR) between 0.50 to 4
(SMR is defined as Tr × λs).
3.9.1 HMIPv6 vs. SIGMA
First, we compare the total cost, normalized overhead and efficiency of SIGMA with
that of HMIPv6.
3.9.1.1 LM vs. HA
Fig. 3.3 shows the total cost of LM (SIGMA) and HA (HMIPv6) as a function of
number of MHs for different subnet residence times. Total cost of HA increases a
much higher rate than that of LM since HA is heavily involved in data transmission
unlike LM (of SIGMA). In SIGMA, the location management and data delivery are
decoupled from each other, thereby reducing total cost on its key mobility entity
(LM).
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Figure 3.3: Impact of number of MHs
on total cost of HA (HMIPv6) and LM
(SIGMA).
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Figure 3.4: Normalized overhead of
the HA (HMIPv6) and LM (SIGMA)
vs. number of MHs.
Figure 3.4 shows the impact of number of MHs on the normalized overhead of LM
(SIGMA) and HA (HMIPv6). Again, we find that the normalized overhead of HA is
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much higher than that of LM due to the involvement of HA in the data transmission
process. The overhead decreases with the increase of subnet residence times since
higher Tr value implies less mobility rate, and this reduces various signaling traffic,
such as, location updates, binding updates, etc.
Figure 3.5 shows the total cost of LM (SIGMA) and HA (HMIPv6) as a function
of SMR for different session lengths. Total cost remains almost constant (actually
decreases very slowly) with the increase of SMR. Increase of SMR (meaning slow
mobility of mobile node) decreases the mobility signaling cost due to less number
of subnet crossing. However, for all different session lengths, the total cost of HA is
much higher than that of LM.
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Figure 3.5: Impact of SMR on to-
tal cost of HA (HMIPv6) and LM
(SIGMA).
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Figure 3.6: Normalized overhead of
the HA (HMIPv6) and LM (SIGMA)
vs. SMR.
Figure 3.6 shows the percentage normalized overhead of LM (SIGMA) and HA
(HMIPv6) with respect to SMR for different session lengths. The normalized over-
head of HA is much higher than that of LM. This is because the HA is directly
involved in packet tunneling while the LM is not. The direct involvement in data
delivery increases extra overhead on the HA, resulting in higher normalized overhead
of HA.
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3.9.1.2 Complete network
Fig 3.7 shows the total cost of SIGMA and HMIPv6 protocol as a function of number
of MHs for different number of Internet hops. It is found the total cost incurred for
SIGMA protocol is much less than HMIPv6 protocol. This is because of the sub-
optimal routing of data packets and use of bidirectional tunnels in HMIPv6 protocol.
Figure 3.8 shows the efficiency of SIGMA and HMIPv6 protocol with respect
to number of CNs for different session lengths. It is found that the efficiency of
SIGMA is much higher than that of HMIPv6 protocol. This is because the total
cost of SIGMA is much less than that of HMIPv6. SIGMA uses direct route between
the MH and the CN whereas HMIPv6 uses sub-optimal routing through the HA,
resulting in its higher total cost of the system, thereby reducing the overall efficiency.
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3.9.1.3 Discussion
In this subsection, we find that the total costs and the normalized overhead of
mobility management entities of SIGMA are significantly less than that of HMIPv6
whereas the efficiency of SIGMA is much higher than HMIPv6. SIGMA protocol
benefits from exploitation of the direct route between the communication nodes
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which is not the case in HMIPv6. Moreover, the LM is not at all involved in data
forwarding task in SIGMA; this relieves LM from extra overhead, unlike HMIPv6.
3.9.2 HMIPv6 vs. HiSIGMA
In this subsection, we compare the total cost, efficiency and normalized overhead
of mobility management entities of HMIPv6 and HiSIGMA. The AZS and HZS of
HiSIGMA correspond to the MAP and HA of HMIPv6, respectively.
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3.9.2.1 AZS vs. MAP
Figure 3.9 shows the impact of subnet residence time (Tr) on the total cost of each
AZS (HiSIGMA) and MAP (HMIPv6). The total cost on each AZS is found to be
much less than that for each MAP. This is because data transmission in HiSIGMA
is decoupled from hierarchical location management and there is no tunneling or
encapsulation of data packets through the AZS in HiSIGMA (unlike HMIPv6). From
Fig. 3.9, we also find that total cost reduces for higher values of Tr which implies
slower speed of MHs. Slow speed of MHs causes less number of handoffs, thereby
reducing signaling costs, e.g., registration, BU, RR costs.
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In Fig. 3.10, the total costs of each AZS and MAP are shown as functions of
number of CNs. Higher number of CNs generates more traffic, thereby increasing
the load on the MAP, unlike for AZS which does not deal with data traffic. Hence,
the cost for AZS is very low compared to MAP.
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Figure 3.11: Impact of SMR on
total cost of HZS (HiSIGMA) and
HA (HMIPv6) for different session
lengths.
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Figure 3.12: Impact of number of CNs
on total cost of HZS (HiSIGMA) and
HA (HMIPv6) for different session ar-
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3.9.2.2 HZS vs. HA
The impact of SMR on total cost of HZS (HiSIGMA) and HA (HMIPv6) is shown
in Fig. 3.11 for different session lengths. We kept λs fixed at 0.01 while varying Tr
between 50 and 400 sec, which yields a SMR in the range 0.50 - 4. Higher session
lengths produces more data; hence, data delivery cost increases compared to the
signaling traffic. This increases the total cost of HA. However, the total cost of HZS
is not affected much by higher session length since HZS has nothing to do with data
packets in HiSIGMA.
Figure 3.12 shows the impact of number of CNs on the total cost of HZS (HiSIGMA)
and the HA (HMIPv6) for different session arrival rates. Again, the total cost of HA
is much higher than that of HZS due to the tunneling/encapsulation of data packets
between MH-CN pairs unlike in HiSIGMA. However, the total cost of HZS slowly
64
increases for higher values of Nc due to higher signaling costs, e.g., query-lookup,
registration and RR cost.
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Figure 3.13: Total cost on the network
as functions of number of MHs.
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Figure 3.14: Efficiency of the whole
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3.9.2.3 Complete network
Figure 3.13 shows the impact of number of MHs on the total cost of the complete
system of HiSIGMA and HMIPv6 for varying session lengths. Higher number of
MHs increases the total cost in all cases. However, the rate of increase is much
higher for HMIPv6 protocol due to additional overhead of packet tunneling through
the HA, and use of non-optimal route between MH-CN pairs.
Figure 3.14 shows the impact of number of CNs and session arrival rate on the
efficiency of HiSIGMA and HMIPv6 protocols. It is found that HiSIGMA exhibits
much higher efficiency than HMIPv6. Moreover, higher value of λs causes more data
traffic into the system, thereby raising the efficiency values of both protocols.
Figure 3.15 shows the impact of number of MHs and subnet residence times on
the efficiency of HiSIGMA and HMIPv6 protocols. Again, the efficiency of HiSIGMA
is found to be much higher than HMIPv6 due to the fact that signaling overhead
(including tunneling) is large in HMIPv6. In addition, efficiency for smaller subnet
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Figure 3.16: Percentage overhead of
the whole system vs. SMR.
residence times are found to be less because smaller value of Tr (implies higher MH
speed) produces more signaling traffic, such as, BU, RR and registration messages.
Finally, Fig. 3.16 shows the impact of SMR on the percentage overhead on the
whole system per unit data traffic of HiSIGMA and HMIPv6 protocols. The over-
head on HMIPv6 system is found to be much higher than HiSIGMA due to the use
of suboptimal path and tunneling.
3.9.2.4 Discussion
In summary, we find that the total costs of mobility management entities of HiSIGMA
are much less than that of HA and MAP (HMIPv6), respectively. This is be-
cause data transmission and location management are decoupled in HiSIGMA unlike
HMIPv6. In addition, the efficiency of HiSIGMA is much higher than HMIPv6 since
HiSIGMA lacks any encapsulation and tunneling of data packets and uses direct
route between MH and CN.
3.9.3 NEMO vs. SINEMO
In this subsection, we compare SINEMO with NEMO entities with respect to their
total cost, normalized overhead and efficiency of protocol operations.
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Figure 3.17: Impact of number of mobile hosts on the total cost of the HA and CLM
for different subnet residence times.
3.9.3.1 CLM vs. HA
We compare NEMO’s HA with SINEMO’s CLM in Fig. 3.17 as their tasks are
similar. The cost of NEMO’s HA is found to be much higher than that of SINEMO’s
CLM as the first data packets of each session are routed through HA-MR. Total costs
of HA-MR and CLM increase for higher number of MHs. However, in terms of Tr,
total cost of CLM and HA-MR behave just opposite. For NEMO, when Tr increases,
refreshing binding cost increases, although costs related to handoff reduces due to
lower handoff frequency. Other costs (query and data delivery) remain unchanged.
The net result is the increase of total cost. For SINEMO, the effect of refreshing
BUs are much less than that related to handoff costs, thereby producing reduced
total cost.
3.9.3.2 MR
In Fig. 3.18, the total cost of each MR is shown for varying number of mobile hosts
and LFNs. Increase in LFNs results in constant shifting of the total cost graph
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due to the increase in query message cost and data delivery cost. Again, cost for
SINEMO is found to be less than NEMO.
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In Fig. 3.19, the total costs of each MR (for NEMO and SINEMO) are shown
as a function of Session to Mobility Ratio (SMR) which is defined as λs × Tr. We
keep λs constant while varying the value of Tr between 50 to 400 sec.The session
lengths are also varied. Higher session length causes more data packets to be routed
through each MR, resulting in higher cost. The total cost is found to be invariant
of SMR due to the dominance of data delivery cost while NEMO having higher cost
than SINEMO in each case.
3.9.3.3 Complete network
The total cost of the complete network is shown as a function of number of mobile
hosts in Fig. 3.20. Increased number of mobile hosts sends higher number of location
and binding updates; in addition, query for the mobile hosts also increases for higher
number of mobile hosts in the MN. The total cost is shown for different number of
hops (hin) in the Internet.The slope of the total cost rises for higher values of hin
since its value influences all the costs of the network.
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In Fig. 3.21, total cost of the network is shown as a function of SMR for different
session length. It is found that the total cost does not vary much (around 1%)
with respect to SMR. This implies that data delivery cost (through optimized and
unoptimized route) dominates the total cost.
3.9.3.4 Efficiency
In Fig. 3.22, efficiencies of NEMO and SINEMO protocols are shown for varying
number of MHs and for different subnet residence times. Efficiency of SINEMO is
found to be higher than that of NEMO, as SINEMO uses direct route to send/receive
data packets between MNNs and CNs. Efficiency of each protocol increases for higher
subnet residence times as the costs related to mobility signaling reduces due to fewer
number of handoffs.
Figure 3.23 shows the efficiencies of NEMO and SINEMO for various SMRs and
different session lengths. Efficiencies of both protocols increase for increased session
lengths since the ratio of signaling traffic to data traffic becomes smaller. However,
SINEMO shows a higher efficiency than NEMO irrespective of session lengths.
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3.9.3.5 Discussion
From Figs. 3.17, 3.18, 3.19, 3.20, and 3.21, we find that the total cost on various
entities of SINEMO is much less than that of NEMO since SINEMO uses optimal
route between mobile network and an arbitrary node in the Internet. Moreover,
SINEMO has higher efficiency than NEMO (see Figs. 3.22 and 3.23) irrespective of
session lengths, number of hosts and subnet residence time of the mobile network.
3.10 Summary
In this chapter, we have developed comprehensive cost analysis models to estimate
total costs and efficiencies of different host and network mobility protocols and their
key entities. Moreover, we have defined two novel metrics, namely normalized over-
head and efficiency, to compare the performance of the mobility protocols and its
entities. Our results show that the SIGMA (and SINEMO) incur much lower over-
head on its key entities and yield higher efficiency than HMIPv6 (and NEMO)
irrespective of session lengths, network size and mobility rate. Our comprehensive
cost model can be used as a framework for estimating total cost of key mobility
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management entities of other handover protocols, and can aid in decision making to
choose the most efficient protocol for future all-IP mobile and wireless networks. In
the next chapter, we focus on the quantitative scalability analysis of the host and
network mobility protocols based on the cost analysis presented in this chapter.
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Chapter 4
Scalability Analysis of Mobility Protocols
With the rapid growth and popularity of mobile devices, increasingly larger num-
ber of IP-enabled mobile devices now require mobility support to gain ubiquitous
Internet access, thereby putting enormous load on the mobility management enti-
ties. This may lead to serious consequences, specially for critical applications, such
as in-flight communications for air traffic signaling in commercial aircrafts or in a
battlefield where continuous connectivity with peers is very crucial. Therefore, it
is essential to choose a mobility protocol that is scalable with the future growth of
networks and user demands. In this chapter, we focus on the scalability analysis of
different IP-mobility protocols. Based on the cost models presented in the previ-
ous Chapter 3, we perform scalability analysis of the mobility protocols (HMIPv6,
SIGMA, NEMO and SINEMO) with respect to network size, mobility rate, and
traffic rate.
4.1 Introduction
Increased number of mobile devices have significantly raised the amount of load on
mobility management entities of a network. These mobility management entities
were not initially designed to absorb such enormous load. Therefore, it is crucial
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to perform scalability analysis of mobility protocols to know whether these proto-
cols can function properly with respect to the future growth of networks and user
demands.
A number of researches on scalability analysis of networking protocols can be
found in the literature. Santivanez et al. [19] present a novel framework to study the
scalability of routing algorithms in ad hoc networks. This framework has been used
in [20] and [21] for the scalability analysis of mobile ad hoc network and wireless
sensor network, respectively. In our work, we use the notion of scalability factors
from [19] since it is an excellent framework for quantitative scalability analysis.
A few simulation and testbed-based scalability analysis [22, 23] on IP-mobility
protocols have also been performed. Gwon et al. [22] present an analysis on scala-
bility and robustness of Mobile IPv6 [17] and related protocols using a large-scale
simulation. Hautala et al. [23] present a study on the scalability of Mobile IPv6 in
a wireless LAN laboratory testbed where multiple users hand over simultaneously.
However, simulation-based works only focus on a particular scenario being simulated
for a given set of system parameters. In contrast, analytical models represent gen-
eral scenarios which provide better insights into the behavior of the system being
analyzed.
The author is not aware of any research work that quantitatively analyzes the
scalability of the mobility protocols which is required to visualize the effects of future
network expansion on the performance of the protocols. This work is believed to
be the first such work. This work will help in finding out the impact of network
parameters on mobility management entities.
The objective of the work presented in this chapter is to perform a comprehen-
sive scalability analysis of the host and network mobility management entities (of
HMIPv6, SIGMA, NEMO and SINEMO) based on the mobility signaling overhead
and to determine the influence of network size, mobility rate, traffic rate and data
volume on them.
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We have chosen HMIPv6 in our analysis (to compare it with our lab-proposed
SIGMA protocol) as HMIPv6 is designed to reduce the signaling cost of the base
MIPv6, and it has the lowest signaling cost in all versions of MIPv6 enhancements [5].
On the other hand, NEMO was chosen since it is the (IETF-proposed) base network
mobility protocol and we want to show the scalability feature of SINEMO with
respect to NEMO.
The contributions of the work presented in this chapter is to develop analyti-
cal models for the entity-wise scalability analysis of various mobility management
entities of HMIPv6, SIGMA, NEMO and SINEMO with respect to network size,
mobility rate and traffic rate.
Our results show that the host mobility protocols (HMIPv6 and SIGMA) and
network mobility protocols (NEMO and SINEMO) have asymptotically identical
scalability feature as far as the complete system is concerned though some of mobility
entities exhibit differences in terms of scalability feature.
Our comprehensive scalability model can be used as a framework to perform
quantitative scalability analysis of different mobility and handover protocols, and
can aid in decision making to choose the most efficient and scalable protocol for
future all-IP mobile and wireless networks. This can also help in visualizing the
effects of future network expansion on the performance of the mobility protocols.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we define scalabil-
ity of mobility protocols along with the assumptions, notations and the scalability
parameters of the model. The scalability models of HMIPv6, SIGMA, NEMO and
SINEMO entities are presented in Section 4.3, followed by the results in Section 4.4.
Section 4.5 has the concluding remarks.
4.2 Modeling Preparation
The definition of scalability for mobility protocols, scalability parameters and nota-
tions are explained in the following subsections.
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4.2.1 Definition of Scalability
Santivanez et al. [19] presented a novel framework to study the scalability of routing
algorithms in ad hoc networks. The same framework has been used in [20] and [21]
to analyze the effect of several factors on the scalability of MANETs and wireless
sensor network. We use this notion of scalability (from [19]) since it is an excellent
framework for asymptotic scalability analysis which is also used in [20] and [21].
According to Santivanez et al. [19], scalability is the ability of a network to
support the increase of its limiting parameters without degrading the network per-
formance. Mobility protocol’s scalability can thus be defined as the ability to sup-
port continuous increase of different (network) parameter values without degrading
the performance of various entities that are responsible for mobility management.
Examples of such limiting parameters are network size, mobility rate, traffic rate,
etc.
Let ΓX(λ1, λ2, . . . ) be the total overhead/cost induced by mobility protocol X ,
dependent on parameters λ1, λ2, . . . (such as network size, mobility rate and traffic
rate). Therefore, the protocol X ’s Mobility Scalability Factor (MSF) with respect
to a parameter λi is defined as follows:
ρXλi = limλi→∞
log ΓX(λ1, λ2, ...)
log λi
. (4.1)
Protocol X is said to be more scalable than protocol Y with respect to parameter
λi if ρ
X
λi
≤ ρYλi .
4.2.2 Assumptions
Following are the assumptions of the scalability model:
• For mobility scalability factor computation, increase of a scalability parameter
does not impact other system parameters.
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• Similar mobility model and network topology are assumed for the two proto-
cols.
• All mobile hosts are identical and uniform.
• Uniform distribution of mobile hosts over the region of the network.
• Session arrival rate for each mobile host is equal.
• The data (file) size in each session is equal.
• We consider costs on various entities considering only one mobile network (in
case of network mobility protocols).
The above assumptions are made for all the mobility protocols so that they can
be compared easily. Moreover, the scalability factor computation requires scalability
parameters to be independent of one another.
4.2.3 Notations
For the scalability analysis, we use all the notations defined in Section 3.2.2. The
scalability models are based on the cost analysis models presented in Chapter 3. We
use the following notation to denote mobility scalability factor:
ρXλ Scalability factor of Protocol X with respect to parameter λ.
4.2.4 Scalability parameters
For scalability analysis, we have chosen some parameters that represent network
size, mobility rate, traffic rate and data volume. These parameters are mutually
exclusive in a sense such that the value of one of the parameters can be increased
independently while keeping others constant.
For the scalability analysis of host mobility protocols, we focus on the following
network parameters:
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• Network size which is represented by the number of mobile hosts (Nm) and
the number of CNs per MH (Nc).
• Speed of the mobile host (V )
• Traffic rate which is represented by session arrival rate (λs)
• Data volume which is represented by session length (α)
For the scalability analysis of network mobility protocols, we focus on the following
network parameters:
• Network size which is represented by the number of mobile hosts (Nm), number
of LFNs (Nf) and and number of CNs per MNN (Nc)
• Speed of the mobile network (V ) which is inversely proportional to subnet
residence time (Tr)
• Traffic rate which is represented by packet arrival rate (λp)
4.3 Scalability Analysis
In this section, we perform the scalability analysis of SIGMA, HMIPv6, NEMO and
SINEMO.
4.3.1 SIGMA
We derive the mobility scalability factors for different entities of SIGMA: Location
Manager, Mobile Host and complete network based on their total cost.
4.3.1.1 Location Manager
In SIGMA, every subnet crossing (that happens every Tr seconds) by an MH triggers
a location update message to be sent to LM. In addition, periodic binding refresh
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messages are sent by the MHs to the LM so that binding entries are not removed
after their lifetime. Moreover, in every MH-CN association, LM has to deal with
the location query message. Therefore, the total cost of the LM is as follows (see
Section 3.4 for details):
ΓLM = Γ
LU
LM + Γ
RB
LM + Γ
QR
LM
= Nm
2δL + βLM
Tr
+Nm(2ηrδB + βLM ) +NmNcλs
(
2δQ + ψ log2Nm
)
=
Π1Nm
Tr
+Π2Nm +Π3NmNcλs +Π4NmNcλs log2Nm.
(4.2)
where Π1 = 2δL+ βLM , Π2 = (2ηrδB + βLM), Π3 = 2δQ, Π4 = ψ. Π1, Π2, Π3 and Π4
are constants as the quantities defined by them are unit transmission and processing
cost which does not change with the increase of other (scalability) parameters.
Therefore, we get the asymptotic cost expression for LM using the Θ notation 1
as follows:
ΓLM = Θ(Nm(V + λsNc log2Nm)). (4.3)
We consider Tr ∝ (1/V ) for the above expression. Hence, SIGMA’s MSF for the
Location Manager with respect to Nm, Nc, V , λs and α can be computed as follows:
ρLM−SIGNm = limNm→∞
log(Nm(V + λsNc log2Nm))
logNm
= 1 (4.4)
ρLM−SIGNc = limNc→∞
log(Nm(V + λsNc log2Nm))
logNc
= 1 (4.5)
ρLM−SIGV = limV→∞
log(Nm(V + λsNc log2Nm))
log V
= 1 (4.6)
ρLM−SIGλs = limλs→∞
log(Nm(V + λsNc log2Nm))
log λs
= 1 (4.7)
ρLM−SIGα = limα→∞
log(Nm(V + λsNc log2Nm))
log α
= 0. (4.8)
1Standard asymptotic notation has been used. Denote by f(n) ∈ Θ(g(n)) if there exist some
positive constants c1, c2, and n0 such that c1g(n) ≤ f(n) ≤ c2g(n) for all n ≥ no.
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4.3.1.2 Mobile Host
In SIGMA, the total cost on the mobile host is due to the query messages exchanged
with ARs, binding update messages exchanged with CNs, and location update and
refreshing update messages sent to LM and packet delivery. The cost expression can
be derived as follows (see Section 3.4.2 for detailed explanation):
ΓMH = Γ
DH
MH + Γ
BU
MH + Γ
LU
MH + Γ
RB
MH + Γ
DD
MH
=
2σδD
Tr
+Nc
6σδS + βAR
Tr
+
2σδL
Tr
+ 2ηrδB +Nc
⌈α
κ
⌉
σλs(δDP + δDA)
= Θ(Nc(V + αλs)).
(4.9)
SIGMA’s MSF for each MH with respect toNm, Nc, V , λs and α can be computed
as follows:
ρMH−SIGNm = limNm→∞
log(Nc(V + αλs))
logNm
= 0 (4.10)
ρMH−SIGNc = limNc→∞
log(Nc(V + αλs))
logNc
= 1 (4.11)
ρMH−SIGV = limV→∞
log(Nc(V + αλs))
log V
= 1 (4.12)
ρMH−SIGλs = limλs→∞
log(Nc(V + αλs))
log λs
= 1 (4.13)
ρMH−SIGα = limα→∞
log(Nc(V + αλs))
logα
= 1. (4.14)
4.3.1.3 Complete network
The total cost on the network due to SIGMA protocol operation is as follows (see
Section 3.4.3 for detailed explanation):
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ΓNet = Γ
QR
Net + Γ
LU
Net + Γ
RB
Net + Γ
DH
Net + Γ
BU
Net + Γ
DD
Net
= NmNcλs(2δQhw + ψ logNm) +Nm
2(hw − 1 + σ)δL + βLM
Tr
+ ηrNm
(
2δB(hw − 1 + σ) +Nm 2σδD + βAR
Tr
+NmNc
6(hw − 1 + σ)δs + βCN
Tr
+NmNcλs
⌈α
κ
⌉
(δDP + δDA)(hw − 1 + σ)
= Θ(NmNcλs(α + V log2Nm)).
(4.15)
Therefore, SIGMA’s MSFs for the complete network with respect to Nm, Nc, V ,
λs and α are ρ
Net−SIG
Nm
= 1, ρNet−SIGNc = 1, ρ
Net−SIG
V = 1, ρ
Net−SIG
λs
= 1, ρNet−SIGα =
1, respectively.
4.3.2 HMIPv6
Next, we derive the mobility scalability factors of HMIPv6 entities: MAP, HA, MH
and complete network.
4.3.2.1 Mobility Anchor Point
As explained in Section 3.3.1, the asymptotic cost expression for MAP can be derived
from Eqn. (3.7) as follows:
ΥMAP = Υ
LC
MAP +Υ
RR
MAP +Υ
RC
MAP +Υ
DD
MAP
= Θ
(
NmNc(V + αλs log2Nm)
)
.
(4.16)
HMIPv6’s MSFs for MAP with respect toNm, Nc, V , λs and α are ρ
MAP−HMIP
Nm
=
1, ρMAP−HMIPNc = 1, ρ
MAP−HMIP
V = 1, ρ
MAP−HMIP
λs
= 1, ρMAP−HMIPα = 1, respec-
tively.
4.3.2.2 Home Agent
As explained in Section 3.3.2, the asymptotic cost expression for MAP can be derived
from Eqn. (3.13) as follows:
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ΥHA = Υ
QR
HA +Υ
RR
HA +Υ
RC
HA +Υ
RB
HA +Υ
DD
HA
= Θ
(
NmNc(V + αλs log2Nm)
)
.
(4.17)
HMIPv6’s MSFs for HA with respect to Nm, Nc, V , λs and α are ρ
HA−HMIP
Nm
= 1,
ρHA−HMIPNc = 1, ρ
HA−HMIP
V = 1, ρ
HA−HMIP
λs
= 1, ρHA−HMIPα = 1, respectively.
4.3.2.3 Mobile Host
As explained in Section 3.3.3, the asymptotic cost expression for each MH of HMIPv6
can be derived from Eqn. (3.19) as follows:
ΥMH = Υ
RC
MH +Υ
LC
MH +Υ
RR
MH +Υ
RB
MH +Υ
PD
MH = Θ
(
Nc(V + αλs)
)
. (4.18)
So HMIPv6’s MSFs for each MH with respect to Nm, Nc, V , λs and α are
ρMH−HMIPNm = 0, ρ
MH−HMIP
Nc
= 1, ρMH−HMIPV = 1, ρ
MH−HMIP
λs
= 1, ρMH−HMIPα = 1,
respectively.
4.3.2.4 Complete network
Finally, the asymptotic cost expression for HMIPv6 can be derived from Eqn. (3.26)
as follows (details can be found in Section 3.3.4):
ΥNet = Υ
QR
Net +Υ
LC
Net +Υ
RR
NetΥ
RB
Net +Υ
RC
Net +Υ
DD
Net
= Θ
(
NmNc(V + αλs log2Nm)
)
.
(4.19)
Therefore, HMIPv6’s MSFs for the complete network with respect to Nm, V , and
Nc λs and α are ρ
Net−HMIP
Nm
= 1, ρNet−HMIPNc = 1, ρ
Net−HMIP
V = 1, ρ
Net−HMIP
λs
= 1,
ρNet−HMIPα = 1, respectively.
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4.3.3 NEMO and SINEMO
We follow an approach similar to the one explained for host-mobility protocols
(SIGMA and HMIPv6) to derive the asymptotical cost expressions and mobility
scalability factors of NEMO and SINEMO based on the cost models presented in
Chapter 3.
We perform an entity-wise scalability analysis of NEMO and SINEMO protocol.
We have chosen CLM and MR of SINEMO for the entity-wise evaluation since CLM
is involved in every session between a CN and a MNN, and all communications with
the mobile network are carried out through the MR. On the other hand, we have
chosen HA and MR of NEMO for entity-wise scalability analysis since these two
entities are the key components for NEMO.
4.4 Results
We summarize our results in the following subsections. We first present results for
host mobility protocols and then for network mobility protocols.
Table 4.1: Mobility scalability factors of SIGMA and HMIPv6.
Protocols Entity Cost Expression ρXNm ρ
X
V ρ
X
Nc ρ
X
λs
ρXα
SIGMA LM Θ(Nm(V + λsNc log2Nm)) 1 1 1 1 0
MH Θ(Nc(V + αλs)) 0 1 1 1 1
Network Θ(NmNcλs(α+ V log2Nm)) 1 1 1 1 1
HMIPv6 MAP Θ
(
NmNc(V + αλs log2Nm)
)
1 1 1 1 1
HA Θ
(
NmNc(V + αλs log2Nm)
)
1 1 1 1 1
MH Θ(V +Nc) 0 1 1 1 1
Network Θ
(
NmNc(V + αλs log2Nm)
)
1 1 1 1 1
4.4.1 HMIPv6 vs. SIGMA
Table 4.1 lists the asymptotic cost expressions and mobility scalability factors for
SIGMA and HMIPv6 entities. It is found that the MSFs of the overall network
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for these two host-mobility protocols exhibit identical values. However, there is a
difference in the MSFs between the LM and HA. The MSF of LM (SIGMA protocol)
with respect to α is 0 (denoted by ρLM−SIGα = 0), whereas the MSF of HA (HMIPv6
protocol) is 1, which is denoted by ρNet−HMIPα = 1 (see the rightmost column in
Table 4.1). This implies that LM is more scalable than HA with respect to data
rate. The significance of this result is that in HMIPv6, data packets are routed
through the HA whereas in SIGMA this is not the case (data packets are not routed
through the LM). Thus, the LM is not flooded with data traffic. This can improve the
performance of SIGMA protocol and the LM can respond quickly to the location
query, and perform other signaling jobs more efficiently than HA. On the other
hand, the HA for HMIPv6 protocol can become overloaded and may not function
as quickly as required to reply to location query of a CN at the beginning of each
session (compared to SIGMA protocol). Moreover, the acknowledgement of the
binding updates to the MH may also get delayed, resulting in increased handover
latency that will affect handover process and may subsequently lead to connection
termination.
4.4.2 NEMO vs. SINEMO
Table 4.2 summarizes the asymptotic cost expressions of the mobility management
entities of NEMO and SINEMO. This was derived from the cost expressions of
NEMO and SINEMO in Chapter 3. In Table 4.3, SINEMO and NEMO’s mobility
scalability factors are listed with respect to Nm, Nf , λp, V and Nc. It is to be noted
that the HA for NEMO corresponds to SINEMO’s CLM.
Results show that the mobility scalability factors of the overall network for these
two network mobility protocols are identical. However, the scalability factors of
CLM and HA are different. SINEMO’s CLM is found to scale better than NEMO’s
HA with respect to packet arrival rate (λp). The reason for this difference is that
like SIGMA, SINEMO uses optimal route for data traffic between any MNN and
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Table 4.2: Asymptotic cost expressions of NEMO and SINEMO.
Protocols Entity Cost Expressions
NEMO HA Θ((V + λp)Nc(Nm +Nf ) log2(Nm +Nf))
MR Θ(Nc(Nm +Nf )(V + λp))
Network Θ(Nc(Nm +Nf )(V + λp log2Nc(Nm +Nf )))
SINEMO CLM Θ(Nc(Nm +Nf)(V +Nc log(Nm +Nf )))
MR Θ(V (Nm +Nf) + λp log2(Nm +Nf) + V Nc log2Nc))
Network Θ((λpNc +Nm +Nf) log2(Nm +Nf) + V Nc log2Nc)
Table 4.3: Mobility scalability factors of SINEMO and NEMO.
Protocols ρXNm ρ
X
Nf
ρXλp ρ
X
V ρ
X
Nc Entity
NEMO 1 1 1 1 1 HA
1 1 1 1 1 MR
1 1 1 1 1 Complete network
SINEMO 1 1 0 1 1 CLM
1 1 1 1 1 MR
1 1 1 1 1 Complete network
the CN, whereas NEMO routes data packets through the HA. Therefore, the HA
does not scale with respect to increased data rate into the mobile network. As the
amount of multimedia data (e.g., audio-video streaming and high resolution images)
access over the mobile network increases very rapidly, the HA serving the MR of a
mobile network is overloaded very quickly, resulting in its performance degradation
(with higher response time and data forwarding time) that subsequently affects the
quality of service of Internet access inside the mobile network.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have developed a mathematical model for the quantitative scal-
ability analysis of host and network mobility protocols with respect to network
size, mobility rate, traffic rate and data volume. We have compared the scalability
features of SIGMA (SINEMO) with its IETF counterpart HMIPv6 (NEMO). Our
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results show that the IP-mobility protocols exhibit asymptotically identical scalabil-
ity pattern as far as the complete network is concerned. However, the key mobility
management entities, (such as HA and LM) exhibit differences in their scalability
factors. We found that decoupling the location management from data transmission
process has relieved the LM (of SIGMA/SINEMO protocol) from its responsibilities,
thereby making it more scalable than HMIPv6/NEMO protocols. On the other hand,
the HA of HMIPv6 and NEMO protocol can become overloaded very quickly with
increased data rate, resulting in its performance degradation (with higher response
time and data forwarding time) that subsequently affects the quality of service of
Internet access inside the mobile network. The scalability analysis framework pre-
sented in this chapter can help in quantifying and visualizing the effects of future
network expansion on the performance of mobility protocols.
In the next chapter, we focus on protecting the crucial mobility signaling against
losses due to the high volume of real-time and non-real data in the network.
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Chapter 5
Multi-class Traffic Analysis of Mobility Protocols
The traffic characteristics in recent years have changed considerably having more
video and audio traffic with critical real-time constraints. This situation is com-
pounded by the increased number of mobile nodes communicating over Internet.
Due to such high data traffic, the access routers are often overloaded with packets
with different priority. The access routers must act quickly enough to avoid loss of
connection of mobile nodes’ ongoing communication. In this chapter, we focus on
the multi-class traffic analysis for mobility protocols. Our objective is to protect the
all-important signaling traffic against losses due to the high volume of real-time and
non-real time data in the network. We propose a scheduling algorithm that gives
the highest priority to signaling traffic, thereby ensuring its minimum loss while
dropping some real-time traffic as they are loss-tolerant.
5.1 Introduction
In each IP-mobility protocol, mobile nodes communicate with the access router
through the wireless channel for sending data packets and signaling packets, such
as binding updates. Due to the proliferation of mobile computing and extensive use
of wireless devices (accessing the Internet), the number of mobile nodes under an
access router is rising rapidly, resulting in the increase of total packet arrival rates.
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Mobile nodes send signaling packets that need to be processed very quickly by
the access routers to notify the mobility agent, such as location manager or home
agent to keep the location database up-to-date. On the other hand, for the traffic
class having time critical deadlines (e.g., real-time audio-video data), packets must
be delivered to the destination before the deadlines. Otherwise, they are useless and
can be dropped by the router.
There have been several research works on multi-class traffic that considered
mobility. Nam et al. [24] presented a two-layer downlink queuing model and a
scheduling mechanism for providing lossless handoff and Quality of Service (QoS)
in mobile networks. Iftikhar et al. [25] presented an analytical model for multiple
queue systems by considering two different classes of traffic that exhibit long-range
dependence and self-similarity. Iftikhar et al. [26] used a G/M/1 queuing system and
developed analytical models based on non-preemptive priority queuing, low-latency
queuing and custom queuing systems. However, these works lack the quantitative
analysis of average queuing delay, queue occupancy and packet drop probability of
data and signaling packets at the access router while managing IP-mobility. None of
the existing work focused on the dynamic scheduling of signaling packets to protect
them from dropping due to the high volume of real-time and non-real time data in
the wireless networks.
In this work, we have considered two classes of data traffic: Real Time (RT)
and Non-Real Time (NRT) traffic. Another class of traffic is the signaling traffic
(binding update) sent by the mobile nodes to update mobility agents about their
current locations. We have proposed a scheduling algorithm that selects a packet
based on its priority and the current location of the mobile node within a cell so
that it produces the least loss to the signaling traffic and handoff traffic, while
allowing packet loss to real-time traffic since RT traffic is loss-tolerant. Based on the
scheduling algorithm, we have derived expressions for average queuing delay, queue
occupancy, and packet drop probability of each class of traffic. We have presented
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results that reflect the impact of node density, service rate and traffic pattern on
these measures.
Our goal of the work presented in this chapter is to analyze the performance
of access router in processing real-time, non-real-time and signaling traffic while
managing IP-mobility simultaneously.
The contributions of the work presented in this chapter are: (i) developing a
mathematical model to estimate the average queuing delay, average queue occupancy
and the packet drop probability at the AR of IP-mobility protocol and (ii) analyzing
the impact of node density, service rate and traffic distribution on them.
The analytical model developed in this chapter can be used to better manage the
access routers and other network components for improved performance of future
wireless and mobile networks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, the cell topology
of the access routers are explained along with the computation of the overlapped
area of a cell. The analytical model is presented in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, we
present our simulation results. Section 5.5 has the concluding remarks.
5.2 Cell Topology and Overlapping Area
The cell topology covered by access routers is shown in Fig. 5.1, where each cell has
overlapping areas with four other neighboring cells. In this Section, we compute the
overlapping area of a cell that will be used in queuing analysis (Section 5.3.5).
Let the radio coverage area of each cell be a circular region of radius r and let
two adjacent cells overlap at a maximum length of l along its diameter. In Fig.
5.1, let AC = a = BC, and DE = l. Since the length of AB is 2r, we find that
a =
√
2r = r + r − l. Therefore,
l = (2−
√
2)r. (5.1)
In order to find out the overlapping area, let us consider Fig. 5.2, where the center
88
rr
C A
B
ED
Figure 5.1: Cell topology.
(C) of a cell is situated at the origin. The cord MN bisects the line segment DE at
point F . Therefore, DF = EF = l/2. Since point C is the origin, CE = r and
CF = CE − EF = r − l/2 = r/√2. As point F is on the x-axis, the coordinate of
point F is ( r√
2
, 0). Therefore, the area of the region CFMP (denoted by ϕ ) is the
area under the circle x2 + y2 = r2 from the origin to point F and can be obtained
by integrating between 0 to r√
2
as follows:
ϕ =
∫ r√
2
0
ydx =
∫ r√
2
0
√
(r2 − x2)dx. (5.2)
Now, putting x = r sin θ, the limit becomes 0 to pi/4. Thus, we get
ϕ = r2
∫ pi/4
0
cos2 θdθ =
r2
4
(pi
2
+ 1
)
. (5.3)
As the area of the cell is pir2, the portion of the cell in the first quadrant (i.e., the
region CPME) is pir2/4. So the area of the shaded region (MFE) can be obtained
by subtracting Eqn. (5.3) from pir2/4:
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Figure 5.2: Overlapping area among the cells.
Area of MFE =
pir2
4
− r
2
4
(pi
2
+ 1
)
=
r2
8
(
pi − 2). (5.4)
The overlapping area between two adjacent cells (MDNE), which is four times the
shaded area (of MFE), equals r
2
2
(
pi − 2). For each cell, there are four neighboring
cells with which it has overlapping areas (see Fig. 5.1). Hence, the total overlapping
area of a cell (φ) is given by,
φ = 4× r
2
2
(
pi − 2) = 2r2(pi − 2). (5.5)
The ratio of the overlapping area (Eqn. (5.5)) to the total area (pir2) is given by
γ =
2r2(pi − 2)
pir2
=
2(pi − 2)
pi
. (5.6)
From Eqn. (5.6), we find that γ = 0.7268, which means that 72.68% area of the cell
is in overlapping area whereas 27.32% area is non-overlapping.
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5.3 Analytical model
First, the assumptions and notations of the model are listed in Sections 5.3.1 and
5.3.2. Section 5.3.3 explains the node architecture of the AR, followed by the schedul-
ing algorithm in Section 5.3.4. Section 5.3.5 presents the queuing analysis.
5.3.1 Assumptions
To make the model analytically tractable, the following assumptions are made.
• Uniform density of the Mobile Nodes (MN) in the network is assumed.
• The number of MNs leaving the coverage area of an AR is equal to the MNs
entering the area. Therefore, the net change in number of MNs under an AR
is zero.
• The ratio of the overlapping area to the total coverage area is used as a measure
of probability for being in handoff status.
• Packet arrival process is a Poisson process.
• Type of queue discipline used in the analysis is FIFO with non-preemptive
priority among various traffic classes.
• One-way (download) traffic is considered for simplicity.
• As Binding Update (BU) messages exchanged between MN and Home Agent
are essential to track a mobile node, BU packets are assigned the highest
priority.
5.3.2 Notations
The notations used in the analysis are listed below.
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Nm Number of MNs in a cell (AR),
λBU Binding update packet rate at each MN,
λRBU Refreshing binding update packet rate at each MN,
λRT Real time packet arrival rate at each MN,
λNRT Non-real time packet arrival rate at each MN,
λi Packet arrival rate at class-i queue of AR,
λ Total packet arrival rate to the system,
µ Service rate of the system,
ρ System utilization factor,
r Radius of each cell,
γ Ratio of overlapping area to the total area of the cell,
E(Ti) Average queuing delay of a class-i packet,
E(ni) Average queue occupancy of class-i packets,
Pd(i) Packet drop probability of class-i packets.
5.3.3 Node architecture of the AR
We have considered three classes of traffic: RT and NRT data traffic, and signaling
traffic (BU and refreshing BU packets) exchanged between mobile nodes and mobility
agents for location management. Depending on the location of the MNs, there can
be two statuses of each packet: handoff (H) and non-handoff. Non-handoff status
is when the MN is inside the coverage area of the AR only, whereas handoff status
when it is moving towards some neighboring cell and about to handoff.
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Figure 5.4: Multi-class packets in the queue of the AR.
While sending data packet in the overlapped coverage region, the MN may set
the flag handoff flag to indicate that it is about to handoff to some new AR. Other
(data) traffic and RBU packets are assumed to have a non-handoff status.
Figure 5.3 shows the queuing architecture at the access router. Packets of all
types arrive at the AR at a rate λ. The classifier categorizes the packets into six
classes according to the traffic and handoff status. The packets are then queued
appropriately. The scheduler follows the scheduling algorithm (Section 5.3.4) to
select the next packet to transmit. Thus, packets of higher priority can be considered
to have been queued ahead of other lower priority packet as shown in Fig. 5.4.
5.3.4 Scheduling algorithm
The steps followed in the scheduling algorithm are listed below:
• If the arrived packet is a BU packet, it is scheduled immediately after the
packets in the BU queues if there is any.
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• When the data packets (RT or NRT) with handoff flag = 1 arrive at the AR,
they are selected with a higher priority than data traffic with non-handoff
status. In addition, RT traffic gets higher priority than NRT traffic.
• While serving RT traffic, check the queue length of NRT traffic. If the NRT
queue grows beyond minThreshold (usually three-fourth of queue size), allow
dropping of RT traffic of different flows (if dropping is allowed).
• While serving RT traffic, if the NRT queue grows beyond maxThreshold (equals
queue size), the transmission of RT traffic is suspended, and NRT traffic is
transmitted until the NRT queue length comes below minThreshold.
As BU/RBU traffic has the highest priority, the queue associated with them will
not grow much and with a reasonable size of the queue (in compliance with the node
density) will ensure the least loss of binding updates. As RT traffic (usually UDP
packets) is loss-tolerant and useless if delivered after a long delay, the queue length
of the RT traffic should be kept small. In case of overflow in RT queue, the (UDP)
traffic will be lost which does not harm the RT communication. As NRT traffic
(usually TCP traffic) is not loss-tolerant, NRT queue size is kept larger than RT
queue. As NRT traffic is assigned the lowest priority, NRT packets (usually TCP)
may be lost, resulting in the retransmission of the same packets.
5.3.5 Queueing analysis
Based on the proposed scheduling algorithm, we have computed the average queuing
delay, queue occupancy and packet drop probability for BU packets, RT and NRT
traffic through wireless media. We have used non-preemptive queuing, which means
lower priority packets in service will not be preempted by higher priority packets.
Let Nm be the number of mobile nodes under the radio coverage area of the AR.
Among them, the fraction of MNs that are in the overlapped region is γNm and these
MNs will send data to the AR setting the handoff flag. Without loss of generality,
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we can assume that γ fraction of the data packets will have handoff (H) status and
the rest will have non-handoff (NH) status. The probability that an MN will be in
the handoff mode is given by γ (see Eqn. (5.6) in Section 5.2).
5.3.5.1 Packet arrival rates
In the overlapping area, binding updates are sent by MNs. As the BU packet rate
at each MN is λBU , BU packet arrival rate at the AR from the Nmγ MNs will be
given by
λ1 = λBU ×Nmγ. (5.7)
Similarly, as the RBU packet rate at each MN is λRBU , RBU packet arrival rate at
the AR from the Nm(1− γ) MNs will be given by
λ2 = λRBU ×Nm(1− γ). (5.8)
For RT traffic, as the packet arrival rate to each MN is λRT , the packet arrival rate
at AR with handoff status is
λ3 = λRT ×Nmγ. (5.9)
Similarly, the RT packet arrival rate at AR with non-handoff status is given by
λ4 = λRT ×Nm(1− γ). (5.10)
For NRT traffic, as the packet arrival rate to each MN is λNRT , the packet arrival
rate at AR with handoff status is
λ5 = λNRT ×Nmγ. (5.11)
Finally, the NRT packet arrival rate at AR with non-handoff status is given by
λ6 = λNRT ×Nm(1− γ). (5.12)
Since the packet arrival rate to each queue is a Poisson process, the total arrival
rate of all classes of packets to the system will collectively be a Poisson process with
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rate λ = λ1 + λ2 + . . .+ λ6. Let the service time of the system be exponentially
distributed with the mean 1/µ. Let ρi = λi/µ. Then, the system utilization factor
can be computed as
ρ =
λ
µ
= ρ1 + ρ2 + . . .+ ρ6 =
6∑
i=1
ρi. (5.13)
5.3.5.2 Mean packet delay and queue length
When a class-1 packet arrives, the system may be in the process of serving a packet of
any other class. The probability that a class-1 packet finds a class-2 packet in service
equals the fraction of time the server spends on class-2 packets which is λ2/µ = ρ2.
Thus, class-1 packet finds any of the class-i packets in service is ρi, where 2 ≤ i ≤ 6.
According to Little’s theorem [27], the average number of packets waiting in the
system is equal to the average delay times the average arrival rate of the system.
This theorem can be used in some part of the system. Let us apply this theorem to
the queue of class-i. As the average packet delay for class-1 packets is E(T1) and
the average queue occupancy is E(n1) with arrival rate λ1, we have
E(n1) = λ1E(T1). (5.14)
Again, when a packet of class-1 arrives at the system, there are, on the average,
E(n1) packets on class-1 queue. Since class-1 packets have the highest priority, the
mean time delay of the packet that has just arrived depends on E(n1) packets which
are already buffered in the class-1 queue plus the packet in service. As E(n1) includes
the class-1 packet in service (if any), the mean time delay of class-1 packet in the
system is the queuing delay and the service time (1/µ). Therefore,
E(T1) =
E(n1)
µ
+
1
µ
+
1
µ
(ρ2 + ρ3 + ...+ ρ6)
=
E(n1)
µ
+
1
µ
+
1
µ
6∑
i=2
ρi.
(5.15)
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Now substituting Eqn. (5.14) into the Eqn. (5.15) and after simplification, we get
E(T1) =
(
1 +
∑6
i=2 ρi
)
(1− ρ1)µ =
1
µ
+
ρ/µ
1− ρ1 . (5.16)
Hence, Eqn. (5.14) can be rewritten as follows:
E(n1) =
(
1 +
∑6
i=2 ρi
)
ρ1
1− ρ1 = ρ1 +
ρρ1
1− ρ1 . (5.17)
While considering the delay of class-2 packets, we have to consider the average
number of class-1 packets (E(n1)) in the system as they have the higher priority
of service. So the class-2 packet which arrives in the system must wait for all the
class-1 packets buffered in the class-1 queue and the class-2 queue. Thus, the average
queuing delay of class-2 packets is given by
E(T2) =
E(n1)
µ
+
E(n2)
µ
+
1
µ
+
1
µ
(ρ3 + ρ4 + ...+ ρ6)
=
E(n1)
µ
+
E(n2)
µ
+
1
µ
+
1
µ
(ρ− ρ1 − ρ2).
(5.18)
Using Little’s theorem for class-2 queue, that is, E(n2) = λ2E(T2) in Eqn. (5.18)
and after simplification, we get
E(T2) =
1
(1− ρ2)µ
(
1 +
ρ
1− ρ1 − ρ2
)
. (5.19)
Hence, the average queue length of class-2 queue is given by,
E(n2) =
ρ2
(1− ρ2)
(
1 +
ρ
1− ρ1 − ρ2
)
. (5.20)
Therefore, the general expression for packets of class-i can be derived as,
E(Ti) =
E(n1)
µ
+
E(n2)
µ
+ . . .+
E(ni)
µ
+
1
µ
+
1
µ
(ρi+1 + ρi+2 + . . .+ ρk)
=
1
µ
(
i∑
j=1
E(nj) +
k∑
j=i+1
ρj + 1
)
.
(5.21)
Again, using Little’s theorem for class-i queue and simplifying, we get
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E(Ti) =
1
µ(1− ρi)
(
i−1∑
j=1
E(nj) + 1 + ρ−
i∑
j=1
ρj
)
. (5.22)
Therefore, the average queue length of class-i queue is given by,
E(ni) =
ρi
(1− ρi)
(
i−1∑
j=1
E(nj) + 1 + ρ−
i∑
j=1
ρj
)
. (5.23)
5.3.5.3 Packet drop probability
Let us assume that Ni denotes the size of the ith queue. Therefore, the packet drop
probability at each queue is the probability of the queue being full. Thus the packet
drop probability at the ith queue can be obtained as follows:
Pd(i) =
ρNii (1− ρi)
1− ρNi+1i
. (5.24)
5.4 Results
In this section, simulation results are presented to show the effect of node density,
service rate and traffic distribution on the average queuing delay, queue occupancy
and packet drop probability at the AR. We have used the ns-2 network simulator [28]
and have implemented the multi-class scheduling algorithm for the ARs.
5.4.1 Simulation Environment
Figure 5.5 shows the topology used for the simulation. The simulation area is a 10
km × 10 km area which is covered by 196 access routers (arranged in 14 rows and 14
columns) with overlapping area similar to that shown in Fig. 5.1. The hierarchical
addresses of all the nodes are listed in Table 5.1. The CNs act as the FTP (over
TCP) or CBR (over UDP) sources whereas the mobile nodes are the corresponding
sinks, thereby simulating non-real-time and real-time communications, respectively.
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Figure 5.5: Simulation topology.
Table 5.1: Hierarchical addresses used for entities in the simulation.
Node Type Hierarchical addresses
CNi 0.0.i
HA 1.1.0
Router 1.0.0
AR1 - AR196 1.1.0 - 1.196.0
MHi 1.1.i
Each mobile node moves according to the mobility model explained in Chapter 10
starting from a random location.
The default values of parameters used for simulations are listed in Table 5.2.
Each AR’s transmission range is 500 m. IEEE 802.11g standard is used for wire-
less communications. The wireless link bandwidth is 54 Mbps and the wired link
bandwidth is 100 Mbps. The RT and NRT packet size was set to 512 bytes whereas
the size of BU/RBU packets is 64 bytes. The percentage of users accessing RT and
NRT traffic was set to be equal, that is, 50% for both types.
The results obtained from the analysis of the simulation traces are presented
in the following subsections. We have measured the average queuing delay, queue
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Table 5.2: Values of parameters used in the simulation.
Simulation Parameters Values
Simulation area 10 km × 10 km
Wireless range 500 m
Wired link BW 100 Mbps
Wireless link BW 54 Mbps
Binding lifetime 30 sec
Number of Access Routers 196
Data packet size 512 bytes
Size of BU packets 64 bytes
Service rate of each AR 30000 pkts/sec
occupancy and packet drop probability at the AR. We have denoted the class-1
through class-6 as BU, RBU, RT-H, RT-NH, NRT-H and NRT-NH (in the graphs
of this section) for clear understanding.
5.4.2 Impact of node density
In Fig. 5.6, the average queuing delays at the six queues are shown for varying
numbers of MNs in a cell (covered by an AR). Our results show that the queuing
delay of NRT traffic rises for higher node density whereas the queuing delay for
signaling traffic remains unchanged ensuring faster delivery of signaling traffic. This
shows that the increased number of MNs in the cell area does not affect the average
delay of the signaling traffic. This implies that the signaling traffic is served by
the AR quickly, thereby preventing disruption of connectivity for the mobile devices
which is the main objective of the scheduling algorithm.
In Fig. 5.7, the average queue occupancy at the six queues is shown for different
node density at the cell region. It is found that the average queue occupancy is
almost zero for signaling traffic as they are served very quickly (due to having high-
est priority) by the AR. The NRT traffic in handoff status has the highest queue
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Figure 5.6: Average queuing delay at the six queues for different number of MNs.
occupancy as the arrival rate is the highest unlike the RT traffic which is served with
a higher priority to meet the real-time deadlines.
In Fig. 5.8, the packet drop probabilities for the six classes of packets are shown
for different node density at the cell region. The probability increases for higher node
density for RT and NRT traffic. However, the packet drop probability for signaling
traffic is zero, meaning that the scheduling algorithm protects all signaling packets
from getting lost. The RT class has the smaller queue size resulting in more packet
drop. In addition, data traffic (RT and NRT) with handoff status has the higher
arrival rates, causing more loss of such traffic. Our scheduling algorithm protects
signaling traffic (BU) in lieu of sacrificing some RT and NRT traffic (with handoff
status). The lost RT traffic may not be required to be retransmitted. However, the
lost NRT traffic triggers the adjustment of congestion window between the sender
and the receiver of the traffic and can be recovered through retransmissions.
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Figure 5.7: Average queue occupancy at the six queues for different number of MNs.
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Figure 5.8: Packet drop probability at the six queues for different number of MNs.
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Figure 5.9: Average queuing delay at the six queues for different service rates.
5.4.3 Impact of service rate
In Fig. 5.9, the average queuing delays are shown for different service rates of the AR.
The queuing delay decreases for higher service rates. Again, the delay for signaling
traffic is the least whereas that of NRT traffic is the highest. Thus, in order to
reduce the delays of the all traffic classes, increase of service rates is important and
today improvement of wireless access technology is facilitating such higher service
rates of the AR.
In Fig. 5.10, the average queue occupancy for the six classes of traffic is shown
for different service rates of the AR. Results show that the average occupancy at the
queue decreases for higher service rates. For RT traffic, it is much less than the NRT
traffic due to the use of higher priority and the smaller queue size in our proposed
scheduling system.
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Figure 5.10: Average queuing occupancy at the six queues for different service rates.
5.4.4 Impact of traffic distribution
Figure 5.11 shows the queuing delay for different classes of traffic varying the per-
centage of users accessing RT and NRT traffic. In case 1, MNs accessing RT and
NRT traffic are assumed to be 5% and 95%, respectively. For cases 2 and 3, the
distributions are 25%-75% and 50%-50%, respectively. It is found that as the RT
traffic increases, the queuing delay for data traffic increases. This is because the
increased RT arrival forces NRT to be delayed/dropped. However, the delay of the
signaling traffic remains almost unchanged for all the cases since they are served
with higher priority, ignoring the high RT and NRT traffic arrival.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a scheduling algorithm that selects packets based
on the priority and current location of the mobile nodes, ensuring the least loss to
signaling traffic, while dropping some loss-tolerant real-time traffic. Based on the
scheduling algorithm, we have derived closed-form expressions for average queuing
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Figure 5.11: Average queuing delay at the queues for different traffic.
delay, queue occupancy and packet drop probability of each class of traffic. We have
presented simulation results showing the impact of node density, service rate and
traffic distribution on those measures. The scheduling algorithm proposed in this
chapter will be helpful to better manage access routers with different classes of data
and signaling traffic, causing the least queuing delay and packet loss for the all-
important signaling traffic while ensuring seamless Internet connectivity for mobile
devices. In the next chapter, we focus on maximizing utilization of available band-
width for mobility protocols exploiting the band-sharing approach among different
traffic classes.
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Chapter 6
Multi-band Architecture for Mobility Protocols
Recent trend in Internet usage has seen large amounts of multimedia traffic accessed
through large numbers of mobile devices. To facilitate higher bandwidth, modern
mobile routers are now capable of supporting simultaneous multi-band frequencies,
incurring less interference (and loss) while raising the total capacity and reliability
of wireless communications. However, there exists no previous work that attempts
to maximize utilization of available bandwidth through the sharing of traffic classes
among different frequency bands of the mobile router. In the previous chapter,
we have focused on the multi-class traffic analysis in the single band and tried to
protect the all-important signaling traffic against losses due to the high volume of
real-time and non-real-time data in the network. In this chapter, we propose a novel
scheduling algorithm for multi-band mobile routers which transmit different classes
of traffic through different frequency bands to achieve an improved performance
while ensuring maximum possible utilization. The objective in this chapter is to
maximize the utilization of multi-band mobile routers through band sharing.
6.1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been an explosive growth of mobile users accessing large
multimedia files (such as high definition audio, video, images, etc.) over the Internet.
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Therefore, the bandwidth demand for mobile Internet access is increasing exponen-
tially [29]. To satisfy such a higher bandwidth requirement, today wireless routers
are available commercially with simultaneous multi-band support of 2.4 and 5 GHz.
Future IEEE 802.11ad (WiGig) tri-band-enabled devices, operating in the 2.4, 5
and 60 GHz bands, are expected to deliver data transfer rates up to 7 Gbps [30].
The benefit of using a multi-band router is to have less interference, higher capacity
and better reliability. Exploitation of rarely-used frequency bands in wireless net-
works reduces interference in heavily-used frequency band, e.g., 2.4 GHz, thereby
increasing the total capacity of the wireless network.
Current simultaneous multi-band routers make use of two different bands (2.4
GHz and 5GHz) for different types of devices in a home network. However, they
do not attempt to exploit the under-utilized frequency band when one of them is
overloaded with data. Moreover, there are different classes of traffic, and some of the
traffic types (such as, real-time) have strict delay constraints associated with it while
the signaling traffic (required for mobility management) is crucial for maintaining
Internet connectivity for the nodes in motion. Therefore, it is essential to propose
an appropriate scheduling and queue management scheme for the multi-class traffic
to ensure the maximum possible utilization of the system resources in multi-band
mobile routers [31]. The aim of the work presented in this chapter is to propose
methods for such maximal utilization of multi-band mobile routers through band
sharing.
There have been several research works reported in the literature [29–35] that
attempt to extend current single band technology through the use of multiple fre-
quency bands, leading to increased bandwidth while reducing interference. Even
though multi-band usage has been widely investigated in cell networks [33, 34], it
is a relatively new concept in wireless networks. Verma and Lee [35] explained a
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possible Wi-Fi architecture with multiple physical and link layers to support mul-
tiple frequency bands simultaneously. Singh et al. [29] proposed a method to as-
sign to end-devices different bands based on their distances from the access router.
In [30, 32], the authors proposed the use of 60 GHz frequency band (having low
range) to attain faster data transfer rate in wireless networks. However, none of
these works [29–35] proposed any scheduling algorithm for multi-band system con-
sidering multi-class traffic, neither do they perform any queueing analysis to measure
various performance metrics of the multi-band system.
To the best our knowledge, there has been no earlier work on scheduling and
queue management for multi-band mobile routers that attempts to maximize uti-
lization of available bands. Moreover, no previous work exists that proposed the
sharing of multiple bands to transmit different classes of traffic. This is a novel work
that aims at attaining maximum possible band utilization and proposes a scheduling
algorithm which exploits band sharing.
The objective of the work presented in this chapter is to analyze the performance
of multi-band mobile routers while ensuring maximum possible utilization through
sharing of bands among different classes of traffic.
The contributions of the work presented in this chapter are: (i) proposing a
band-sharing router architecture and a novel scheduling algorithm to ensure the
maximum possible utilization of the system, (ii) developing an analytical model to
evaluate the performance (utilization of bands, average class occupancy, packet drop
rate, average delay, and throughput) of the proposed multi-band system, and (iii)
validating our analytical model through extensive simulations.
Our proposed algorithm considers the multi-class Internet traffic and schedules
them through alternate under-utilized frequency bands, thereby reducing packet loss
and delay of the system.
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Results show that the packet drop rate and throughput are significantly im-
proved in the proposed band-sharing architecture of the mobile router. Moreover,
the simulation results validate our analytical model.
Our proposed scheme and related analysis will help network engineers build next
generation mobile routers with higher throughput and utilization, ensuring the least
packet loss of different classes of traffic.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we explain the
typical architecture of multi-band mobile routers, followed by the proposed archi-
tecture in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 presents the analytical model to derive different
performance metrics of the proposed architecture. In Section 6.5, we present the
simulation results that validate our analytical model; we also compare the perfor-
mance of the proposed and typical architectures. Section 6.6 has the concluding
remarks.
6.2 Typical Multi-band Router Architecture
Commercial (simultaneous) multi-band mobile routers available today make use of
two different bands (2.4 GHz and 5GHz) for different types of devices in a home
network. Laptops may connect to 2.4 GHz network while WiFi-enabled TV, gaming
devices may connect to 5 GHz network. This reduces interference with the heavily-
used 2.4 GHz network (as cordless phones, microwave oven use similar band). In
addition, video streaming can be done through the high frequency band. Future
IEEE 802.11ad (WiGig) tri-band-enabled devices, operating in 2.4, 5 and 60 GHz
bands, are expected to deliver data at a much higher rate (up to 7 Gbps) [30].
The main principle of today’s simultaneous multi-band MR is the non-sharing
of bands among different flows of traffic. Moreover, some of the devices available
today (such as IPTV) mostly deals with real-time traffic. Based on this fact, we
have assumed that each of the band of typical simultaneous multi-band MR only
deals with one type of traffic. This might be a slight deviation from the real MR
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of a typical (simultaneous) multi-band mobile router.
used today. However, we have assumed this to compare our proposed architecture
with typical simultaneous multi-band MR.
Figure 6.1 shows the typical architecture of a simultaneous tri-band MR. Here,
three bands are assumed to be used for three different classes of traffic: signaling
traffic or Binding Update (BU), real-time (RT) and non-real-time (NRT) traffic.
Each class of traffic is solely assigned to each designated frequency band as shown in
Fig. 6.1, and we name the corresponding queues as B-queue, R-queue and N-queue.
There will be absolutely no sharing of traffic among different bands even if a band
is under-utilized due to low traffic arrival to that queue while the others are full.
6.3 Proposed Multi-band Router Architecture
In this section, we explain the proposed architecture of multi-band MRs that pro-
motes sharing of bands in order to maximize the overall system utilization. We have
considered three different queues (shown in Fig. 6.2), each of which corresponds to
a frequency band of a simultaneous tri-band Mobile Router.
As shown in Fig. 6.1, we consider three classes of traffic and each queue is des-
ignated for each class of traffic. However, unlike the typical architecture, in this
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Figure 6.2: Proposed architecture of a simultaneous multi-band mobile router.
proposed architecture (see Fig. 6.2) the traffic of one class can flow through other
queues, provided the other queues have empty slots, thereby ensuring better utiliza-
tion of buffer spaces available. For example, if the B-queue has some empty spaces
available and a bursty RT traffic comes in, the overflowed RT traffic can be queued
in the B-queue and subsequently served (or sent) through the B-server (transmitter).
6.3.1 Time and space priority
The time and space priority for the three queues of the proposed architecture are
explained in Figs. 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. For B-queue, BU packets have the highest
priority; RT and NRT packets have dynamic priority based on arrival rates (see
Eqns.(6.4) and (6.5)). Regarding space priority, BU packets are queued in front of
B-queue and if there are empty spaces available, other types (RT and NRT) can be
accommodated as shown in Fig. 6.3.
R-queue can have only RT and NRT packets as shown in Fig. 6.4. RT traffic
has higher priority over NRT traffic. Therefore, R-queue can have NRT packets
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Figure 6.3: Queue corresponding to BU band.
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Figure 6.4: Queue corresponding to RT band.
only if RT packets cannot fill the R-queue at any time and there are NRT packets
overflowed from the B-queue.
Finally, Fig. 6.5 shows the N-queue which is designated for NRT traffic. However,
if there are empty spaces available in this queue, overflowed RT traffic out of B-queue
can be enqueued in N-queue (see Fig. 6.2).
6.3.2 Scheduling algorithm
We have considered the following two crucial factors to ensure improved performance
of the multi-band MR:
• The unused buffer space of one queue (or band) can be used for other traffic
types, thereby reducing the system idle time.
µNαN NRT
RT
RT packets overflowed
from B-queue
Figure 6.5: Queue corresponding to NRT band.
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• Priorities of different traffic classes are considered while selecting a particular
type of packet over others. Priority has an inverse relationship with the arrival
rate of the corresponding traffic class.
The proposed scheduling policies are explained as follows:
• Attempts are first made to queue different class of traffic in their corresponding
buffer.
• If N-queue (or R-queue) overflows, the corresponding traffic is forwarded to
the B-queue.
• If B-queue does not have enough empty slots to handle the overflowed NRT and
RT packets, they race for slots in B-queue based on priority (see Eqns. (6.4)
and (6.5).
• If overflowed RT packets cannot be accommodated in B-queue, they are queued
in N-queue, if space is available in the queue.
• If the R-type packets cannot even be accommodated in N-queue, they are
dropped from the system.
• Similar policy is enforced when dealing with NRT packets in the B-queue and
then in the R-queue.
6.4 Analytical Model
In this section, we present our analytical model to derive various performance metrics
of the proposed multi-band mobile router architecture. First, the assumptions and
the notations of the model are listed in Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2, followed by the
analytical models in the subsequent subsections.
113
6.4.1 Assumptions
To make the model analytically tractable, the following assumptions have been made.
• Packet arrival follows a Poisson distribution [10, 12].
• Queue discipline is FIFO with non-preemptive priority among various traffic
classes.
6.4.2 Notations
The notations used in the analysis are listed below. To simplify our notation, we
use T as the common notation for different traffic class types, and T ∈ { B, N, R }.
NT Queue size of T -queue in the MR,
αT Total packet arrival rate at T -queue of i-th MN,
µT Service rate at T -queue of i-th MN,
σTBQ Priority of class-T traffic in B-queue,
PdTXQ T-type packet drop probability in X-queue, where X ∈ {B, N, R}
E(DT ) Average queuing delay of class T packets,
E(nT ) Average queue occupancy of class T packets,
P sysdT Final packet drop probability of class T packets.
6.4.3 Total arrival rates in each queue
For queuing analysis of the proposed system, we need to determine the total arrival
rate of all classes of traffic in each queue. In general, overflow in a queue can happen
when the arrival rate is larger than the buffer space or when the service rate is
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smaller than the arrival rate and there is no buffer space left, as specified by the
following conditions:
αT > NT or µT < αT . (6.1)
6.4.3.1 B-queue
Packets overflowed from N-queue and R-queue go to B-queue. Thus, the arrival
rates of N-type and R-type packets to the B-queue (denoted by α
′
N and α
′
R) can be
obtained as follows:
α
′
N = αNPdNNQ . (6.2)
α
′
R = αRPdRRQ . (6.3)
where PdNNQ and PdRRQ are packet drop probabilities of N-type packets in N-queue
and R-type packets in R-queue.
Priorities of different classes are taken into account while allowing traffic into B-
queue. Priority of B packets in B-queue is σBBQ = 1. Priorities of other classes of
traffic in B-queue are measured as follows:
σNBQ =
αR
αB + αR + αN
. (6.4)
σRBQ =
αN
αB + αR + αN
. (6.5)
Now, the total (effective) arrival rate of all classes of traffic in B-queue can be
obtained as follows:
αB(Total) = αB + α
′
N + α
′
R. (6.6)
6.4.3.2 N-Queue
The N-queue is designated for NRT traffic. However, if there are empty buffer spaces
available in the N-queue (due to low NRT arrival rate), this queue can be used to
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transmit the RT traffic that is overflowed from the B-queue. Let α
′′
R denote the
arrival rate of RT packets in N-queue. Then, the total arrival rate (of both N and
R-type packets) in the N-queue is:
αN(Total) = αN + α
′′
R. (6.7)
6.4.3.3 R-Queue
The R-queue is designated for RT traffic. However, if there is an empty buffer space
available in the R-queue (due to low RT arrival rate), this queue can be used to
transmit NRT traffic which has been overflowed from the B-queue. Let α
′′
N denote
the arrival rate of N-type packet going to R-queue. Then, the total arrival rate (of
both R and N-type packets) in the R-queue is:
αR(Total) = αR + α
′′
N . (6.8)
6.4.4 Packet drop probability
The packet drop probability of R-type packets in R-queue can be obtained using
standard M/M/1/N formula as follows [36]:
PdRRQ =
ρNRR (1− ρR)
1− ρNR+1R
. (6.9)
where ρR =
αR
µR
. Similarly, the packet drop probability of N-type packets in N-queue
can be obtained as follows:
PdNNQ =
ρNNN (1− ρN )
1− ρNN+1N
. (6.10)
where ρN =
αN
µN
. Let us assume that the priority of R-type packets is higher than
that of N-type packets in B-queue. Therefore, while computing the R-type packet
drop probability in B-queue, we can safely consider only B-type and R-type packets
in B-queue. Let us define utilization in B-queue as ρBR =
αB+α
′
R
µB
while considering
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only B-type and R-type packets in the B-queue. Thus, the packet drop probability
of B-type packet in B-queue, denoted by PdBBQ , can be obtained as follows [37]:
PdBBQ =
ρBRρ
NB
1 (1− ρ1)(1− ρNB+1BR )
(1− ρNB+11 )(1− ρNB+2BR )
. (6.11)
where ρ1 = αB/µB and ρ2 = α
′
R/µB. Using Eqn. (6.11), the packet drop probability
of R-packets in B-queue can obtained as follows [37]:
PdRBQ =
(1− ρBR)(
1− ρNB+2BR
)ρNB+1BR + αBα′R
(
(1− ρBR)(
1− ρNB+2BR
)ρNB+1BR − PdBBQ
)
. (6.12)
Hence, the RT packet arrival in N-queue can be obtained as follows:
α
′′
R = α
′
RPdRBQ . (6.13)
The total arrival of N-queue is the sum of two arrival rates αN and α
′′
R (see
Eqn. (6.7)); the former has the higher priority than the latter. Therefore, following
a similar approach as in Eqn. (6.11), we can compute PdNNQ . Then we can follow a
similar approach in Eqn. (6.12) to compute PdRNQ which is the final drop of R-type
packets from the system. That is, P sysdR = PdRNQ . The computation of N-type packet
drop probability follows similar steps as followed for R-type packets. Therefore,
P sysdN = PdNRQ .
6.4.5 Average queue length
Each queue behaves as an M/M/1/N queue. Therefore, the estimated queue length
can be obtained as follows:
E(nT ) =


ρT−(NT+1)ρ
NT +1
T
+NT ρ
(NT +2)
T(
1−ρT
)(
1−ρNT +1
T
) if ρT 6= 1
NT
2
if ρT = 1.
(6.14)
The average queue occupancy of R-type packets depends on the queue occupancy
of R-packets in R-queue, B-queue and N-queue. This is computed as follows:
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E(nsysR ) = E(n
RQ
R ) +E(n
BQ
R ) + E(n
NQ
R )
= E(nRQR ) +
(
E(nBQB+R)− E(nBQB )
)
+
(
E(nNQN+R)− E(nNQN )
)
. (6.15)
To compute E(nRQR ), we need to put NT = NR, ρT = ρR = αR/µR in Eqn. (6.14).
A similar approach can be used for the rest of the terms in Eqn. (6.15).
Since B-type packets are only queued in B-queue, the average queue occupancy of
the B-type packets in the system can be obtained as follows:
E(nsysB ) = E(n
BQ
B ). (6.16)
To compute the average queue occupancy of N-type packets in the system, a
similar approach as in Eqn. (6.15) can be used:
E(nsysN ) = E(n
NQ
N ) + E(n
BQ
N ) + E(n
RQ
N ). (6.17)
6.4.6 Throughput
The throughput of the T class of traffic can be obtained as follows:
γsysT =
(
1− P sysdT
)
αT . (6.18)
6.4.7 Average packet delay
The average packet delay of T class is given by,
E(DsysT ) =
E
(
nsysT
)(
1− P sysdT
)
αT
. (6.19)
6.5 Results
We have used a discrete event simulation in MATLAB by taking into account the
assumptions and scheduling policies mentioned in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. We have
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followed M/M/3/N procedures [36] for the implementation of simulation programs.
We have kept equal buffer length (50 packets) for each queue. Buffer lengths are kept
small [38] similar to real routers to decrease packet delay. RT and NRT packets are
assumed to be 512 bytes [30,39] whereas the BU packets are assumed to be 64 bytes.
The service rates of the B, N and R-queues are kept 27, 75 and 132 packets/sec which
is proportional to service rates of multi-band routers [30]. We ran each simulation
for 20 trials having different traffic class arrival rates as follows:
λB(i) = { i }, λN(i) = { 3i }, λR(i) = { 18i }
where i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 20. We have run simulations with increased arrival rates of all
types of traffic to observe the impact of heavy traffic on the multi-band system. The
arrival rates of B-queue and N-queue are increased slowly in each trial whereas the
RT traffic arrival rate is increased at a much higher rate. This eventually saturates
the R-queue and we explain the impact of this overflow on different performance
parameters of our proposed system and typical existing system.
6.5.1 Validation of analytical model
In this subsection, we show the simulation results for proposed architecture and com-
pare them with those produced by the analytical expressions derived in Section 6.4
to validate our analytical model.
6.5.1.1 Average class occupancy
Figure 6.6 shows the average class occupancy of the proposed multi-band system
obtained through simulations and analytical model. The simulation and analytical
results are very close to each other. The class occupancy of N-class and B-class are
very low as their service rate is higher than arrival rates. However, this is not the
case for R-class where the arrival rate is higher than R-queue service rate; hence,
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the excessive RT packets are enqueued in other two queues, thereby increasing the
average occupancy of R-class.
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6.5.1.2 Average class delay
Figure 6.7 shows the average class delay for the proposed multi-band system obtained
through simulations and analytical model. As we can see the simulation results are
close to the analytical one (for all three traffic types) though these exists little
differences between them because of discrete time simulation environment. Delays
for B, N and R classes depend on occupancy. Therefore, Fig. 6.7 follows the similar
patterns as in Fig. 6.6 with different rates.
6.5.1.3 Class drop rate
Figure 6.8 shows the class drop rate for the proposed multi-band system. Again
the simulation results closely match the analytical one. Drop rates of B-class and
N-class are low due to low arrival rate. However, the R-class drop rate rises as we
use very high arrival rates in subsequent trials.
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6.5.1.4 Class throughput
Figure 6.9 shows the class throughput for the proposed multi-band system. Again
the simulation result closely matches with the analytical one.
Thus, it is evident from Figs. 6.6, 6.7 6.8, and 6.9 that the analytical and simu-
lation results are very close to each other, thereby validating the analytical model.
6.5.2 Proposed architecture vs. typical architecture
In this subsection, we present results comparing the performance results of our
proposed (band-sharing) architecture and typical (non-sharing) architecture.
6.5.2.1 Utilization
Utilization is a performance measure that indicates how efficiently bands are used
and whether there is any unused capacity of the system. Figure 6.10 shows band
utilizations for proposed (shared) and typical (non-shared) architectures of multi-
band routers. When packet arrival rates are low (in trials #1 through 7) compared to
the capacity of each queue, all the queues have somewhat similar and low utilization
121
for both the architectures. However, for trials #8 through 20, the utilizations of B-
queue and N-queue are much higher for proposed architecture than for typical one.
This is because increased number of RT packets are dropped in typical architecture
(see Fig. 6.13) whereas in proposed one, they are accommodated in B-queue and
N-queue, thereby improving their utilizations and maximizing system performance.
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6.5.2.2 Average class occupancy
Figure 6.11 shows the average queue occupancies of each class of traffic (in the
system) for proposed and typical architecture. Average class occupancy for B-queue
and N-queue are similar for both architectures as we have used low arrival rates
(for BU and NRT) compared to the service rates. However, the RT arrival rates
are increased significantly (in trials # 7 through 20) compared to R-queue service
rate. As a result, the class occupancy for RT class is much higher for the proposed
architecture than the typical one. This is because a large amount of RT traffic
is transmitted though the other frequency bands as they are under-utilized having
empty buffer space.
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6.5.2.3 Average packet delay
Figure 6.12 shows the average packet delay of each class of traffic for proposed
and typical architecture. The delay for RT traffic (for trails # 8 through 20) in
proposed architecture is higher than the typical one. This is because excessive RT
packets are immediately dropped from the system in typical architecture and these
lost packets do not come into account in delay calculations. On the contrary, in
proposed architecture overflowed RT packets get chances to be enqueued in B and
N-queue before being dropped. RT packets are second priority packets in N-queue
and B-queue and they have to wait for NRT and BU packets, respectively before
being scheduled for service. Hence, it increases the delay of RT packets.
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Figure 6.12: Average packet delay for
proposed and typical architectures for
different simulation trials.
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Figure 6.13: Average packet delay for
proposed and typical architectures for
different simulation trials.
6.5.2.4 Packet drop probability
Figure 6.13 shows packet drop probability of each class for proposed and typical
architecture. For both the approaches, the drop rate of BU and NRT are low and
similar since the arrival rates are lower than the service rates. When the arrival rates
for RT increases (in trials # 7 through 20), RT packet drop rate gradually goes up
for typical (non-shared) architecture. However, the proposed architecture does not
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allow RT traffic to drop as long as the excessive RT packets can be queued in the
empty buffer spaces at B-queue and N-queue. Therefore, the RT packet drop rate
is much lower for proposed architecture than the typical one.
6.5.2.5 Throughput
Figure 6.14 shows the throughput of each class for proposed and typical architec-
tures. The throughput of NRT and BU class is increased with the increase of their
arrival rates for both architectures. However, in case of RT class and for the typi-
cal architecture, the throughput is saturated at µR (= 132 pkts/sec) when the RT
arrival rate reaches this value. However, the RT class throughput for the proposed
architecture goes much higher (due to sharing of other under-utilized bands) and
reaches its peak value in trial #11. After that it starts to decrease slowly due to the
impact of increased arrival rates of other queues (B and N-queue) that result in a
less available space for overflowed RT packets.
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Figure 6.14: Throughput of proposed and typical architectures for different simula-
tion trials.
124
6.5.3 Discussion on results
Our simulation results closely match the analytical ones (see Figs. 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, and
6.9), thereby validating our analytical model. Moreover, we find that the proposed
architecture attempts to maximize the system utilization (Fig. 6.10) through band
sharing. This affects the average queue occupancy and delay of RT traffic (Fig. 6.11
and 6.12). However, the packet drop and throughput (Figs. 6.13 and 6.14) are
significantly improved in the proposed band-sharing architecture.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel scheduling algorithm for multi-band mo-
bile routers that exploits a band sharing approach to attain the maximum possible
utilization. We have developed an analytical model to a perform queuing analysis of
the proposed multi-band system and derived various performance metrics that have
been validated through extensive simulations. Our results show that the proposed
architecture can ensure the maximum possible utilization through the sharing of
capacities among the bands. Our proposed scheduling algorithm and the related
analytical model can help network engineers build next generation mobile routers
with higher throughput and utilization ensuring the least packet loss for different
classes of traffic.
In the next chapter, we focus on the quantitative survivability evaluation of
mobile networks.
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Chapter 7
Survivability Analysis of NEMO
Survivability is a crucial aspect for any kind communication. A survivable network
has the ability to withstand malicious attacks and continue to work properly even
in the presence of natural or man-made disturbances. Wireless and mobile networks
have the challenge of survivability, since users are mobile and the communication
channels are accessible to anyone. The mobile router acts as the gateway for all the
nodes inside the mobile network and it is the key entity in NEMO. Since a single MR
can be single point of failure, increase in number of MRs can improve the reliability
of NEMO. However, there has been no survivability analysis of multiple MR-based
NEMO. In this chapter, we have performed quantitative survivability analysis of
NEMO with multiple MRs, taking into consideration possible node and link failures
along with Denial of Service attacks.
7.1 Introduction
Network survivability is a crucial aspect for any kind communication. A survivable
network has the ability to withstand malicious attacks and continue to work properly
even in the presence of natural or man-made disturbances. It focuses on delivery
of essential services and rapid recovery of full services when situation improves [40,
41]. Wireless and mobile networks have the challenge of survivability, since users
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are mobile and the communication channels are accessible to anyone. Hence, it is
essential to analyze the survivability of NEMO.
The mobile network can have one or more mobile routers that act as the gateways
for all the nodes inside the mobile network known as Mobile Network Nodes (MNN).
These MRs connect the MNNs to the global Internet, forwarding signaling traffic
required for mobility management as well as data traffic to the desired Internet hosts.
As the MR is the key entity in NEMO, the load on the MR can be very high as
the MR has to deal with every ongoing session between any MNN and any Internet
node. In addition, the MR sends signaling messages to the Home Agent whenever
the mobile network changes its point of attachment. Therefore, the MR can become
the performance bottleneck for the mobile network. Hence, increase of number of
MRs can improve the performance and enhance reliability of the network as a single
MR in NEMO can be single point of failure. Therefore, we are interested in the
survivability analysis of NEMO.
Earlier attempts [41–46] focused on the redundancy and load balancing of the
mobility agents, such as, home agent to improve the survivability mobility protocol.
These works did not focus on the survivability of mobile router. However, Kuntz
et al. [47] proposed that the cooperation of multiple mobile routers in NEMO can
improve the bandwidth, network coverage and reliability as well as incorporate dy-
namic load sharing among the MRs. The solution was based on Neighbor Discovery
and was validated by a real testbed. Our work aims at quantitative survivability of
mobile routers to improve the performance of NEMO.
There have been a few works on network survivability evaluation. Chen et al. [40]
used a Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) model to evaluate the end-to-end
availability of wireless ad hoc networks. Heegaard et al. [48] developed an analytical
model to assess the survivability of a network with virtual connections exposed to
link or node failures; the model has been validated by simulations. Fu et al. [49]
performed the survivability analysis of SIGMA and Mobile IP which are based on
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multiple location managers for mobility management. However, the author is not
aware of any survivability evaluation of NEMO that considers various failure types
and denial of service attacks which can drastically degrade the performance of the
mobile network. This work differs from previous work in this respect and is believed
to be the first such work.
The objective of the work presented in this chapter is to perform quantitative
survivability evaluation of NEMO with multiple MRs, taking into consideration
different failure types as well as malicious attack traffic. We have used the CTMC
as the analytical tool to develop the survivability model.
The contributions of the work presented in this chapter are: (i) developing a
survivability model for NEMO to compute the packet drop probability and mean
packet delay through CTMC modeling, and (ii) presenting numerical results showing
performance and delay metrics while under attacks or failures.
Our results reveal interesting relationship among network performance, failure
rates and attack strengths. Our developed model can be used by the network engi-
neers to evaluate survivability and robustness of their networks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2 the survivability
model is presented. Section 7.3 presents the numerical results. Section 7.4 has the
concluding remarks.
7.2 Survivability Analysis
Figure 7.1 shows the architecture of NEMO with multiple MRs that has been consid-
ered for the survivability evaluation. The survivability evaluation of the multihomed
NEMO aims at providing improved availability of the nodes inside the mobile net-
work and allowing load-sharing among the routers.
128
Figure 7.1: NEMO with multiple mobile routers.
7.2.1 Assumptions
Following assumptions have been made to make our model tractable:
• Total packet arrival to the NEMO is assumed to be λ which includes data
packets, signaling packets and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack
packets. Arrival of all such packets are Poisson processes.
• There is no way to distinguish between legitimate data (or signaling) packets
and the DDoS attack packets.
• Processing time for data, signaling and DDoS packets are exponentially dis-
tributed, having the same mean value (µ). This assumption is made to limit
the complexity of the CTMC model.
• We are assuming that MRs act in such a way that load on each MR is shared
among them similar to the approach specified in [47].
• Only one MR (with highest load) may fail at a time .
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• The failure of one MR does not halt the whole mobile network.
• Packets in the buffer of a failed MR are assumed to have been dropped. If
at any time there are R routers and B packets in the system, then due to a
router failure L1 = ⌈BR⌉ packets in the failed router’s buffer will be lost.
• Link failure may happen for any router in the mobile network. If at any time
there are R routers and B packets in the system, the link failure will only
reduce the number of packets in the system by L2 = ⌊BR⌋ and those L2 packets
are considered to remain in the router buffer and will add to the total count
when this link is up again at a recovery rate of δ2.
7.2.2 Notations
The notations used in this chapter are listed as follows:
Nr Total number of MRs in the mobile network,
Ri Number of available MRs in state i,
Bi Number of packets in state i,
S Queue size (in number of packets) of each MR,
λd arrival rate of data packets,
λs arrival rate of signaling packets,
λa arrival rate of DDoS attack packets,
λ Total arrival rate, i.e., λ = λd + λs + λa,
µ Processing rate,
γ1 Node failure rate,
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γ2 Link failure rate,
δ1 Repair rate from node failure,
δ2 Repair rate from link failure,
ψ1 Irreversible node failure rate (when node failure cannot be repaired),
ψ2 Irreversible link failure rate (when a link failure cannot be repaired),
β Rate of introducing a error-free MR to the system.
7.2.3 Survivability model with multiple MRs
We use a CTMC model for the survivability analysis of NEMO with multiple MRs.
There are Nr MRs in the mobile network each of which has a buffer of size S. Errors
can happen in two ways: node failure or link failure. Node failure can happen due to
hardware failure of the MR or battery power failure. Link failure can happen when
a MR loses connection with the Access Router of the home/foreign network.
Figure 7.2 shows the state transition diagram of the CTMC model. Each state of
the model is labeled as (I, J,K) where I represents number of active (or available)
routers in the mobile network, J represents total number of packets in the system,
and K represents type of failure, where I ∈ {0, 1, 2, .., Nr}, J ∈ {0, 1, 2, .., SNr
}, and K ∈ {0, 1, 2} (0 for no failure, 1 for node failure, 2 for link failure). The
states with K = 1, and K = 2 are intermediate states and these (node and link)
failure may or may be resolved, thereby leading to the states with K = 0 (i.e., no
error states). In the case of recovery (involving transition rates of δ1 or δ2), the next
state will have the same number of MRs. In case of no recovery scenarios (involving
transition rates of ψ1 or ψ2), the next state will have one less MRs than the current
state.
Figure 7.2 shows the transition diagram using a representative state of (R,B, 0)
which means that there are R active MRs with a total number of B packets in the
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Figure 7.2: State transition diagram of NEMO with multiple mobile routers.
system in a ”no failure” state. The possible states that can be reached from this
state are:
• Arrival of packets: This event will lead to the state (R,B + 1, 0) with a tran-
sition rate of λ/R.
• Departure of a packet: This will lead to the state (R,B−1, 0) with a transition
rate of Rµ.
• Node failure: This event happens for the MR with heaviest load, having L1 =
⌈B
R
⌉ packets which will be lost as a result of the failure. This leads to the state
(R− 1, B − L1, 1) with a rate of Rγ1.
• Link failure: This can happen for any of the active MRs having L2 = ⌊BX ⌋
packets in its queue. The event leads to the state (R − 1, B − L2, 2) with a
rate of Rγ2.
The following events from the following states can lead to the state (R,B, 0):
• Departure of a packet from the state (R,B + 1, 0).
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• Arrival of a packet from the state (R,B − 1, 0).
• Recovery of node failure from the state (R − 1, B, 1).
• Recovery of link failure from the state (R− 1, B − L2, 2).
• From the state (R− 1, B, 0) and due to the introduction an error-free MR.
When Ri < Nr, number of states is 3(RiS+1); for Ri = Nr, it is SNr+1. Thus,
the number of states with Ri MRs can be expressed as follows:
fs(Ri) =


3(RiS + 1), when Ri < Nr
SRi + 1, when Ri = Nr
(7.1)
Therefore, the size n of the generator matrix Q, can be obtained as follows:
n = |K|
Nr−1∑
i=0
(iS + 1) + (SNr + 1)
= 3
(
S
Nr−1∑
i=0
i+
Nr−1∑
i=0
1
)
+ (SNr + 1)
=
SNr
2
(3Nr − 1) + (3Nr + 1).
(7.2)
We number the states (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), and (0, 0, 2) as states 1, 2 and 3, respec-
tively. Hence, the states (1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 2), and so on are numbered as states
4, 5, 6, and so on.
For the CTMC shown in Fig. 7.2, we can determine each element of the generator
matrix Q = [qi,j] (0 ≤ i, j ≤ n) as follows:
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qi,j =


λ/Ri, j = i+ 3, Bi ≤ SRi (arrival)
Riµ, j = i− 3, Bi ≥ 1 (departure)
Riγ1, j = i− fs(Ri − 1)− (3
⌈
Bi
Ri
⌉− 1) (node failure)
Riγ2, j = i− fs(Ri − 1)− (3
⌊
Bi
Ri
⌋− 1) (link failure)
δ1, j = i+ fs(Ri)− 1 (node repair)
δ2/(S + 1), j = i+ fs(Ri)− 2 + 3X (link repair)
β, j = i+ fs(Ri) (new MR introduction)
0, other j 6= i
−∑nk=1 qi,k, j = i, k 6= i.
Let us explain each of the transition rates of qi,j in details.
• Arrival: The arrival of packets in any state increases the number of packets in
the system by 1 as long as there is buffer space available in the system, i.e.,
Bi ≤ SRi.
• Departure: The transmission (departure) rate of the system is proportional to
number of available MRs at any time.
• Node failure: The node failure happens for the MR with highest load, and
Ri > 0. This will cause the packets in the failed MR to be lost.
• Link failure: The link failure can happen for any link involving an active MR
and the AR when Ri > 0.
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• Node repair: This increases number of available MR(s) by 1 with no addition
in the number of packets.
• Link repair: The link repair can bring a MR into the system with X number
of packets, where X ∈ {0, 1, .., S}.
• Introduction of new MR: This increments the number of active MRs by 1
without increasing the number of packets in the system.
Once the infinitesimal generator matrix Q have been determined, the steady state
probability distribution (pi) of the CTMC can be obtained as follows:
piQ = 0. (7.3)
When a packet arrives, if the system is in state (0, 0, K) or state (Ri, SRi, K)
(whereK ∈ {0, 1, 2}), the packet is dropped due to lack of buffer space in the system.
Therefore, the dropping probability can be calculated by:
Pd = piD
T
where D = [D0,D1, · · ·Dj · · ·DNr ],
and Dj = [0, · · · 0, 1, 1, 1]3(jS+1) , j = 0, · · · , Nr − 1
and DNr = [0, · · · 0, 1]SNr+1. (7.4)
The average number of packets (E(m)) in the whole system can be determined as
follows:
E[m] = pivT
where v = [v0, v1, · · · vj · · · vNr ]
and vj = [0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, · · · , Sj + 1, 0, 0], j = 0, · · · , Nr − 1
and vNr = [0, 1, 2, · · · , SNr]. (7.5)
Hence, we can obtain the average packet delay using Little’s law as follows:
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E[T ] =
E[m]
λaccepted
=
E[m]
λ(1− Pd)
. (7.6)
7.2.4 Survivability model with single MR
The transition diagram for NEMO with single MR is a simplified version of Fig. 7.2
which is shown in Fig. 7.3. Here, the total number of states is S + 4.
Figure 7.3: State transition diagram for NEMO with one MR.
We number the states (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (1, 2, 0), . . . ,(1, S, 0) as states 1, 2, 3, .., (S+
1). The states (0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 2), and (0, 0, 0) are numbered as (S+2) through (S+4).
The generator matrix Q can be expressed as follows:
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qi,j =


λ, j = i+ 1, Bi ≤ S,Ri = 1 (arrival)
µ, j = i− 1, Bi ≥ 1, Ri = 1 (departure)
γ1, i ≤ S + 1, j = S + 2 (node failure)
γ2, i ≤ S + 1, j = S + 3 (link failure)
δ1, i = S + 2, j = 1 (node repair)
δ2/(S + 1), i = S + 3, j ≤ S + 1 (link repair)
β, i = S + 2, j = 1 (new MR introduction)
0, other j 6= i
−∑nk=1 qi,k, j = i, k 6= i.
Steps similar to Eqns. (7.3)-(7.6) can be followed to compute the steady state
probabilities, packet dropping probabilities, the average number of packets in the
system and the average packet delay.
7.3 Results
In this section, we evaluate the survivability of NEMO using the analytical model
developed in Secs. 7.2.3 and 7.2.4. The values of the system parameters are listed in
Table 10.2 which are similar to [40]. We explain the logic behind setting these values
to the system parameters. The data packet arrival rate is kept 100 packets/sec and
the signaling traffic rate is used as one-tenth of data traffic. Node failures happen
once in every 500 sec whereas link failures happen twice in every 500 sec. Link
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recovery requires twice the node recovery time as it might be difficult to detect in
the first place. Some failure may be fatal or irreversible with very small rates.
Table 7.1: Values of system parameters used in numerical analysis.
Parameters Meaning Value
λd Data packet arrival rate 100 per sec
λs Signaling packet arrival rate 10 per sec
µ packet transmission rate 300 per sec
γ1 Node failure rate 0.002 per sec
γ2 Link failure rate 0.004 per sec
1/δ1 Node repair time 10 sec
1/δ2 Link repair time 20 sec
ψ1 Irreversible node failure rate 0.00001 per sec
ψ2 Irreversible link failure rate 0.00002 per sec
β Rate of introducing error-free MR 0.001 per sec
S Queue size 15 packets
Figure 7.4 shows the impact of DDoS attack strength on the packet drop prob-
ability at MR for different queue size. We have used Nr = 3 for this graph. It is
found that with increasing DDoS attack strength, the packet drop probability in-
creases drastically compared to its normal values as there is no way to distinguish
between legitimate data (or signaling) packets and the DDoS attack packets. In ad-
dition, more packets are dropped for smaller queue size as the buffer slots are filled
up quickly by the attack packets.
Figure 7.5 shows the impact of number of MRs and failure rates on the mean
packet delay. It is found that increase in number of MRs reduces the mean delay
since long queues cannot develop in a MR; rather packets are distributed among the
MRs and get served faster. Moreover, the mean delay is higher for higher failure
rates since higher failure rates may cause more packets to be queued in the active
MRs, thereby increasing the delay.
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Figure 7.6 shows the impact of mean time to recover (MTTR) on the average
packet drop probability for different data packet arrival rates. In this case, we have
assumed the failure recovery times for node and link failures to be equal. It is found
that higher MTTR causes more packets to be dropped due to the lack of sufficient
number of active MRs. In addition, higher data traffic rate raises the packet drop
rate since more data packets are fed into the system, causing more drops.
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In Fig. 7.7, the impact of DDoS attack strength on the mean packet delay is
shown for two NEMO scenarios. We have used S = 10 for this graph. Mean delay
increases for higher values of λa, as more attack traffic causes queues to be filled up
with these traffic, raising the delay for all the packets. Moreover, the delay is higher
for single MR case, as this means lower queue size and less processing speed for the
incoming packets in the system.
Figure 7.8 shows the impact of queue size on the packet drop probability at
MR for different recovery times. Larger queue size can accommodate more packets,
thereby reducing the drop rate. On the other hand, lower recovery time causes nodes
or links to be up again, resulting in better performance, i.e., lower drop probability.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have developed an analytical model for quantitative survivability
evaluation of NEMO with multiple mobile routers taking into consideration possible
natural or man-made failures as well as DDoS attacks. Our results reveal interesting
relationships among network performance, failure rates and attack strengths. It is
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found that increase in the number of mobile routers reduces the mean delay and drop
probability of data packets while withstanding attack packets. Our survivability
model can be used as a framework for quantitative survivability evaluation of other
host or network-based mobility protocols.
Next, we perform experimental evaluation of multihomed NEMO which aims at
seamless handover and increased availability.
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Chapter 8
Experimental Evaluation of Multihomed NEMO
In the previous chapter, we performed quantitative survivability analysis of NEMO
having multiple routers. In this chapter, we propose a seamless handover scheme
for multi-homed NEMO architecture by exploiting the multihoming feature (having
multiple physical network interfaces) of the mobile router. We perform experimen-
tal evaluation for the handoff performance of the proposed multihomed NEMO and
compare it with NEMO basic architecture. Results demonstrate that the proposed
multihomed NEMO outperforms the basic NEMO while achieving seamless han-
dover.
8.1 Introduction
Mobile router plays the key role in a mobile network and acts as the gateway for
all its nodes, connects them to the global Internet, forwarding signaling traffic as
well as data traffic to the desired remote hosts. Mobile router usually has higher
transmission capability and is usually powered by the vehicle. In basic NEMO, the
MR uses single interface to connect to the access network. During the handover
of NEMO, the MR has to break the connection with the old access network before
establishing a connection (‘break-before-make’) with new access network, resulting in
high handover latency and packet loss. Applications that are highly sensitive to delay
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and packet loss are affected badly due to NEMO protocol operation. Therefore, it is
essential to ensure seamless handover of the mobile network so that the performance
of real-time applications (e.g., voice-over-IP) is not compromised.
Original NEMO supported only one (primary) care-of-address to be registered
with its home agent (or correspondent node). However, multiple physical interfaces
in a mobile node can benefit from increased availability, fault tolerance, ubiqui-
tous access, load balancing, and flow distribution through simultaneous wireless
access, thereby reducing the delay and packet loss during handoff. Recently, IETF
has proposed extension to NEMO allowing Multiple Care-of-Addresses registration
(MCoA) [50] although it has not specified the way to exploit it to ensure seamless
handover between access networks. The MCoA registration policy can be used to
establish a new connection before breaking the old one, known as make-before-break
strategy.
There have been several works related to NEMO with MCoA. Pan et al. [51] pro-
posed a capacity-aware MCoA framework for mobile nodes to choose the preferred
link with highest available bandwidth, without having any experimental validation.
Romain [52] demonstrated the fault-tolerance and load-balancing of NEMO MCoA
with an experimental testbed although the handover was not seamless. Chen et
al. [53] proposed another handover algorithm for NEMO in a heterogeneous envi-
ronment and analyzed the performance through experimentation. Sazzad et al. [54]
compared the performance of NEMO with a transport layer mobility protocol using
experimental testbed. Petander et al. [55] measured the handoff performance and
routing overheads of multihomed NEMO using an experimental testbed. However,
they [54, 55] did not use MCoA registration feature of NEMO. The author is not
aware of any thorough experimental evaluation of NEMO MCoA that exploits the
make-before-break strategy. Our work differs from the previous works in a way that
we have used a cross layer approach to exploit the extension of multihomed NEMO
143
and presented a thorough analysis of experimental results demonstrating seamless
handover of NEMO.
Our objective of the work presented in this chapter is to exploit the multihom-
ing feature of NEMO to achieve seamless handover and to demonstrate it through
experimentation. Our proposed scheme is a cross layer approach which senses link
layer signal strength in the overlapping area and makes the soft handover decision,
thereby reducing delay and packet loss during handoff.
Our contributions in this chapter are (i) proposing the system framework for
NEMO MCoA that exploits ‘make-before-break’ strategy to achieve seamless han-
dover through multihoming, and (ii) evaluating the handover performance of the
proposed scheme and comparing it with NEMO through real experimental testbed.
Our experimental results validate that our proposed scheme outperforms basic
NEMO in terms of handoff delay, round trip time and throughput– three major
performance metrics for any mobility management scheme.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Our proposed seamless NEMO
architecture is explained in Section 8.2. In Section 8.3, the experimental setup for
basic NEMO and NEMO MCoA is described, followed by the experimental results
in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 concludes the chapter.
8.2 Seamless Handover Scheme for NEMO
Original NEMO basic support protocol allowed only one care-of-address registration
per home address of a mobile router. Wireless devices available nowadays have mul-
tiple network interfaces that aim at constant connectivity with the Internet through
different access technologies, such as Wi-Fi, GPS, 3G networks. Recently IETF has
proposed extension to NEMO allowing MCoA registration [50] of a MR’s home ad-
dress in the HA. However, the IETF RFC 5648 [50] has not specified the way to
exploit MCoA feature to ensure seamless handover between wireless access networks.
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Figure 8.1: Architecture of multi-homed NEMO.
We propose a cross layer approach that works in combination with MCoA regis-
tration policy to ensure seamless handover for multihomed NEMO (see Fig. 8.1) in
which the MR has multiple network interfaces that can acquire IP prefixes from ARs
while residing in the overlapping radio coverage area. The MR then sends binding
update to the HA to register the acquired CoAs in HA’s binding cache (facilitated by
IETF’s MCoA registration policy [50]). This ensures establishing a new connection
before breaking the old one (called make-before-break strategy). The new CoA is
sent (through BU) to the CN so that traffic is sent through the new AR to avoid
packet loss during handover. The MR also scans the link layer signal strength to
make decision of handoff to the stronger access network. We name our proposed
scheme as M-NEMO since it exploits the multihoming feature.
The proposed soft handover process of M-NEMO is explained briefly using a
flow diagram in Fig. 8.2. The MR obtains CoAs from ARs through MR’s multiple
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Figure 8.2: Soft handover algorithm using M-NEMO.
interfaces and compares the link layer signal strength to make decision to handoff
to the higher valued signal. This ensures least packet loss and delay during handoff.
8.3 Experimental Setup
For the performance evaluation of basic NEMO and M-NEMO, we have used Linux-
based experimental testbeds. The testbed setup for basic NEMO and M-NEMO are
described in the following subsections.
8.3.1 NEMO testbed setup
There exists several open source implementation for Basic NEMO, e.g., NEPL [56],
SHISHA [57], etc. For our NEMO testbed setup, we used the NEPL implementation
since we are using a Linux-based testbed for M-NEMO and NEPL is based on
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Figure 8.3: Testbed architecture for basic NEMO.
Linux platform unlike SHISHA which uses BSD platform. This will ensure a fair
comparison with M-NEMO testbed.
Figure 8.3 shows the experimental testbed for basic NEMO where the mobile
network has single level of nesting. Table 8.1 summarizes the hardware and soft-
ware configurations of the devices used in the NEMO testbed. To capture the real
network phenomena, the testbed is connected to the University of Oklahoma (OU)
operational network that carries production traffic.
The testbed architecture of NEMO consists of home network (which advertises
the home prefix 2001:a:b:0::/64), foreign network (which advertises the foreign net-
work prefix 2001:a:d:1::/64), CN, MR, and LFN. The access networks (home or
foreign) are connected to CS network. The global IPv6 prefix of the CS network is
2001:468:a02:78::/64. All the devices of the mobile network were placed on a trolley
that was moved between the home and the foreign network, and handover data was
captured using wireshark network protocol analyzer.
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Table 8.1: Configuration of devices for basic NEMO testbed.
No
Device
Type
Software Configuration Hardware Configuration
1 MR Debian 2.6.22 Kernel +
NEPL
CPU: Intel Pentium 4, 2.20 GHz, 512 MB
RAM, NIC: 802.11 based Netgear MA111
2 LFN FC5 + FTP Client CPU: Intel Pentium 4, 1.73 GHz, 1 GB
RAM
3 HA Debian 2.6.22 Kernel +
NEPL
CPU: Intel Pentium 4, 1.50 GHz, 512 MB
RAM
4 AR1 FC6 2.6.18-1 kernel +
radvd-1.0
CPU: Intel P4, 1.50 GHz, 512 MB RAM
5 AR2 FC6 2.6.18-1 kernel +
radvd-1.0
CPU: Intel P4, 1.73 GHz, 512 MB RAM
6 APs Channel 6 and Channel
11
DLink WBR-1319
7 CN FC5 + FTP Server CPU: Intel Celeron, 2.8 GHz, 512 MB
RAM
8.3.2 M-NEMO testbed setup
Figure 8.4 shows the experimental testbed for M-NEMO and Table 8.2 summarizes
the hardware and software configuration of the devices used in the testbed. The
testbed configurations are almost similar to each other. Some of the devices, such
as AR1 and AR2 are exactly the same while other devices have very little differences
between them and it does not have much impact on the output pattern. As shown
in Fig. 8.4, there are two access routers, AR1 and AR2 that advertises two foreign
prefixes (2001:a:d:1::/64 and 2001:a:c:1::/64, respectively). The MR is now equipped
with two wireless NIC cards that can connect to both the foreign links simultaneously
whenever the mobile network is in the radio coverage area of both ARs. In that case,
the MCoA registration is done in the HA and we can verify the addresses through
bc command in the HA as shown in Fig. 8.5.
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Figure 8.4: Testbed architecture for M-NEMO.
Table 8.2: Configuration of devices for M-NEMO testbed.
No
Device
Type
Software Configuration Hardware Configuration
1 MR Ubuntu 8.04 Kernel
2.6.23 + NEPL
CPU: Intel Core 2 Duo, 2.20 GHz, 2 GB
RAM, NIC: 802.11 based two Netgear
MA111
2 LFN Windows XP + FTP
Client
CPU: Intel Celeron, 2.19 GHz, 256 MB
RAM
3 HA Ubuntu 8.04 Kernel
2.6.23 + NEPL
CPU: Intel Core 2 Duo, 2.20 GHz, 2 GB
RAM
4 AR1 FC6 2.6.18-1 kernel +
radvd-1.0
CPU: Intel P4, 1.50 GHz, 512 MB RAM
5 AR2 FC6 2.6.18-1 kernel +
radvd-1.0
CPU: Intel P4, 1.73 GHz, 512 MB RAM
6 APs Channel 6 and Channel
11
DLink WBR-1310
7 CN Windows Vista + FTP
Server
CPU: Intel Core 2 Duo, 2.2 GHz, 2 GB
RAM
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Figure 8.5: Binding cache entry in Home Agent for M-NEMO.
8.4 Results
The experimental results are presented in this section. We measure the throughput,
Round Trip Time (RTT) and handoff latency by analyzing the packet flows through
Wireshark network protocol analyzer at the CN, MR and LFN.
8.4.1 Throughput
The rate at which payload data are received at any node is termed as its throughput.
In our experiment, LFN receives data traffic from CN. We measure throughput at
the LFN by analyzing the wireshark capture data.
Figure 8.6 shows the throughput at LFN for NEMO BSP tested during handoff
between home network and foreign network. The variations in throughput graph
within a network is caused by the network congestion resulting from cross traffic
in CS operational network. However, while the mobile network performs handover
from the home to foreign network between t = 23 sec and t = 36 sec , the throughput
(at LFN) becomes zero for about 13 sec. The LFN does not receive any data from
the CN during this period which is explained further in Section 8.4.2.
Figure 8.7 shows the throughput at LFN for M-NEMO testbed. Unlike NEMO
BSP, the throughput in M-NEMO does not drop to zero during the handoff period
t = 20.073 sec to t = 20.148 sec. This verifies that M-NEMO throughput is not
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Figure 8.6: Throughput at LFN for
NEMO BSP.
Figure 8.7: Throughput at LFN for M-
NEMO.
affected much by the handoff as the communication can continue through the MR’s
other network interface. Thus, M-NEMO is benefitted by the multihoming feature
of MR unlike NEMO BSP.
8.4.2 Handover latency
Handover latency is defined as the time interval between the last data segment
received through the old access network and the first data segment received through
the new access network. In order to measure the handover latency of NEMO BSP,
we analyzed the wireshark capture data at the LFN (see Fig. 8.8). As we moved
from the home network to foreign network, the MR acquired CoA from the foreign
network, sent binding update to the HA (at t = 29.528 sec) and received the binding
acknowledgement from the HA (at t = 31.135 sec). We also found that the last data
segment (with sequence number 999) received by the LFN through the old AP is
at t = 23.2397 sec, whereas the first data segment (with sequence number 1000)
received through the new AP is at t = 36.1593 sec. Therefore, the handover latency
is 12.9196 sec (36.1593 - 23.2397).
For M-NEMO, the TCP sequence numbers received at the LFN are plotted in
Fig. 8.9. Initially, the MN was in the AR1’s radio coverage area, so the HA had only
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Figure 8.8: TCP sequence numbers of
data received at LFN in NEMO BSP.
Figure 8.9: TCP sequence numbers of
data received at LFN in M-NEMO.
one binding entry in its binding cache. Next, we moved towards the AR2. We found
that the MR received the router advertisement from AR2 at t = 11.5487 sec. This
means that the MN entered the radio coverage area of AR2 and acquired second
CoA from AR2 and notifies HA to register both CoAs. Thus, the make-before-break
was achieved by the MR. At t = 20.0735 sec, LFN received the last packet (with
sequence number 1021) through AR1, and at t = 20.1484 sec, the first packet with
sequence number 1022) through AR2 arrived at the LFN. Therefore, the handover
latency for M-NEMO is 75 msec (20.1484 - 20.0735). As in Fig. 8.9, there is almost
no gap between sequence numbers during M-NEMO handover which verifies that
LFN did not face in any disruption in receiving data segment during handoff. This
essentially demonstrates the seamless handoff capability of M-NEMO through soft
handover by exploiting MR’s multihoming facility.
We ran experiments for 10 different trials and the handoff latencies for each run
of NEMO BSP and M-NEMO are shown in Figs. 8.10 and 8.11, respectively. The
average values of the handoff latencies are shown in (blue and red) straight lines
which are 12.96 sec and 75 ms for NEMO and M-NEMO, respectively. Using two-
sample right-tail t-test, we found that the t-test rejects the null hypothesis with
5% significance level. The 95% confidence interval on the mean of the differences
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Figure 8.10: Handoff latency bar chart for NEMO BSP.
between NEMO and M-NEMO handoff latencies is at least 12.91 sec. Thus the
hypothesis testing verifies that mean handoff latency of M-NEMO is much less than
NEMO BSP.
8.4.3 Retransmissions during handoff
From our analysis, we found that a large number of packets were retransmitted by
the CN due to the large handoff latency (connection disruption). This is shown
in Fig. 8.12 where we find that data segments with sequence number 1000, 1001,
and 1002 were retransmitted thrice, twice and twice, respectively. The following
segments were retransmitted once. This forces CN to back off, and the timeout
value for the TCP sender at CN is increased, thereby producing poor throughput at
the LFN during handoff (see Fig. 8.6).
However, this is not the case for M-NEMO testbed. As shown in Fig. 8.13, we can
see that there were fewer number of retransmissions (10) than NEMO BSP testbed
(28). Hence, the throughput of M-NEMO did not drop drastically during handoff.
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Figure 8.11: Handoff latency bar chart for M-NEMO.
8.4.4 Round trip time
RTT is measured by the difference in time between the CN sending a packet and
receiving the corresponding acknowledgement. In case of lost (data or acknowledge-
ment) packets, the RTT takes time difference between successful reception time of
Acknowledgement at CN and first time sent time of the data packet.
Figure 8.14 shows the RTT between CN and LFN measured at CN for NEMO
BSP. The gap in the RTT graph (between t = 23 sec and t = 36 sec) represents the
handoff when the connection was interrupted. This disruption caused retransmission
timeout at CN due to lost data or acknowledgement packets. So the CN started to
retransmit those packets. Hence, we observe the sudden spike (of around 15 sec) in
the RTT graph of NEMO. Packets transmitted during handover period suffer from
large RTT which is also explained earlier in Fig. 8.12.
Figure 8.15 shows the RTT between CN and LFN measured at CN for M-NEMO.
The values of the RTT remains fairly stable during the handoff period (t = 20 sec)
of M-NEMO. There are few small spikes due to the cross traffic from CS production
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Figure 8.12: Number of retransmissions
during NEMO BSP handoff.
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Figure 8.13: Number of retransmissions
during M-NEMO handoff.
Figure 8.14: RTT observed at the CN
in NEMO BSP.
Figure 8.15: RTT observed at the CN
in M-NEMO.
network. The stability of RTT implies that packet loss during handoff is minimum,
thereby confirming M-NEMO handover to be seamless.
8.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a seamless handover scheme for NEMO exploiting
the multihoming feature of the mobile router. We have used experimental testbeds
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to measure the handoff performance (throughput, round trip time, and handoff la-
tency) of multihomed NEMO and compared it with basic NEMO. Results show that
basic NEMO and multihomed NEMO have handover delay of 13 sec and 75 msec,
respectively. In addition, the throughput remains fairly unaffected during handoff.
Thus, our experimental results validates that our proposed scheme outperforms ba-
sic NEMO in terms of handoff delay, round trip time and throughput– three major
performance metrics for any mobility management scheme.
In the next chapter, we focus on the security issues and corresponding defense
mechanisms of the mobility management protocols.
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Chapter 9
Security Issues of Mobility Protocols
Mobility protocols can be vulnerable to security threats. This is because the commu-
nication media is wireless (therefore, easily accessible by attackers) and the mobility
protocols require data to be delivered to a node which are moving and can have
multiple point-of-attachments. These special features in mobile computing have in-
troduced several security issues. Any malicious agent can try to fool mobility agents
by sending spoofed control messages and redirecting traffic away from the victim
nodes, hijacking ongoing sessions, or even modifying the contents if proper pro-
tection mechanisms are not enforced. In this chapter, we explain with illustrative
examples major security threats on various components of the network due to IP-
mobility protocols. We have analyzed the existing defense mechanisms along with
their capabilities and limitations to prevent or mitigate the security threats. We
also propose an effective defense mechanism for SIGMA to protect against possible
threats from malicious agents.
9.1 Introduction
IP-mobility protocols require signaling among the mobility agents to keep track of
the mobile node’s current location and maintain its reachability. Moreover, mobility
protocols that employ route optimization (to ensure direct data path between end
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hosts) are required to send binding updates to its correspondent nodes and it can
significantly improve the performance of mobility protocols. However, these binding
updates are vulnerable to various attacks since malicious agents may send fabricated
binding updates to deceive mobile host, home agent or its correspondent node. Thus,
the requirement of seamless connectivity in mobile environment and use of route
optimization techniques between the communicating nodes have introduced several
security issues in IPv6 networks.
Some of the major threats for mobility protocols are traffic redirection attack,
man-in-the-middle attack, replay attack, bombing attack, denial-of-service attack,
home agent poisoning, etc. These are serious threats for the integrity and confiden-
tiality of data packets, leading to session hijacking and resource exhaustion as well
as degrading performance of key network entities.
To prevent or mitigate security attacks, the existing defense mechanisms aim
at choosing solutions that are simple enough to be implemented in mobile devices,
computationally less expensive and low latency solutions so that the main objec-
tive (seamless connectivity) of mobility protocol is not affected. Several defense
mechanisms have been proposed to protect against the vulnerabilities of mobility
protocols, such as return routability protocols, IP Security (IPsec) protocols, IKE-
based schemes, etc.
There have been several attempts to identify potential threats to the public
Internet due to IP-mobility protocols’ operation. Kempf et al. [58] outlines the
security threats to Mobile IPv6 and explain how the security features of Mobile
IPv6 protocol mitigate them. Hu et al. [59] discusses and outlines the security
threats for network mobility architecture and propose a public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) and secret key based protection approach for it. Elgoarany et al. [60] present a
survey on the Mobile IPv6 security through the classification of threats and possible
scenarios. IETF RFC for Mobile IPv6 [17] also lists possible security threats and
discusses some techniques that can protect against such threats. However, there is
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lack of research work that outlines all the possible security vulnerabilities caused by
mobility protocols along with detailed analysis of existing defense mechanisms.
The objective in this chapter is to point out major security vulnerabilities of
mobility protocols, and analyze existing defense mechanisms to compare their effec-
tiveness to protect mobility infrastructure.
The contributions in this chapter are (i) explaining with illustrative examples all
the major security threats on various components of the IPv6 network due to the
introduction of the IP-mobility protocol, (ii) critically analyze the existing defense
mechanisms while pointing out their capabilities and limitations to guard against
major security threats, and (iii) proposing effective defense mechanisms for SIGMA
protocol.
Our comprehensive analysis on the security threats for mobility protocols and
corresponding defense mechanisms presented in this chapter can help mobile users
identify possible vulnerabilities in their networks and choose a suitable solution to
protect against threats.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 9.2, a brief explanation
is given for binding updates in IP-mobility protocols. In Section 9.3, major security
threats relating to IP-mobility protocols are discussed with illustrative examples. In
Section 9.4, existing defense mechanisms are explained in brief. In section 9.5, we
critically analyze the defense mechanisms along with their capabilities and limita-
tions to prevent or mitigate threats. In section 9.6, we propose security measures
to prevent or mitigate security threats for SIGMA protocol. Section 9.7 has the
concluding remarks.
9.2 Binding Update in IP-mobility protocols
In IP-mobility protocols, while away from its home, an MH is also associated with a
Care-of Address (CoA), which provides its current location information. Whenever
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Figure 9.1: Major fields in the binding update.
a MH acquires a new CoA from a foreign network, it must inform its HA about this
new CoA through a Binding Update (BU).
Figure 9.1 shows the main information contained in a BU message: HoA, CoA
and the binding entry lifetime The HA accepts the BU and updates it binding cache
(a table maintained by the HA for all its MHs), and sends a binding acknowledge-
ment.
Data packets from the Correspondent Node (CN) follows an un-optimized route
to MH (CN –> HA –> MH) (as shown in Fig. 2.1) instead of direct route (CN –>
MH). This degrades the performance of Mobile IP introducing larger delay.
To alleviate the performance penalty, Mobile IPv6 or other protocols another
mode of operation known as route optimization (RO). Figure 9.2 shows the MIPv6
route optimization where MH sends BU to the CN informing the newly acquired
CoA along with its home address. The CN, an IPv6 node, caches the binding of
the MH’s home address with the CoA, and send any packets destined for the MH
directly to it at this CoA. Thus, using Mobile IPv6, an MH may change their point-
of-attachment to the Internet without changing its home address, allowing them to
maintain transport and higher-layer connections while roaming.
9.3 Threats for Mobility Protocols
In this section, we explain major security threats for the mobility protocols with
illustrative scenarios. In summary, most of the potential threats exploits false bind-
ings, usually resulting in Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Unauthenticated binding
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Figure 9.2: Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization.
updates can create serious security vulnerabilities. The attacker can use fabricated
BU, thereby deceiving CN about the MH’s current location. This may lead to traffic
redirect attack as well as Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks, compromising the
secrecy and integrity of data packets.
There are some attacks that are due to manipulation in the IPv6 routing headers
or in the home address options. Some attack tries to use all the resources (CPU,
memory) to degrade the performance of the mobile host or the mobility agent. Some
attack blocks MH sending legitimate binding update by flooding packets in the radio
access network while some forces to use sub-optimal route for delay sensitive packets.
These security threats for mobility protocols are due to the fact that mobility is
transparent to upper layer protocols and also due to the effort of making things
simpler for the low-power mobile devices.
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(a) (b)
Figure 9.3: Traffic redirection attack (a) The attacker sends fabricated BU to the
CN to modify the binding cache for the MH to some fictitious (Lisa) IP address and
CN accepts the BU (b) Traffic is redirected away from the MH to Lisa’s IP address.
9.3.1 Traffic redirection attack
The attacker may send a fake binding update message claiming that a node (victim)
has changed its care-of address due to its movement to a new location. This may
happen if the BU is not authenticated. If such BU is accepted by the the CN, it will
start sending packets to the new CoA and the victim node will not get any traffic.
As shown in Fig. 9.3(a), the attacker sends fabricated BU to the CN to replace MH’s
IP with some fictitious IP address (say Lisa’s IP address) and CN accepts the BU.
As the result, the ongoing session of CN with the MH has been redirected towards
Lisa’s location as shown in Fig. 9.3(b) and the MH loses all subsequent traffic of the
session.
In most cases, data encryption and use of IP Security (IPsec) protocol can-
not prevent such attack on data integrity and confidentiality, since route optimiza-
tion signaling are transparent to IPsec, thereby redirecting the traffic even though
the attacker cannot read the encrypted data. To launch traffic redirection attacks,
the attacker needs the knowledge of the IP addresses of the communicating nodes.
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(a) (b)
Figure 9.4: Man-in-the-middle attack (a) The attacker sends fabricated BU to the
CN to modify the binding cache of the MH to its own (Attacker) IP address and CN
accepts the BU (b) Traffic is redirected to the Attacker who learns the confidential
information of the packet and may modify the packet before forwarding to the MH
without the knowledge of the involved parties.
Therefore, nodes with well-known IP addresses, such as public servers, DNS servers
or file servers are more vulnerable to such attacks.
Remedy: Nodes with frequently changing addresses or nodes that use randomly
generated addresses may mitigate such attacks. However, this addition of security
mechanisms to the BU process makes the mobility protocol slower and more complex.
9.3.2 Man-in-the-middle attack
The attacker might send binding update message to the CN telling it to modify MH’s
IP with its own (attacker’s) IP address. If the CN accepts such binding update, CN
will start sending the packets to the attacker instead of the MH. The attacker will
then be able to learn the confidential contents of the message, may modify the packet
before forwarding it to the MH. Thus, the attacker might act as a MITM getting
all-important private data destined to the victim (MH) without the knowledge of
the CN and the MH.
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Figure 9.4 shows the MITM attack launched on the MH to steal information
of the ongoing communication between the CN and MH. First, the attacker sends
an malicious BU to the CN saying that the MH’s CoA has changed and it is now
the attacker’s IP address. If CN accepts such fabricated BU from the attacker, it
will confirm with a binding acknowledgement (see Fig. 9.4(a)). Since the CN has
updated its binding cache in response to the malicious BU, it will start sending traffic
towards the attacker rather than the MH as shown in Fig. 9.4(b). The attacker thus
intercepts the packet to learn confidential contents of the message, may modify the
packet content before forwarding it to the MH.
Another way of MITM attack is to send spoofed binding update long before CN
and MH are in contact, with attacker’s address as the CoA and MH’s HoA in the
home address option. If such binding update remains in CN’s binding cache, the CN
will send traffic through the attacker (assuming it to be the HA), thereby allowing
the attacker to act as a MITM. Such attack can be mitigated by setting shorter
lifetime of binding update.
9.3.3 Replay attack
This kind of attack takes advantage of previously sent (authenticated or unauthen-
ticated) binding updates by recording it and later on, replaying it when the victim
(MH) moves to some new location, thereby interrupting the CN-MH communica-
tion. The attacker may get the opportunity to record BUs while residing in the
same radio access network where MH is located. Replay attack can also work on
authenticated binding updates since the malicious agent only replays it to deceive
the CN. Therefore, it is difficult to protect against such attacks.
A reply attack is shown in Fig. 9.5. The MH was first in subnet A in Fig. 9.5(a)
and it sends a binding update to CN to update MH’s CoA in CN’s binding cache.
Any attacker listening to such BU can record the BU and use that for replay attack
in future. In Fig. 9.5(b), the MH has moved to some new subnet (B). Now the
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(a) (b)
Figure 9.5: Replay attack (a) When the MH is in subnet A, MH sends the BU to the
CN informing its newly acquired care-of address and the attacker records the BU
message for prospective replay attack in the future (b) When MH moves to other
subnet B, the attacker sends the recorded BU of the MH claiming that MH is in
subnet A, thus disrupting traffic away from the MH to some non-existing host.
attacker may use the previously recorded BU and send it to CN to deceive it. If
the CN accepts such replayed message, CN would then start sending packets to the
old (subnet A) address thinking that MH has moved to subnet A again which is
not true. Thus, traffic from CN are redirected to a non-existing IP-address, thereby
disrupting the communication.
9.3.4 Bombing attack
In this type of attack, huge amount of unsolicited data traffic is redirected to the
victim node (or a network) to degrade its performance as well as bandwidth wastage.
The attacker may exploit real-time streaming servers for this kind of attack. First,
the attacker establishes a connection with streaming server, and starts to download
a stream of data. After getting the sequence number, the attacker might claim that
it has moved to a new location. The attacker might use the IP address of the victim
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(a) (b)
Figure 9.6: Bombing attack (a) The attacker establishes a connection with a stream-
ing server, later on the attacker sends a fake BU involving the IP address of the MH,
(b) The streaming data packets are redirected to the MH that the MH has not
requested for.
node in the binding update. As a result, subsequent packets from the server will be
directed to the victim node.
Figure 9.6 shows the bombing attack on a MH which overwhelms MH with
unsolicited data packets and degrade its performance. In Fig. 9.6(a), the attacker
establishes a connection with a streaming server and after some time, it sends a
false BU to the server claiming that its CoA has changed. In the BU message,
the attacker uses the IP address of the victim MH. As a result, the traffic from the
streaming server has been redirected to the MH causing its performance degradation
and bandwidth wastage.
In such attacks, the victim node will not accept those unsolicited (streaming
data) packets and therefore, will not send the acknowledgement, thereby stopping
the communication. However, the attacker can ensure a a continuous flow of data
streams sent to the victim by sending spoofed acknowledgement (towards the server)
as the attacker knows the initial sequence number. One possible remedy of this
attack could be to use the TCP RESET signal by the victim node to immediately
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stop such large flow of data stream. This may not be possible since the victim
will always drop the packets immediately without even processing the appropriate
header to know the actual source address.
The bombing attack can be very serious since it can target any Internet node or
a whole subnet with enormous amount of unwanted data and the target node cannot
do anything to stop such data flow, thereby losing its bandwidth without any clue
to such attacks. This attack may become severer and harmful to the Internet if it is
used in combination with distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.
9.3.5 Reflection attack
In some earlier design of Mobile IP, the CN could initiate route optimization signaling
whenever the CN receives packet through HA. This can lead to reflection attack.
Route optimization was initiated to the address that was included in the Home
Address option. An attacker can take advantage of this and can send traffic with a
care-of-address of the victim and the victim’s address in the Home Address option,
thereby redirecting RO signaling to the victim. Figure 9.7 shows the reflection attack
where the attacker sends a false initial message to the CN, thereby inducing CN to
send two messages to the MH. As a result, the MH receives every packet sent by the
attacker twice due to the reflection. Thus the attacker is able to amplify a packet
flooding attack against a target MH by a factor of two. Moreover, the identity of the
attacker of such reflection attacks remains undetected as both the messages arriving
at the target have the CN’s address as the source address.
9.3.6 Home Agent poisoning
The HA keeps the mapping of HoA to CoA of the MH. Therefore, in every subnet
crossing location updates are sent to the HA to update the database entry accord-
ingly. The entry can be corrupted if spoofed BU is accepted by the HA. This will
affect all subsequent communication with that host whose entry has been corrupted
167
Figure 9.7: Reflection attack.
and no Internet node will be able to reach the victim node. Figure 9.8 shows the
HA poisoning. The attacker sends spoofed BU to the HA (Fig 9.8(a)) and the HA
accepts the BU. Therefore, the subsequent query to the HA by any CN (for the MH)
will produce wrong reply as shown in Fig. 9.8(b).
To present this kind of attack, the HA must verify two things. First, the node
sending BU is a legitimate client of the HA and secondly, this node sending BU has
the right to change its CoA. Otherwise, any legitimate client of the HA may launch
attack and modify the binding cache of some victim node under the HA.
9.3.7 Blocking MH to send legitimate BU
When the MH enters a new radio access network, it obtains new IP address and
sends BUs to the HA and the CNs. If the attacker is on the same radio link (as the
victim MH), the attacker can block MH from sending legitimate BU by launching
brute-force attack on the radio link or by a flooding attack. Thus when the MH
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(a) (b)
Figure 9.8: HA poisoning (a) Spoofed BU send to the HA and the HA updates the
entry in the location database for the MH (b) When the CN queries the HA for the
IP address of the MH, it receives the wrong IP.
gives up sending BUs to the CN, the attacker can send fabricated BUs to the CNs
and the HA, thereby redirecting MH’s traffic towards the attacker. This could lead
to MITM attack as well.
9.3.8 Resource exhaustion attack
Attacker establishes connections with the MH with thousands of fake IP addresses.
Thus whenever, the MH moves to some new location, the MH has to send to send
BU to these imaginary hosts, thus huge processing power of the MH is wasted
while dealing with these unnecessary BUs. This attack cannot be prevented with
authenticated BUs. These fake connection will require the victim to keep states for
each one of them, wasting its memory as well, resulting in denial of service attacks.
Moreover, the attacker may trick MH to participate in unnecessary complex
cryptographic operations, using up the resources of the MH. These attacks become
severer for strong and expensive defensive mechanism.
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(a) (b)
Figure 9.9: Resource exhaustion attack (a) The attacker establishes unnecessary
connections with the MH using fake IP addresses (b) MH sends BUs to all the fake
IP addresses thus wasting its processing power as well as memory.
9.3.9 Forcing sub-optimal routing
To prevent itself from attacks that aims at exhausting MH’s resources (resource
exhaustion attack), the MH can turn off route optimization to the CN. Thus, the
traffic from the CN will follow sub-optimal route through the HA, causing more
delay for packet delivery. This kind of attack is most effective for delay sensitive
traffic, such as real-time audio/video traffic.
9.3.10 Exploitation of routing header
Routing headers pose general security threats that might be exploited by the mali-
cious agents. When a packet having one or more routing headers reaches the IPv6
node specified in the destination address (IP header) field, the top routing header is
popped out and the IP header of the packet is modified with the address from the
routing header as the new destination address. The packet is then routed to this
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Figure 9.10: Exploitation of routing header to hide the attacker’s source IP.
new destination. Thus, an attacker can misuse this routing header, and launch at-
tack traffics indirectly going through multiple intermediate destinations. Therefore,
finding the original source of the attack traffic might be very difficult for the victim
node. In addition, general protection mechanism (such as ingress filtering) may not
work to counter such attack since this attack allows skipping between the inside and
outside of an administrative domain.
Figure 9.10 shows the exploitation of Routing Header (RH) by the attacker (A)
that sends attack traffic to a victim node V, routing through an intermediate node
B. The attacker sends attack traffic (with its own source IP) destined to the node B.
However, the attacker includes a RH which has the IP address of the victim node V.
When the packet arrives at the node B, since it contains a RH, node B overwrites
the destination address field in the IP header with the content of RH (which is V)
and the source address field is now B. Then the packet is sent to the victim (V).
When it reaches V, the victim node cannot find out the actual source of this attack
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packet. Thus, the attacker can successfully hide his identity while sending malicious
traffic through one or more intermediate nodes.
9.3.11 Exploitation of home address destination option
In an IPv6 packet, destination option field contains information that are only pro-
cessed/examined by the destination node. Home address of any MIPv6-enabled
node does not change and this HoA is used by the transport layer to identify a TCP
connection between the MH and the CN. When a mobile node visits any foreign
network, it obtains its care-of-address which is a topologically correct address. This
address cannot be used in transport layer since it will require breaking of the TCP
connection when the MN gets a new CoA. For RO traffic from the MN, the MN
uses the CoA as the source address field (in route optimized packet towards the
CN). However, the MN must also identify itself and does so by including its home
address in the home address destination option field. After receiving such packet
from the MH, CN overwrites the source address field with the MH’s HoA and for-
wards it to the transport layer. Thus, the transport layer never have to deal with
the care-of-address.
An attacker can exploit this home address destination option to disguise the
source address of the attack. The attacker can send malicious traffic (from outside)
with a source address (in HoA option) within an administrative domain. The egress
filter would allow such traffic as it is coming from outside. However, when the victim
node receives the packet, it overwrites the source address with the address contained
in the HoA destination option. Therefore, it appears that the attack is coming from
the inside of the administration domain, which is misleading. Figure 9.11 shows such
an illustration. The attacker sends malicious traffic to the victim node V. However,
the attacker uses the HoA address of the node B in the HoA option field. When
V receives the packet, it overwrites the source IP with the HoA option field (which
contains B’s HoA) as if node B has launched the attack. Thus, the attacker can
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Figure 9.11: Exploitation of HoA option to hide the attacker’s source IP.
easily disguise its identity bypassing the firewall and it seems that somebody within
the V’s administrative domain has launched the attack.
9.3.12 Acting as the HA and learning about home network
Each MH learns about its HA through Home Agent discovery message. However,
MIPv6 does not protect this message with IPsec since this message is sent to anycast
address in the home network. Therefore, any attacker in the home network can take
this opportunity to claim itself as the HA and can initiate security associations with
the MH.
In the event of network renumbering in home network, the HA can send ICMPv6
unsolicited mobile prefix reply message to the MH to update it. If such message is not
protected properly, any malicious agent may send such message, thereby updating
the MH’s home prefix to the attacker’s network. Moreover, the attacker may learn
about the topology of the MH’s home network by soliciting ICMPv6 mobile prefix
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message to the HA. This knowledge may be exploited in future attack (such as
bombing attack) towards the home network
9.4 Defense Mechanisms
In this section, some of the defense mechanisms that can be used to prevent the
prospective attacks have been discussed. The main considerations while designing
security solutions are summarized as follows:
• Focus on the attacks that are introduced due to IP-mobility protocol.
• Low processing requirement: The processing overhead required for crypto-
graphic operations and/or authentication protocols are relatively high for low-
power mobile devices. Therefore, defense mechanisms that are simple and
computationally less expensive are suitable to be implemented in mobile nodes
with low processing power.
• Infrastructure less approach: To protect against malicious BU leading to traf-
fic redirection and MITM attacks, authentication of BU is essential. However,
use of strong cryptographic (authentication) protocols require the existence of
certification infrastructure. As there is no distinction between a fixed IPv6
node and a mobile node, this certification infrastructure is required to authen-
ticate all IPv6 nodes across the public network. However, at present there is
no such existing infrastructure that can be used to authenticate all IPv6 nodes.
The deployment of such global infrastructure is neither realistic nor feasible in
the current Internet. Therefore, infrastructure-less solutions are more realistic
solution.
• Low latency efficient solution: The main focus of the mobility protocol is to
facilitate uninterrupted ongoing communications between the MH and CN. If
the security protocols requires significant amount of time for computation, the
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connection between the parties may be broken. Therefore, it is desirable that
the security protocols are fast enough to meet this goal.
9.4.1 IP security protocol
IP security (IPsec) [61] is a suite of protocols designed to provide inter-operable, high
quality, cryptographically-based security for IPv4 and IPv6. IPsec services [61] are
provided through the use of two traffic security protocols, namely the Authentication
Header (AH) and the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), and through the use
of cryptographic key management procedures and protocols.
In any mobility protocol, it is assumed that MH has a prior trust relationship with
the HA and IPsec (AH/ESP) protocol is suitable to be used to authenticate binding
updates between MH and the HA. However, it might not be so for the BUs between
the MH and the CN due to the absence of such trust relationship since the CN can be
any IPv6 node in the Internet. Moreover, these exists no such global infrastructure
that can be used to authenticate all IPv6 nodes. Therefore, use of AH protocol to
authenticate the BUs between the MH and CN is not feasible. Alternative solutions
for securing MH-CN BUs is the use of return routability protocol (discussed later in
this section) or any other infrastructureless authentication.
In IPsec protocol, a preconfigured Security Association (SA) is established be-
tween the MH and the HA to authenticate the binding update and the following
binding acknowledgement. SAs can be established through Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) [62] with certificate authentication discussed in the next subsection. Each SA
records the algorithm and parameters controlling security operations. An index pa-
rameter, called the Security Parameters Index (SPI) is used in security associations.
They are referenced by the sending host and established by the receiving host. SAs
are unidirectional and two SAs must be established between the MH and the HA
for the bi-directional tunnel required for mobility signaling. The SAs are based on
HoA instead of CoA. Therefore, SAs are not required to be changed when the MH
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moves and attaches to a new access network. Once the security association has been
performed, the MH and HA are ready to use IPsec protocol. Therefore, when MH
moves to a new subnet, it sends BU message.
9.4.1.1 Authentication Header protocol
IPsec Authentication Header (AH) protocol [63] is one of IP security protocols that
can ensure that the binding update is originated from the MH, not from malicious
agent or attacker. AH protocol guarantees connectionless integrity and data origin
authentication of IP packets. However, AH protocol cannot provide confidentiality
or privacy of the contents. Though confidentiality is not strictly required to protect
MH-HA signaling, other mobility signaling, such as in return routability protocol
require confidentiality to protect keys exchanged between MH, HA and CN. Hence,
AH protocol is not widely used. Instead, IPsec ESP protocol is used since it supports
encryption of messages in addition to ensure authenticity.
(a) (b)
Figure 9.12: Protecting security and integrity using ESP (a) Security association
performed between MH and the HA (b) The binding update sent by MH is protected
by ESP header.
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9.4.1.2 Encapsulating Security Payload protocol
IPsec ESP protocol [64] can be used since ESP can provide confidentiality, data
origin authentication, connectionless integrity, anti-replay service and traffic flow
confidentiality. At the time of security association, the set of services can be chosen.
ESP protocol ensures confidentiality of data by encrypting the datagram. An
encryption algorithm combines the data in the datagram with a key to transform
it into an encrypted form. This is then repackaged using a special format (with
ESP header, trailer and authentication data) and transmitted to the destination.
After receiving the encrypted packet, the destination node decrypts it using the
same algorithm. ESP supports its own authentication scheme or can be used in
conjunction with AH. The ESP header is inserted after the IP header and before the
next layer protocol header.
In IP-mobility protocols, the binding update, binding ack, ICMPv6 prefix dis-
covery solicitation and corresponding reply message can be protected by IPsec ESP
protocol. MH may use ESP for both authentication and encryption to protect MH-
HA communication against traffic analysis and to provide privacy for traffic routed
over public Internet.
Figure 9.12 shows the use of ESP header for security data packets between the
MH and HA. A security association is performed between the MH and HA to choose
security algorithm and the related parameters in Fig. 9.12(a). After the security
association, the MH sends BU packet to the HA with proper encryption along with
the ESP header as shown in Fig. 9.12(a), thereby ensuring data integrity and confi-
dentiality.
9.4.2 IKE-based schemes
IKE or IKEv2 [62], a key distribution mechanism for Internet community, is com-
monly used to performing mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining
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security associations for IPsec protocol suite. To ensure confidentiality, data in-
tegrity, access control, and data source authentication to IP datagrams, IPsec main-
tains state information at the two ends of the data communication. IKE helps to
dynamically exchange the secret key that is used as the input to the cryptographic
algorithms. Security associations are established using the Internet Security Asso-
ciation and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP). Thus, IKE establishes a secured
framework to distribute public keys and defines ways to generate those keys.
IKE works in two phases. In phase 1, two communicating peers establish a secure
authenticated communication channel, namely ISAKMP security associations using
the DiffieHellman key exchange [65] algorithm to generate a shared secret key to
encrypt further IKE communications. In phase 2, SAs are negotiated on behalf of
services, e.g., IPsec ESP that needs key or parameter negotiation.
9.4.2.1 Limitations of IKE
Although IKE provides very strong security, it has the following limitations:
• IKE-based scheme require the existence of certification infrastructure for its
operation. This requirement cannot be met to protect against spoofed binding
updates between the MH and the CN (fixed or mobile) which can be any
Internet node. This is because currently there exists no infrastructure-based
solution that can authenticate all IPv6 nodes in the world. It is not also
realistic to propose and build such global infrastructure.
• IKE requires very complex and power-consuming operations. This may be a
major issue for low-end mobile devices when each of the packets (both outgoing
and incoming) are required to be processed by the cryptographic engine in the
MH.
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Figure 9.13: Return routability test in Mobile IPv6.
9.4.3 Return Routability protocol
One of the major security concerns for mobility protocols is the use of unauthen-
ticated and forged binding updates. To prevent such attacks, a node sending a
binding update must prove its right to redirect the traffic. The solutions proposed
in MIPv6 [17] for this kind attack is Return Routability (RR) test. This approach
of RR is used before each binding update message is sent to the CN, and they are
exchanged among the MH, HA and CN. Figure 9.13 shows the message exchange
in RR test. The MH initiates RR by sending Home Test Init (HoTI) and Care-of
Test Init (CoTI) message to the CN; among these two messages, the HoTI goes
to CN via the HA whereas the CoTI goes directly to the CN. The CN then send
corresponding challenge packets Home Test (HoT) and Care-of Test (CoT) destined
to the MH. After such message exchange, the CN accepts BU from the MH that is
able to receive those challenge packet (HoT and CoT)
The first two messages of the test include two 64-bit cookies, the HoTI cookie and
CoTI cookie (see Fig. 9.14). These cookies are randomly generated 64-bit numbers
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Figure 9.14: Message exchange in return routability test.
and they must be returned by the CN in the reply messages, that is, Home Test
(HoT) and Care-of Test (CoT) messages. Each CN is assumed to maintain a 20-
byte secret key, Kcn which is not shared with anyone and this value of Kcn is used
as a parameter for the key generating function HMAC SHA1() which is a specific
construction for calculating a message authentication code (MAC) involving a secure
cryptographic hash function SHA-1. Kcn is the first parameter of this function and
the second parameter is composed of the concatenation of the Home (or Care-of)
address, nonce index and a byte x. This byte is 0 for home address and 1 for care-of
address. The first 64-bit of the output of the function is used as the key generation
(keygen) token for the HoT and CoT message.
After receiving both the HoT and CoT messages, the MH first matches the cook-
ies to make sure that they are same as those sent in the HoTI and CoTI messages.
The mobile host then hashes both the (home and care-of) keygen tokens together and
forms a 20-byte Kbm using the SHA1 function. The mobile host records the value of
Kbm and the nonce indices included in the HoT and CoT messages associated with
the correspondent host, for use in the binding update.
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The RR protocol is considered to a relatively weak authentication protocol (com-
pared to IKE-based scheme) to be used between the MH and the CN and it requires
no certification infrastructure. The pros and cons of the protocol are explained in
the following subsections.
9.4.3.1 Advantages
The use of the RR protocol has the following benefits:
• The RR protocol limits the number of potential attackers that can hijack an
ongoing session. If RR is not used, any IPv6 node can spoof BUs to redirect
traffic as shown in Figs. 9.3 and 9.4. The use of RR protocol can significantly
scale down such damages though some attack is possible (explained in the
limitation section)
• The RR protocol requires less CPU processing power and it only uses relatively
inexpensive encryption and one-way hash functions unlike other complex cryp-
tographic operations.
• The RR protocol is also stateless as the CN does not store a separate state for
each mobile host. Instead, it stores a single periodically-changing randomly-
generated secret key Kcn for this purpose and remains stateless until CN has
authenticated the MH.
9.4.3.2 Limitations
Following are the limitations of the RR protocol:
• The vulnerabilities of the RR method exists on the path between the HA
and the CN. As CN can be any node in the Internet, no prior relationship
or security association exists between these nodes. Attackers who are on this
path or have access to the packets sent on this path can learn the secret that
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is necessary for spoofing the BU. Such attacks include various DoS attacks,
impersonation and eavesdropping, etc.
• Another vulnerability is possible when the CN is another mobile node at an
unsecured access network. In that case, an attacker in such network may learn
the keygen tokens and can send spoofed binding updates.
• The return routability are subject to race condition though the chance is very
low. Return routability process starts after the MH has sent the binding update
to the HA. The race condition is possible if this binding update is delayed to
reach the HA whereas the HoT message is returned by the CN to the HA. This
results in tunneling the HoT message to the wrong care-of address by the HA.
Thus, RR protocol is a relatively weak routing-based authentication method and
it does not protect against all possible attacks, rather aims at limiting the number of
potential attackers for a particular target, and number of targets a potential attacker
can threaten.
9.4.4 Protection for routing headers related issues
Several security vulnerabilities are related to routing header and home address des-
tination option that are used to optimize route between MH and CN. The protection
mechanisms to prevent their malicious use are summarized in the following subsec-
tions.
9.4.4.1 Routing header
To protect misuse of routing headers to deceive IPv6 nodes and sending packets
hiding the source’s identity, MIPv6 defines a new routing header, called type 2
routing header. This new routing header enables packets to be routed directly from
a CN to the MH’s CoA. The MH’s CoA is inserted into the IPv6 destination address
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field. Once the packet arrives at the CoA, the MH retrieves its home address from
the routing header, and this is used as the final destination address for the packet.
Mobile IPv6 follows several rules to process this routing header and prevent
misuse of the routing header. Firewalls and/or other access control devices applies
these rules allowing type 2 routing headers while blocking other routing headers.
Following are the list of rules/restrictions for type 2 routing headers:
• Only one routing header per packet is allowed.
• All IPv6 nodes that process this routing header must verify that the address
contained within is the node’s own HoA.
• The IP address contained in the routing header must be a unicast routable
address since it is the MH’s HoA.
• The scope of the HoA (within the routing header) must not be smaller than
the scope of the CoA.
A node must drop the packet if any of these conditions are not met while processing
the type 2 routing header.
9.4.4.2 HoA option
To protect against attacks regarding HoA destination option, similar restrictions are
used:
• The IP address contained in HoA option must be a unicast routable address.
• If it is non-BU packet, the CN must not accept any packet with a HoA that
dose not have any current binding in its cache.
• For BU packet, it must be protected by ESP (in case for the HA) or by some
security parameters established by RR protocol (in case for the CN).
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• The receipt of a HoA option must not trigger any change in the routing table
or binding cache in a node.
9.4.5 Additional measures to mitigate attacks
There are a few measures that can be taken by the entities to protect against possible
attacks. These are described as follows.
9.4.5.1 Keeping nodes stateless
An IPv6 node may not save any state information for receiving and replying to
BU messages. This stateless approach can prevent the CN from DoS attacks by
malicious agents causing resource (CPU and memory) exhaustion. To make CN
stateless, the BU will have to contain enough information so that accounting can be
done for legitimate BUs.
9.4.5.2 Keeping shorter lifetime for binding entry
To mitigate the attack based on the spoofed BU, one possible approach is to limit
the binding entry lifetime. As a result, binding entry is removed from the cache of
the CN if no further BU is received. Therefore, the attacker cannot take advantage
of the old binding entry when the MH is inactive for some time.
The problem of such quick expiration (of binding entry) is the wastage of band-
width and transmission power of the MH and the CN (or HA) in legitimate situa-
tions. These messages are absolutely unnecessary resulting in overhead on the HA
(or CN), sometimes leading to resource exhaustion.
9.4.5.3 Use of Cryptographically Generated Address
The use of Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) [66] can reduce the chance
of attack on a victim node. This idea was first introduced in a BU authentication
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protocol known as CAM [67]. In this approach, the least significant 64-bits of the
IP address (the interface identifier) is selected by computing a 64-bit one-way hash
of the node’s public signature key. In the CGA approach, the MH signs the binding
update with its private key and sends the public key along with the signed data.
The recipient of the binding update hashes the public key and compares the hash
to the address before verifying the signature on the location data. This prevents
anyone other than the node itself from sending location updates for its address. The
main advantage of this approach is that it provides public-key authentication of the
IP address without any trusted third parties.
9.5 Comparison among the Defense Mechanisms
In this section, we analyze the defense mechanisms along with their capabilities and
limitations. Table 9.1 lists the defense mechanisms and their capabilities to prevent
various attacks along with their merits and demerits.
9.5.1 MH-HA security
Mobility protocols assume that there exists a trust relationship between the MH and
the HA. Based on this assumption, IPsec ESP protocol can be used to protect against
the security threats between the MH and HA. The required security associations in
IPsec protocol can be established through IKE-based scheme which helps in sharing
secret keys required for cryptographic algorithms. Thus, use of IPsec and IKE can
secure the control traffic as well as the data traffic between the MH and HA. Thus
it protects against certain types of traffic analysis and provides data confidentiality.
However, use of ESP does not protect against misbehaving MH that may use
spoofed CoA in BU to launch DoS attacks to the HA. Moreover, the authentication
based on IPsec and IKE can be applied for securing control and data traffic between
the MH and CN (which might be any IPv6 nodes in the public Internet). This
185
Table 9.1: Security threats and defense mechanisms for IP-mobility protocols.
Defensive
mechanism
Protection
from
Benefits Limitations
IPsec and
IKE
Attack on
traffic be-
tween MH
and HA
Strong security
measures, Ensures
authentication
and data confi-
dentiality
High CPU overhead, does not
protect against misbehaving
MH, assumes a trust relation-
ship between MH and HA
Return
routability
Attack on
control traf-
fic between
MH and CN
Infrastructure-less
scheme, less CPU
processing
Weak authentication, Does not
protect from attackers on the
path between HA and CN, can
malfunction due to race condi-
tion
Keeping
nodes state-
less
Resource ex-
haustion at-
tacks
Helps in avoiding
DoS attacks
May introduce additional delay
for legitimate traffic
Use of Se-
quence num-
ber
Replay
attack
It is enough if
sequence number
can be stored in
stable storage
Replay attack is possible after re-
boot or turnover at 16 bit bound-
ary if stable storage is not avail-
able
Use of access
control rules
for Routing
headers
IP spoof-
ing, MITM,
traffic redi-
rection
Attacker cannot
hide identity
deceiving firewalls
additional processing for gate-
way router
Use of
shorter
binding
lifetime
Replay at-
tack, HA
poisoning
Up-to-date entry
in binding cache
Frequent refreshing updates
wastes bandwidth
Use of CGA Bombing
attack,
MITM,
traffic redi-
rection
Prevents IP-
spoofing and hard
for attackers to
target
Higher complexity and higher
CPU processing
Blocking le-
gitimate BU
MH may
keep on
trying to
send BU
Can avoid HA poi-
soning or session
hijacking
Too much overhead on the MH
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is because currently there exists no global infrastructure-based solution that can
authenticate any IPv6 node. It is not also realistic to propose and build such a global
infrastructure. In addition, processing overhead of the IPsec/IKE-based schemes are
quite high and can be a big issue for mobile devices with limited processing capability.
9.5.2 MH-CN security
Since no global authentication infrastructure exist to authenticate all IPv6 nodes,
mobility protocols encourage use of return routability protocol, an end-to-end au-
thentication technique to mitigate attacks on control packets (BU) between the MH
and CN. This makes sure that the MH sending the BU has the right to use the CoA.
However, this authentication scheme is not as strong as IPsec/IKE-based scheme.
Vulnerabilities are possible if the attacker is on the path between HA and CN. The
RR protocol actually aims at limiting the number of potential attackers for a target
node.
9.5.3 Protection against routing header related issues
To protect against manipulation using routing headers, several rules are applied
while processing such headers. This ensures sure that attackers cannot deceive IPv6
nodes hiding their own identity. However, additional processing is required by the
gateway routers which may slow down their operation.
9.5.4 Other protection mechanisms
To protect against resource exhaustion attacks, the MH or CN may abstain from
keeping states information. Therefore, the MH or CN will not have to keep track
of the current states of the half-open requests, thereby saving its resources and
preventing possible DoS attack on the victim node. However, legitimate control
traffic will require more time for processing.
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Use of sequence number in the control traffic (BU) may foil the replay attack if
the sequence number can be stored between reboots. In addition, the binding entry
lifetime should be kept small to prevent HA poisoning by overwriting the entry with
wrong CoA, thereby leading to MITM or traffic redirection attack.
Nodes with fixed IP addresses are more vulnerable to attacks, such as, bombing
attack, traffic redirection attack, MITM attack. To ensure that a IPv6 node does not
become a victim such attacks, it may choose to change its IP address periodically
or use CGA.
To mitigate the attack on the MH’s radio access network, the MH may keep trying
to send BU message in spite of failures in several attempts until an acknowledgement
is received. This will ensure the binding entry in the HA or the CN is not corrupted
by the attackers. However, this will impose additional overhead on the low-end
mobile devices.
9.6 Security Solutions for SIGMA
SIGMA was proposed as a transport layer mobility solution that ensures seamless
connectivity of mobile nodes with the Internet. It exploits the multi-homing feature
of STCP to achieves seamless handover and uses a make-before-break strategy so
that the ongoing communication is not interrupted during handover. The MH ac-
quires a second IP-address into the association and continue communication without
much loss of data after the handover. Thus, the main advantages of SIGMA are the
least handoff latency and packet loss compared to Mobile IPv6.
In SIGMA, traffic between MH and the CN follow a direct route avoiding the
triangular routing of Mobile IP. However, this performance improvement of SIGMA
introduces several security vulnerabilities. SIGMA requires binding updates to be
exchanged between MH and CN to maintain direct routing between them. Moreover,
MH must update the LM after moving to a new access network. These binding
updates along with other mobility signaling may result in several security issues,
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including session hijacking, bombing attack, various denial of Service attacks, etc.
To secure the MH, CN or the LM from these attacks, security measures must be
enforced.
9.6.1 Securing MH-LM signaling
To secure the signaling between the MH and the LM, the binding update must be
protected. In this section, we explain the mechanism that can be used to protect
MH-LM communication against possible attacks. The MH-LM communication can
be protected by adopting defense mechanism based on the ESP protocol.
In SIGMA, the MH takes advantage of multiple IP addresses into the SCTP
association to ensure seamless handover. The MH has an ID for identifying its on-
going session to the upper layer protocols and this ID is unique and does not change
with the change of the CoA. When the MH reaches the overlapping area between
two cells, the MH acquires the second IP address from the new access network and
informs the LM to ”add” the second IP address into the association though the
SCTP dynamic address reconfiguration option [6] with a value of ADD IP. When
the MH moves further inside into the new access network, the added (second) IP
address is set as the primary address and the MH informs it through another BU
with SET PRIMARY option. At this point, if the old IP address is no longer valid,
it is deleted from the association by using DELETE IP option.
To secure the above mentioned MH-LM signaling from security threats, defense
mechanism based on the ESP protocol can be used. Figure 9.15 shows the exchange
of secured BU between the MH and the LM while the MH reaches the overlapping
region and acquires a new CoA. It is assumed that the MH has a prior relationship
with the LM and has a pre-established security associations with the LM.
Figure 9.16 shows the format of the secure BU packet (exchanged between MH
and LM) for SIGMA protocol where the source address is the MH’s CoA address and
the destination address is the LM’s address. The MH identity option field contains
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Figure 9.15: Securing the MH-LM signaling in SIGMA protocol.
the MH’s ID (that might be a fixed domain name or some other identification [3])
which replaces the source address field (of IPv6 header) when it reaches the LM
and thus LM identifies that the binding update came from the MH. The LM then
checks the type field in BU options to see whether this BU is intended for add,
delete or set primary options. The BU type field is subdivided into three bits: A,
S, and D bits, meaning add this address into the association, set this address as
the primary address, and delete this address from the association, respectively. The
exact meanings of the all the valid bit patterns of the type field are listed in Table 9.2.
For example, if the value of the type field is ”100”, the LM adds the CoA into the
SCTP association.
As we can see in Fig. 9.16, the CoA appears in the IPv6 header and is not
covered by ESP header. However, the LM must authenticate that the BU came
from an authorized MH that can change its CoA. Therefore, the Alternate CoA
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Table 9.2: Secure SIGMA binding update type bits and their meanings.
Type bits
Meaning
A S D
1 0 0 Add this CoA into the association and do not set it primary
0 1 0 Set this CoA as the primary address
1 1 0 Add this CoA into the association and set it primary
0 0 1 Delete this CoA from the association
IPv6 Header
Src = CoA
Dest = LM
MH Identity
Option
MH-ID ESPHeader
IPSec 
Header
BU options
Alt CoA 
option = CoAA S D
Figure 9.16: Binding update (MH-HA) packet format with IPsec Header.
mobility option are used in SIGMA that contains the MH’s CoA in the BU as
shown in Fig. 9.16.
Our proposed mechanism to secure MH-LM signaling is based on the ESP pro-
tocol, and is therefore very difficult to break by the intruders. It protects certain
types of traffic analysis and also provides confidentiality.
The session between the MH and CN may still be stolen if the wireless access
network is jammed by the malicious agent, thereby blocking the MH from sending
legitimate secure BU packets to the LM to update the CoA field into the association.
The refreshing BU timer (or lifetime), therefore, may come into the rescue of such
attacks. The LM may drop/invalidate a binding entry from its binding cache if there
is no BU or refreshing BU received within certain time period. This can protect
against future attacks targeting the location database in the LM. Alternatively, if
MHs are challenged and blocked to send binding updates to the LM in a hostile
network (e.g., in battlefield), it is better to switch to a more reliable access link
(such as satellite link) to prevent possible attacks.
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Src = MH
Dest = LM MH-ID HoTI CookieRH = CN
Figure 9.17: HoTI message format sent from the MH to the LM.
Src = LM
Dest = CN MH-ID HoTI Cookie
Figure 9.18: HoTI message format sent from the LM to the CN.
9.6.2 Securing MH-CN signaling
In SIGMA, the MH must notify the CN about the change of IP address into the
SCTP association through sending BU to the CN. This BU must also be protected.
Compared to MIPv6, the defense mechanism in SIGMA can have more time in
setting up the new CoA into the association as the communication can continue
with the old address.
As mentioned earlier, it is not possible to build a global infrastructure to au-
thenticate every IPv6 node of the public Internet, IPsec protocol cannot be used
for securing MH-CN signaling. Therefore, we propose the involvement of the LM
in securing MH-CN signaling. The proposed solution is based on the idea of return
routability protocol (see Fig. 9.13).
Before sending the BU to the CN, the MH should initiate the process by simul-
taneously sending two messages (HoTI and CoTI) to the CN; one of them through
the LM and the other directly. Each of the messages has a 64-bit cookie (randomly
generated) and the MH ID. The HoTI message are sent with a routing header that
contains CN’s IP address as shown in Fig. 9.17. After it reaches the LM and then
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Src = CN
Dest = LM MH-ID
HoTI 
Cookie
RH = MH Keygen
Figure 9.19: HoT message format sent from the CN to the LM.
Src = LM
Dest = MH MH-ID
HoTI 
Cookie Keygen
Figure 9.20: HoT message format sent from the LM to the MH.
the LM forwards it to the CN by removing the routing header field and modifying
the source and destination IP field (src: LM, dest: CN) as shown in Fig. 9.18.
The CN receives the HoTI messages and uses a hash function to generate the
keygen for the HoT message as in RR test (see Section 9.4.3). The CN replies with
HoT message to the LM (see Fig. 9.19) and the LM forwards to the MH (Fig. 9.20).
Regarding the Care-of Test Init message, the MH sends this message along with
the MH’s ID and 64-bit CoTI cookie as shown in Fig.9.21. The CN follows a pro-
cedure similar to HoT to compute the CoT keygen value and sends the reply along
with the CoTI cookie to the MH as shown in Fig. 9.22.
The approach used to secure the MH-CN signaling in SIGMA does not require
any complex cryptographic operation, thereby saving CPU power for low-end mobile
Src = MH
Dest = CN MH-ID CoTI Cookie
Figure 9.21: CoTI message format sent from the MH to the CN.
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Src = CN
Dest = MH MH-ID
CoTI 
Cookie Keygen
Figure 9.22: CoT message format sent from the CN to the MH.
devices. It also does not depend on any certification infrastructure. However, if the
attacker is on the path between the CN and the LM, it can learn the secret that is
necessary to send spoofed BU. Thus, it is a relatively weak defense mechanism with
less CPU and memory requirement.
9.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have identified major security threats for the IPv6 network in-
troduced due to IP-mobility protocol. We have explained in details possible security
vulnerabilities on various components of the network, and their possible impacts on
the Internet. We have also analyzed the existing defense mechanisms along with their
capabilities and limitations to prevent or mitigate these security threats. Finally, we
have proposed effective defense mechanism for SIGMA to protect it entities against
threats from malicious agents. Our comprehensive analysis on the security threats
for mobility protocols and corresponding defense mechanisms can help mobile users
identify possible vulnerabilities in their networks and choose a suitable solution to
protect against threats.
In the next chapter, we develop analytical model to derive mobility patterns of
nodes or networks onboard vehicles roaming in city streets.
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Chapter 10
Vehicular Mobility Model in City Streets
Performance evaluation of mobility protocols require knowledge of different stochas-
tic properties of the node mobility. Mobile networks can be formed in vehicles (with
onboard IP-enabled devices) that roam around the city with certain mobility pat-
tern. However, there exists no previous work that analyzed the stochastic properties
of vehicular mobility models in city streets. In this chapter, we have used a realistic
mobility model for vehicular movement in the city environment and have analyti-
cally derived its fundamental stochastic properties to analyze the model thoroughly.
The analytically derived properties have been validated by ns-2 simulations whose
parameters have been taken from real street map data. Our developed model can
be used as a generic framework for comprehensive analysis of other mobility models.
10.1 Introduction
Mobility models that can mimic the movement pattern of vehicles, are important
building blocks for simulation-based studies for mobile networks (onboard a vehi-
cle). Mobility models can help in testing and evaluating protocols related to mobile
networks. Mobility should be modeled in a realistic manner to ensure match be-
tween simulation results and data from real-world deployment of vehicular mobile
networks.
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Vehicular mobility models [68] can be grouped into four categories: the first is
synthetic model that is based on mathematical models while others are survey-based
models, trace-based models and simulator-based models. Among these four variants,
we are interested in synthetic models since mathematical models can help in obtain-
ing the general trend and behavior of the mobility model. Moreover, sensitivity of
certain system parameters can be easily analyzed in mathematical models which
might not be possible for other types of mobility models.
In real life scenarios, while moving along city streets, vehicles do not have the
freedom to travel freely along any arbitrary direction with a random speed. There
are buildings, rivers, trees, etc, and the vehicular mobility environment is constrained
by city streets. Moreover, vehicles must follow traffic regulations, such as stop lights,
speed limits, etc. Therefore, many widely used random (synthetic) mobility mod-
els [69–72], for example, random waypoint and random direction models are not
suitable at all to represent vehicular movement. In this chapter, we have developed
a mathematical model to mimic the movement pattern of vehicles roaming in a city,
and termed it as Vehicular Mobility model in City Streets (VMoCS). This model
takes into account the city street map and street constraints (such as, stop lights,
speed limits, acceleration, deceleration, etc.) as expected in city streets. In this
model, a vehicle travels from a random initial point (at crossroad) to another desti-
nation point, and such a movement is termed as an epoch. We have derived several
stochastic properties of the VMoCS model. To be specific, we have derived closed
form expressions for the distance traveled by a vehicle during each cycle, variance of
epoch length, mean epoch time, number of subnet crossing per epoch and the dura-
tion a vehicle resides under an access network (subnet). These stochastic properties
are very crucial for mobility protocols since they give an estimate of the amount of
signaling required for mobile networks moving around the city. Without the proper
knowledge of these properties, such mobility models cannot be accurately utilized
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by mobility simulation tools required for the performance evaluation of vehicular
mobile networks.
Several works on vehicular mobility models, both analytical [40, 73–78] and
simulation-based [79–84] have been reported in the literature. However, the ana-
lytical models in [40,73–78] lack expressions for various stochastic properties (such
as mean epoch length, epoch time, and subnet residence time) that are very crucial
for the utilization and applicability of any mobility model. On the other hand, as
this work deals with synthetic models, simulation-based models [79–84] are not the
focus of this work. Moreover, simulation studies cannot always be tested with a
large range of parameter values due to resource limitation and may sometime fail
to model the general trend of the problem. In contrast, analytical models represent
general scenarios which provide better insights into the behavior of the system being
analyzed.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no previous work that quantitatively
analyzed the stochastic properties of vehicular mobility models in city streets. Our
earlier work on city mobility model [85] lacks real driving strategies, such as variation
of speed in different street segments, and chance of delays in crossroads. In addition,
there was no validation presented earlier. This work aims at capturing these real
driving strategies into the analytical model and presents a complete and detailed
mathematical analysis for vehicular mobility in city streets. We have also verified the
correctness of our analytical model by comparing numerical results with simulations.
Simulation parameters have been derived from real street map data (in contrast to
randomly picked values) so that simulation generates results in accordance to real-
world street scenarios rather than non-existing scenarios.
Our objective in this chapter is to develop an analytical model for vehicular mo-
bility pattern that considers city street constraints and real driving strategies and
to obtain its key stochastic properties for deeper understanding of its behavior. Our
contributions of the work presented in this chapter are (i) developing an analytical
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model to formulate various stochastic properties, such as expected epoch length,
variance of epoch length, expected epoch time, expected number of subnet cross-
ing, and subnet residence time of VMoCS mobility model, and (ii) validating the
analytical results through ns-2 simulations that uses real street map data.
The mathematical analysis presented in this chapter explains analytically how
certain parameters of VMoCS model can influence its epoch length, epoch time,
number of subnet crossings, and subnet residence time, thus giving a deeper under-
standing of the behavior of the model. The results obtained using VMoCS model
can be used for estimating various performance metrics of mobility enabled devices
in vehicles while roaming in city streets.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 10.2, the VMoCS
mobility model is explained and its various stochastic properties are derived and an-
alyzed. The simulation results are presented in Section 10.3. Section 10.4 concludes
the chapter.
10.2 VMoCS Mobility Model
The street map considered in VMoCS model is represented by a grid shown in
Fig. 10.1. Each vehicle starts movement from a randomly picked crossroad. It then
chooses a destination point (another crossroad in the street map). Movement to
the destination involves (at most) one horizontal and one vertical movement. Upon
reaching the destination crossroad, the vehicle again chooses another destination
point and the process is repeated. Each such cycle is termed as an epoch.
Following are the assumptions of the VMoCS model:
• Starting and destination points are assumed to be crossroads.
• Each street and avenue have separate speed limits.
• Streets and avenues are parallel to axes.
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Figure 10.1: Road network in VMoCS mobility model.
• Stop light is present at every crossroad. A vehicle encounters the stop light at
a crossroad with a probability.
• After each stop signal, each vehicle accelerates up to the speed limit of the
street/avenue (in a fraction of the street segment) and moves with the speed
unless a stop light is encountered.
• In case of encountering a stop light, the vehicle stops by decelerating in a
fraction of street segment.
The street map shown in Fig. 10.1 is a rectangular shaped area of dimension
a × b. Let there be Ns horizontal roads (streets) and Na vertical roads (avenues)
and streets be Sy distance apart and avenues be Sx distance apart. So number of
streets and number of avenues are
Na =
a
Sx
+ 1 (10.1)
Ns =
b
Sy
+ 1. (10.2)
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In the i-th epoch, the vehicle moves from point Si to point Di via intermediate
point I i, involving (at most) one horizontal and one vertical movement. So the
movement pattern in each epoch of VMoCS model can be represented by (Si, V ix ,I
i),
(I i, V iy , D
i), where V ix and V
i
y are speed limits of the two streets. In an epoch where
the starting point and destination point are on the same (horizontal or vertical) road
segment, the intermediate point I i coincides with Di.
In the following subsections, we derive five stochastic properties of the VMoCS
mobility model. First, we derive the expression for expected epoch length that gives
an estimate of the distance traversed by the vehicle in an epoch. Then the expression
for variance of epoch length is derived and it gives us a measure of how the expected
epoch length varies, which in turn gives some indication of the randomness of the
VMoCS model. Next, the mean epoch time is derived considering the restrictions in
city streets (such as speed limit, stop light). Next, we derive the number of subnet
crossing in an epoch considering circular shaped cells. Finally, the mean residence
time in a cell (or subnet) is computed.
10.2.1 Epoch length
In each epoch, the vehicle moves along (at most) two road segments. Let Lix and L
i
y
be the lengths of those two road segments during i-th epoch. So Lix = |I ix − Six| and
Liy =
∣∣Diy − I iy∣∣, where Px and Py are the x and y-coordinates of the point P . So the
total distance covered by the vehicle during i-th epoch is as follows:
Li = Lix + L
i
y. (10.3)
It should be noted that the destination point (Di) of one epoch is the starting
point (Si+1) of the next epoch. Hence, successive epochs are not totally independent
of one another. But distances covered by odd epochs (i.e., first, third, fifth and so on)
are independent of one another. Therefore, L1, L3, L5, . . . , L2n+1 are independent
of one another. A similar situation holds for L2, L4, L6, . . . , L2n. We can combine
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these two series and it does not change the asymptotic nature of the total distance
covered by the vehicle [69].
Let us number each of the avenues as 1, 2, . . . , Nath avenue from left to right
and each of the streets as 1, 2, . . . , Nsth street from top to bottom. So while
considering the horizontal movement path along SI street segment (Fig. 10.1), both
the points S and I can be selected from a street having a maximum of Na discrete
points. The probability mass function (pmf) of a randomly selected point’s location
on a horizontal line of Na discrete points is given by,
fPx(x) =


1
Na
, when x ∈ {1, 2, ...Na}
0, otherwise.
(10.4)
Since the random selection of both the points is independent of each other, their
joint pmf is as follows:
fPx1 ,Px2 (x1, x2) = fPx1 (x1).fPx2 (x2)
=


1
Na2
, when x1, x2 ∈ {1, 2, ...Na}
0, otherwise.
10.2.1.1 Expected epoch length
The expected epoch length of VMoCS mobility model gives a measure of the distance
covered by a vehicle in an epoch on the average which is required while analyzing
vehicular mobility and handover protocols.
Let us first find out the expected length along the street (i.e., along horizontal
direction). Let it be Lx. The values of Lx can be found from the following Na ×Na
matrix whose entries are given by,
M(i, j) = Sx | i− j |,where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ Na. (10.5)
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

0 Sx 2Sx .. (Na − 1)Sx
Sx 0 Sx .. (Na − 2)Sx
2Sx Sx 0 .. (Na − 3)Sx
3Sx 2Sx Sx .. (Na − 4)Sx
. . . .. .
. . . .. .
(Na − 2)Sx (Na − 3)Sx (Na − 4)Sx .. Sx
(Na − 1)Sx (Na − 2)Sx (Na − 3)Sx .. 0


The possible values of Lx are 0, Sx, 2Sx, 3Sx, . . . , (Na − 1)Sx and it depends
on the location of the starting and destination points of an epoch. Therefore, the
expected value of Lx can be obtained as follows:
E(Lx) =
1
Na
2
(
Na × 0 + 2
(
(Na − 1)Sx + (Na − 2)2Sx + ..+ 2(Na − 2)Sx + 1(Na − 1)Sx
))
=
2Sx
Na
2
Na−1∑
i=1
(Na − i)i
=
Sx(Na
2 − 1)
3Na
.
(10.6)
Substituting a = Sx(Na − 1) in Eqn. (10.6), we get
E(Lx) =
a(Na + 1)
3Na
. (10.7)
Similarly, for movement along avenues, the expected value of Ly can be obtained as
follows:
E(Ly) =
b(Ns + 1)
3Ns
. (10.8)
Therefore, the expected epoch length can be obtained by adding Eqns. (10.7) and
(10.8) as follows:
E(L) =
a(Na + 1)
3Na
+
b(Ns + 1)
3Ns
. (10.9)
In Fig. 10.2, expected epoch length (per unit length of road network), i.e., E(L)/a
of VMoCS model and classical Random Waypoint (RWP) model [69] is plotted
against b/a. For VMoCS model, number of streets (Ns) is obtained by Ns ≈ (b/a)Na
(see Eqns. (10.1) and (10.2)). For the RWP model, the expression for the expected
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Figure 10.2: Expected epoch length of VMoCS model within an a × b rectangular
road network.
epoch length has been taken from [69]. Here, the general trend of all these graphs
is that the value of E(L)/a increases with the increase of b/a ratio. That means
expected epoch length (per unit length of road network) increases as the grid (for
road network) becomes more homogeneous (towards a square shape). This is because
for a fixed value of a, increased value of b/a implies larger grid dimension, resulting
in higher mean epoch length. For example, the expected epoch lengths of VMoCS
model for an a × a square shaped grid are E(L) = 0.68a and 0.6711a for Na =
50 and 150, respectively whereas that of RWP model is E(L) = 0.5214a. For an
a × (a/2) rectangular road network, E(L) is 0.5133a and 0.5044a for Na = 50 and
150, respectively for VMoCS model whereas that of RWP model is E(L) = 0.4024a.
Thus, it is found that the expected epoch length of RWP model is much less than
that of VMoCS model (irrespective of the value of Na). This is because in RWP
model mobile node uses straight (unrestricted) route between source and destination
point (in an epoch) which is not the case for vehicle movement in VMoCS model.
For large values of Na and Ns, Eqn. (10.9) reduces to
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E(L) =
a
3
+
b
3
. (10.10)
For a square shaped grid of dimension a× a, E(L) = 2a/3.
10.2.1.2 Variance of epoch length
The variance of epoch length implies how the epoch lengths vary about the mean
epoch length. To compute the variance, let us first compute the second moment of
Lx as follows:
E(L2x) =
1
Na
2
[
Na × 02 + 2
(
(Na − 1)S2x + (Na − 2)(2Sx)2 + . . .+ 1{(Na − 1)Sx}2
)]
=
2S2x
Na
2
Na−1∑
i=1
(Na − i)i2
=
S2x(N
2
a − 1)
6
.
(10.11)
Again, substituting a = Sx(Na − 1) in Eqn. (10.11), we get
E(L2x) =
Sx(Na + 1)a
6
. (10.12)
Similarly,
E(L2y) =
Sy(Ns + 1)b
6
. (10.13)
Therefore, the second moment of L can be obtained by adding Eqns. (10.12) and
(10.13) as follows:
E(L2) =
Sx(Na + 1)a
6
+
Sy(Ns + 1)b
6
. (10.14)
In Fig. 10.3, E(L2)/a values of VMoCS model are shown for various number of
avenues and for Sx = Sy = 50 to 200 meters. For an a × a square shaped road
network, E(L2) = 3.4a km and 13.4a km for {Na, Sx} = {50, 200 m} and {200, 200
m}, respectively. For an a × (a/2) rectangular shaped network, E(L2) = 2.1333a
km and 8.3833a for {Na, Sx} = {50, 200 m} and {200, 200 m}, respectively. Thus,
the second moment of L increases with the increase of Sx and Na which follows
Eqn. (10.14).
Now the variance of Lx can be obtained as,
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Figure 10.3: E(L2)/a of VMoCS model within an a × b rectangular road network
for various numbers of avenues.
V (Lx) = E(L
2
x)− (E(Lx))2
=
S2x(N
2
a − 1)
3
(
1
2
− N
2
a − 1
3N2a
)
.
(10.15)
For large value of Na, N
2
a − 1 ≈ N2a . Hence, Eqn. (10.15) reduces to
V (Lx) =
S2x(N
2
a − 1)
18
=
E(L2x)
3
. (10.16)
Similarly,
V (Ly) =
S2y(N
2
s − 1)
18
=
E(L2y)
3
. (10.17)
Therefore, the variance of epoch length can be obtained by adding Eqns. (10.16)
and (10.17),
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Figure 10.4: V (L)/a of VMoCS model within an a× b rectangular road network for
various numbers of avenues.
V (L) =
S2x(N
2
a − 1)
18
+
S2y(N
2
s − 1)
18
. (10.18)
In Fig. 10.4, V (L)/a values of VMoCS model are shown for various number
of avenues and for Sx = Sy = 50 to 200 meters. For an a × a square shaped road
network, V (L) = 2.2444a km and 4.4667a km for {Na, Sx} = {100, 200 m} and {200,
200 m}, respectively. For an a × (a/2) rectangular road network, V (L) = 1.4056a
km and 2.7944a km for {Na, Sx} = {100, 200 m} and {200, 200 m}, respectively.
Thus, it is found that the variance of VMoCS model increases with the increase of
Sx (inter-road spacing) and Na (number of avenues), since V (L) is proportional to
the square of Sx and Na.
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10.2.2 Epoch time
The next step is to find out the total time required for a vehicle (mobile node)
to complete an epoch. We have considered possible restrictions in the city streets,
such as stop lights, speed limits. We have assumed an average delay of τ sec at
each crossroad with a probability of φ of encountering it, that is, the vehicle will
encounter a stop light in a crossroad with a probability φ.
There is an average of E(Lx)/Sx crossroads while moving along the streets, and
E(Ly)/Sy crossroads while moving along the avenues in an epoch. So the total delay
regarding stoppages in crossroads can be estimated as follows:
Txroad = φτ
(
E(Lx)
Sx
+
E(Ly)
Sy
)
. (10.19)
After encountering the stoplight at a crossroad, the vehicle starts accelerating
up to the speed limit. Let us assume that the vehicle reaches the speed limit after
traversing the χ fraction of the road segment. Similarly, there are deceleration
phase before each stoplight which covers some χ (let) fraction of the street segment.
Therefore, (1− 2χ) fraction of the road segment is traversed at the maximum speed
which is corresponding street’s speed limit. Let V px be the speed limit of the p-th
street. For the acceleration phase, the average speed is (0 + V px )/2 = V
p
x /2. Similar
is the case for the deceleration phase.
Therefore, time required to travel along the horizontal road (street) in an epoch
(excluding the delay in crossroads) is the sum of the following:
• At the beginning of each epoch, the χ fraction of the first road segment (Sx)
is traversed at a speed of V px /2. This requires a time of χSx/(V
p
x /2).
• In the last (horizontal) road segment, the vehicle stops to take a (left/right)
turn to the avenue. Hence, the end portion (χ fraction) of the last road segment
(Sx) is traversed at a speed of V
p
x /2. This also requires a time of χSx/(V
p
x /2).
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• In an epoch, an average of E(Lx)/Sx street segments is traversed by the vehicle.
The length of the middle parts of each street segment is (1−2χ)Sx which is tra-
versed at the speed limit (V px ). So the time required to travel the middle parts
of all the horizontal road segments in an epoch is (1− 2χ)Sx(E(Lx)/Sx)/V px .
• The vehicle encounters stop signal at each crossroad with a probability φ. So
for φ(E(Lx)/Sx) street segments, the end part will have deceleration phase
and the next start part will have acceleration phase. These two parts will be
traversed at an average speed of V px /2. So the time required for acceleration
and deceleration phase (near the crossroad with stop light present) is φ(χ +
χ)(E(Lx)/Sx)Sx/(V
p
x /2).
• In crossroads where vehicles do not encounter stop lights, the crossroad (along
with the end and the next start part) is traversed at the corresponding speed
limit. So the time required to travel those crossroads (including the end and
start part) is (1− φ)(χ+ χ)(E(Lx)/Sx)Sx/V px .
Therefore, the time required to travel along the horizontal road (street) in an
epoch (excluding the delays in crossroads) can be obtained as follows:
E(Tx) =
χSx
V px /2
+
χSx
V px /2
+ (1− 2χ) Sx
V px
× E(Lx)
Sx
+ φ(χ+ χ)
E(Lx)
Sx
× Sx
V px /2
+ (1− φ)(χ+ χ)E(Lx)
Sx
× Sx
V px
=
4χSx
V px
+
E(Lx)
V px
((1 − 2χ) + 4φχ+ 2χ(1− φ))
=
4χSx
V px
+
E(Lx)
V px
(1 + 2φχ).
(10.20)
Similarly, the time required to travel the vertical road segment (excluding the delays
in crossroads) in an epoch is
E(Ty) =
4χSy
V qy
+
E(Ly)
V qy
(1 + 2φχ). (10.21)
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Figure 10.5: Expected epoch time of the VMoCS model as a function of speed limit
and number of avenues (streets).
Hence, the total epoch time can be obtained by adding Eqn. (10.19), (10.20) and
(10.21):
E(T ) = Txroad + E(Tx) + E(Ty). (10.22)
In Fig. 10.5, the expected epoch time of the VMoCS mobility model is shown
for an a × a square and an a × (a/2) rectangular road network. Here we have
assumed V px = V
q
y = V
max. We find that the expected epoch time decreases with
the increase of speed limit which is quite obvious. On the other hand, expected
epoch time increases with the increase in number of avenues (Na) and streets (Ns).
Higher value of Na means larger grid dimensions for fixed inter-road spacing (see
Eqns. (10.1) and (10.2)), resulting in higher epoch time. For an a × a square road
network, E(T )/a = 262.17 milisec/meter and 145.75 milisec/meter when {V max, Na}
= {5 m/s, 200} and {V max, Na} = { 25 m/s, 200}, respectively. For an a × (a/2)
rectangular road network, E(T )/a = 178.96 milisec/meter and 91.02 milisec/meter
when {V max, Na} = {5 m/s, 200} and {V max, Na} = {25 m/s, 200}, respectively.
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Figure 10.6: Subnet overlapping among the cells.
10.2.3 Number of subnet crossings
Let us consider that the road network of dimensions a× b (Fig. 10.1) is covered by
Access Points (AP); let there be n rows of APs and m APs in each row. In total,
there will be mn APs to cover the rectangular area. Let the radio coverage area
of each AP be a circular region of radius r and two successive APs overlap at a
maximum length of l along its diameter. So we have,
a = 2mr − (m− 1)l (10.23)
b = 2nr − (n− 1)l. (10.24)
Our aim is to figure out the average number of cell boundaries a vehicle crosses
during an epoch. Let the radius r of each subnet be greater than the inter-road
spacing, i.e., r > Sx and r > Sy. In Fig. 10.6, the length of AB = 2r, and let
AC = x = BC, DE = l. Since the cells are parallel to axes, we find that x =
√
2r =
r + r − l. Hence,
l = (2−
√
2)r. (10.25)
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Now putting the value of l in Eqn. (10.23), we get,
m =
⌈√
2a− 2(√2− 1)r
2r
⌉
. (10.26)
Similarly, we can have
n =
⌈√
2b− 2(√2− 1)r
2r
⌉
. (10.27)
For a = 36 km, b = 24 km, and r = 0.5 km, we have, m =51, n = 34. Thus, we find
that the a×b rectangular road network is covered by m×n access points. Therefore,
the effective cell length per access point is a/m or b/n.
Let us compute the expected number of subnet crossing during the movement
along horizontal direction, i.e., movement from starting point S to the intermediate
point I (Fig. 10.1). Let us assume that a/m = b/n = KSx = KSy. If the distance
between these two points is between 0 to (K − 1)Sx, i.e., less than an AP’s effective
coverage area, there will be at most one subnet crossing. For any distance between
KSx to (2K − 1)Sx, there will be at most two subnet crossings, and so on. Thus, if
the point S is at first avenue and point I is at Na-th avenue, then the distance of
the road segment will be (Na − 1)Sx and there will be m subnet crossings. Thus,
we can find out the expected number of subnet crossings in an epoch for movement
along horizontal direction as,
E(Cx) =
2
Na
2
[
(Na − 1) + (Na − 2) + ...+Na − (K − 1) + 2
(
(Na −K) + (Na −K − 1) + . . .
+ (Na − 2K + 1)
)
+ ...+m{(Na − (m− 1)K) + ..+ (Na −mK + 1)}
]
=
2
Na
2
[
KNa
m∑
i=1
i−
{K−1∑
i=1
i+ 2K2 + 2
K−1∑
i=1
i+ ...+m(m− 1)K2 +m
K−1∑
i=1
i
}]
=
2
Na
2

KNa m∑
i=1
i−K2
m∑
i=2
i(i− 1)−
K−1∑
i=1
i
m∑
j=1
j


=
m(m+ 1)K
6Na
2 (6Na − 4mK +K + 3).
(10.28)
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Figure 10.7: Expected number of subnet crossings of VMoCS model as a function
of K and number of avenues.
Similarly, expected number of subnet crossings in an epoch for movement along the
vertical direction is,
E(Cy) =
n(n+ 1)K
6Ns
2 (6Ns − 4nK +K + 3). (10.29)
Therefore, the expected number of subnet crossing in an epoch can be obtained by
adding Eqns. (10.28) and (10.29):
E(C) = E(Cx) + E(Cy). (10.30)
In Fig. 10.7, the expected number of subnet crossings of VMoCS model is shown
for an a × a square road network and an a × (a/2) rectangular road network. We
find that the expected number of subnet crossings decreases with the increase in the
value of K which is the ratio of the diameter of an AP to the inter-road spacing, i.e.,
2r/Sx. Higher values of K mean larger coverage area for access points, resulting in
fewer number of subnet crossings. On the other hand, expected number of subnet
crossings increases with the increase in number of avenues (Na) and streets (Ns).
Higher values of Na and Ns mean larger grid dimensions for fixed inter-road spacing
(see Eqns. (10.1) and (10.2)), resulting in higher number of subnet crossings.
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Figure 10.8: Residence time of VMoCS model as a function of speed limit and
number of avenues.
For an a × a square road network, E(C) = 19.79 when K = 7, Na = 200; and
E(C) = 39.85 when K = 3, Na = 200. For an a× (a/2) rectangular road network,
E(C) = 15.04 when K = 7, Na = 200; and E(C) = 30.26 when K = 3, Na = 200.
10.2.4 Subnet residence time
The subnet residence time is the time duration that the mobile node (vehicle) resides
under a cell. This can be obtained by dividing the mean epoch time by expected
number of subnet crossing as follows:
Tr =
E(T )
E(C)
. (10.31)
In Fig. 10.8, the residence time of VMoCS model is shown for 36 km × 36 km
square-shaped and 36 km × 18 km rectangular-shaped road network. Here, we used
K = 5. We find that the residence time decreases with the increase of speed limit
as less time is required to cross the coverage area of an AP. Residence time also
decreases with the increase in number of avenues (Na) and streets (Ns). Higher
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values of Na (Ns) result in increased E(C) values, but the value of E(T ) is not
affected much. As a result, the residence time decreases.
For a 36 km × 36 km square road network, Tr = 899.37 sec and 190.95 sec when
{V max, Na} = {10 m/s, 50} and {30 m/s, 200}, respectively. For a 36 km × 18 km
rectangular road network, Tr = 767.18 sec and 154.28 sec when {V max, Na} = {10
m/s, 50} and {30 m/s, 200}, respectively.
10.3 Simulation Study
To validate our mathematical model, we have performed ns-2 simulation [28]. Simu-
lation environment, analysis of the results and a comparative discussion are presented
in the following subsections.
10.3.1 Simulation environment
Figure 10.9 shows the topology used for the simulation. The simulation area is a
36 km × 36 km area which is covered by 1764 access routers (arranged in 42 rows
and 42 columns as shown in Fig. 10.1). The hierarchical addresses of all the nodes
are listed in Table 10.1. CN is the FTP source over TCP whereas the mobile nodes
(in vehicles) are the TCP sinks. In each run, each mobile node (vehicle) moves
in the environment covered by the 1764 ARs following the constraints of VMoCS
mobility model. The HA of each mobile node also acts as an AR, they are assumed
to have the address of 1.1.0-1.20.0. In each simulation run, all the 20 mobile nodes
moved according to VMoCS model starting from a random location; each mobile
node (vehicle) completed 10 epochs in each run, totalling 200 epochs per simulation
run. We have taken the average of the results.
To estimate certain model parameters (such as inter-road spacing, speed limit)
for VMoCS model, we have considered the manhattan road maps in the City of New
York since it matches our assumed road network. It has been found the inter-street
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Figure 10.9: Simulation Topology.
spacing in Manhattan is around 80-100 m and inter-avenue spacing is around 320-340
m. The speed limit is roughly 30 miles/hour. We have measured these parameters
by analyzing Google Maps [86] data. The signaling time cycle at the crossroads of
New York city is between 45 and 120 seconds [87].
Based on the above observations, we have chosen our simulation parameter val-
ues. The default values of parameters used for simulations are listed in Table 10.2.
We used a square shaped road network with a dimension of 36 km × 36 km. We
assumed the inter-street and inter-avenue spacings to be the same (240 m). There-
fore, number of avenues in the road network is 151. Similar is the case for number
of streets. The speed limit is assumed to be 15 meter/sec (which is around 33.55
miles/hr, reasonable for city streets). Delay in each crossroad is assumed to be 50
sec (maximum value) and there is a 40% chance of encountering stop light in a cross-
road. The acceleration portion of the street segment is assumed to be 10% of that
segment. Similar is the case for deceleration phase. Each access point’s transmission
range is 600 m. IEEE 802.11b standard is used for wireless communications. The
wireless link bandwidth is 11 Mbps and wired link bandwidth is 10 Mbps.
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Table 10.1: Hierarchical addresses used for entities in the simulation.
Node Type Hierarchical addresses
CN 0.0.0
Router 1.0.0
AR1 - AR1764 1.1.0 - 1.1764.0
MH1 - MH20 1.1.1 - 1.20.1
Table 10.2: Values of parameters used in the simulation.
Simulation Parameters Values
Simulation area 36 km × 36 km
Inter-road spacings (Sx or Sy) 240 meter
Speed limit of each street/avenue 15 meter/sec
Number of Avenues (Streets) 151
Prob. of encountering stoplight at crossroad (φ) 0.4
Average delay in crossroad (τ) 50 sec
Portion of street segment used for acceleration (χ) 0.1
Number of MHs 20
Number of Epochs per MH per simulation 10
Wireless range 600 m
Wired link BW 10 Mbps
Wired link delay 1.8 ms
Wireless (802.11b) link BW 11 Mbps
Number of Access Points 1764
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10.3.2 Simulation results
The results obtained from the analysis of the simulation traces are presented in
this subsection. We have measured the mean epoch length, epoch time, number
of subnet crossings, residence times of each simulation run. In addition, we have
measured the average packet drop probability, handoff frequency, average end-to-
end delay, number of binding updates.
Figure 10.10: Mean epoch lengths for
different simulation trials.
Figure 10.11: Variance of epoch lengths
for different simulation trials.
10.3.2.1 Expected epoch length
Figure 10.10 shows the bar chart of epoch lengths for each simulation run (having
200 epochs iterated in each run). There are 40 such simulation results. The average
epoch length of all the simulation runs is 24.2113 km which is shown using the red
straight line in Fig. 10.10. The variation among the epoch length values reflect the
randomness of the mobility model.
According to the theoretical model presented in Section 10.2, the expected epoch
length for the road network is given by Eqn. (10.9). Hence, E(L) = E(Lx) +E(Ly)
= 2 * 36 * (151 + 1) / (3*151) = 24.1589 km. This value is close to the average
epoch length obtained from simulation results with an accuracy of 99.78%.
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10.3.2.2 Variance of epoch length
During each simulation run, we had 200 epochs. We recorded the epoch lengths in
each trial and computed the mean epoch length of each trial. Using the mean value,
we have computed the variance of epoch lengths in each trial as shown in Fig. 10.11.
The average variance of all the 40 trials is 146.58 km2. Hence, the standard deviation
for epoch lengths is 12.10 km.
Using the analytical model, the variance of epoch lengths (for Sx = Sy = 240
m, and Na = Ns = 151) can be obtained using Eqn. (10.18) and is 145.92 km
2.
Therefore, the standard deviation for a 36 km × 36 km square shaped road network
is 12.079 km. Thus, the theoretical value matches the simulation one (accuracy of
99.54%).
Figure 10.12: Mean epoch times for dif-
ferent simulation trials.
Figure 10.13: Average number of subnet
crossing for different simulation trials.
10.3.2.3 Epoch time
Epoch time includes delay in the crossroads and the time to travel horizontal and
vertical road segment in an epoch. The theoretical value for delay in crossroads can
be obtained using Eqn. (10.19) as Txroad = 0.4 * 50 * (12079.45 / 240) *2 = 2013.2
sec. In addition, time required to travel horizontal and vertical street movement
can be computed by Eqns. (10.20) and (10.21) which are Tx = 811.62 sec and Ty
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= 811.62 sec. Therefore, the calculated epoch time (from the analytical model) is
E(T ) = 2013.2 + 811.62 + 811.62 = 3636.44 sec = 60.61 min.
On the other hand, the distribution for epoch time obtained from simulations are
shown in Fig. 10.12. The average value is 63.01 min which is shown using the red
straight line. The simulation value of mean epoch time are close to the analytical
one with an accuracy of 96.19%.
10.3.2.4 Expected number of subnet crossings
Using the analytical model, the expected number of subnet crossing can be obtained
using Eqns. (10.28), (10.29), and (10.30). For the square shaped road network of 36
km × 36 km, number of streets (avenues) are 151, the value K = a/(mSx) = 3.57.
Using the Eqn. (10.28), we find that E(Cx) = 14.74 = E(Cy) due to square road
shaped road network. Hence, E(C) = E(Cx) + E(Cy) = 29.48.
From the simulation traces, the average number of subnet crossing in each trial
is obtained and Fig. 10.13 shows the corresponding bar chart. The average value is
29.208 shown using the red straight line. This average value is close to the analytical
value with an accuracy of 99.05%.
Table 10.3: Comparison between analytical and simulation results.
Type of results E(L) V(L) E(T) E(C) Tr
Analytical 24.15 km 145.92 km2 60.61 min 29.48 123.36 sec
Simulation 24.21 km 146.58 km2 63.01 min 29.20 129.31 sec
10.3.2.5 Subnet residence time
The subnet residence time can be computed using Eqn. (10.31) as Tr = 60.61 min /
29.48 = 123.36 sec. On the other hand, we show the subnet residence times for each
simulation trial in Fig. 10.14. The distribution is almost flat and the average value
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Figure 10.14: Subnet residence times for
different simulation trials.
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Figure 10.15: Average packet drop prob-
ability vs. speed limit for different inter-
road spacing.
of all simulation trial is 129.31 sec. Thus, we find that the simulation value matches
the analytical one with 95.39% accuracy.
In Table 10.3, the results obtained from the mathematical model (Section 10.2)
and the ns-2 simulation are presented for a 36 km × 36 km square-shaped road
network with inter-road spacing of 240 m. The theoretical values of mean epoch
length, variance of epoch length, epoch time, mean number of subnet crossing and
subnet residence time matches the values obtained by simulation, thus validating
our analytical model.
The objective of the chapter is to derive several stochastic properties of realistic
vehicular mobility model in city streets. These properties have been validated by
ns-2 simulation results in Figs. 10.10 - 10.14. However, while doing ns-2 simulations,
we have collected additional results related to the packet drop probability, number
of handoff, and number of binding updates. These results are part of simulation
results that cannot be obtained from our analytical model. These are particularly
related to network protocol modeling.
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10.3.2.6 Average packet drop probability
To compute the packet drop probability, we have counted the number of packets
sent by CN, and number of packets received by the all mobile hosts. We have
computed the packet drop probability by taking the ratio of dropped packets to the
total packets sent by the CN.
In Fig. 10.15, the average packet drop probability is shown for varying speed
limit of the road network. Average drop probability increases for higher speed limit
which implies higher mobility rate of mobile nodes (vehicles). Moreover, the drop
rate increases for higher inter-road spacings. Higher Sx value implies lower value
of Na for fixed dimension of the road network. This reduces number of possible
destination points in an epoch, resulting in higher packet drop rate.
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Figure 10.16: Handoff frequency vs.
speed limit.
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10.3.2.7 Handoff frequency
Figure 10.16 shows the number of handoff per 1000 sec of simulation time for varying
speed limit of the road network with different delay time and probability of red light
at crossroads. The handoff frequency increases for shorter delays (φ = 0.3, τ = 30
sec) in crossroads (possibly during the off-peak hour) since this allows vehicles to
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complete the epoch faster. Thus the mean epoch time reduces, resulting in higher
handoff frequency. During the peak hours, there are large delays at crossroads with
higher probability of encountering stop light (φ = 0.5, τ = 70 sec). This increases
the total delay to complete an epoch, causing the handoff frequency to drop.
10.3.2.8 Binding updates
The simulation was run for several speed of mobile network, ranging from 5 to 25
m/s. We have counted the number of binding updates sent by the MH in every
minute of simulation time as shown in Fig. 10.17. It may be noted that the binding
lifetime was set to 60 sec. Therefore, if there were no regular binding update sent
(due to handoff) within a time period of 60 sec, refreshing binding updates were
sent by the mobile node to keep the home agent’s binding cache valid. It is found
that number of binding updates sent by the MH increases with higher mobility rate
of the vehicles due to higher handoff rate.
10.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have analyzed a realistic vehicular mobility model that captures
the real driving strategies along with possible constraints in city streets, such as stop
lights at crossroad, speed limits, etc. We have performed a complete and detailed
analysis of the model deriving the expressions for its various stochastic properties:
expected epoch length, variance of epoch length, expected epoch time, expected
number of subnet crossings and subnet residence time. The analytical model has
been validated by ns-2 simulations with parameters chosen from real street map
data. Our work can help in estimating various performance metrics of IP-enabled
devices or mobile networks on-board vehicles in city streets.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
In this dissertation, a comprehensive evaluation of host and network mobility pro-
tocols has been performed. Specifically, we have focused on the cost, scalability,
survivability and security analysis of mobility protocols. We have also proposed a
dynamic scheduling algorithm to protect the mobility signaling message from getting
ignored as a consequence of excessive amount of audio-video streaming data in mo-
bile Internet. Moreover, we have proposed a multi-band mobile router architecture
that aims at maximizing bandwidth utilization. Finally, we present a mathematical
model to derive various stochastic properties of a realistic mobility model for mobile
networks and apply the model in protocol analysis. The analysis presented in this
work can help network engineers evaluate different mobility protocols quantitatively,
thereby choose one that is more reliable, secure, survivable and scalable.
11.1 Summary
First, we have developed comprehensive cost analysis models to estimate total costs
and efficiencies of different host and network mobility protocols and their key enti-
ties. We have defined two novel metrics, namely normalized overhead and efficiency,
to compare the performance of the mobility protocols and its entities. We have
presented numerical results to demonstrate the impact of increased network size,
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mobility rate, traffic rate and data volume on the total cost, overhead and efficiency
of mobility management entities. Our results show that SIGMA (and SINEMO)
incurs much lower overhead on its key entities and yields higher efficiency than
HMIPv6 (and NEMO) irrespective of session lengths, network size and mobility
rate. Based on the cost models, we performed scalability analysis of these mobility
protocols. Our results show that the host mobility protocols (HMIPv6 and SIGMA)
and network mobility protocols (NEMO and SINEMO) exhibit asymptotically iden-
tical scalability feature for complete system though the LM (of SIGMA) is found to
be more scalable than the HA (of HMIPv6).
Next, we focus on the multi-class traffic analysis for mobility protocols to protect
the all-important signaling traffic from getting lost due to the high volume of real-
time and non-real data in the network. We propose a scheduling algorithm that
gives highest priority to signaling traffic, thereby ensures its minimum loss. Based
on the scheduling algorithm, we have derived closed form expressions for average
queuing delay, queue occupancy, and packet drop probability of each class of traffic.
Results show the impact of the node density, service rate and traffic distribution on
those measures.
We proposed a novel scheduling algorithm for multi-band mobile routers that
aims at maximizing utilization of available bandwidth of mobile routers. We have
also derived various performance metrics of the multi-band router architecture, that
have been validated by extensive simulations. Our results show that the proposed
architecture can ensure maximum possible utilization through sharing of capacities
among the bands.
We perform quantitative survivability evaluation of NEMO with multiple mobile
routers taking into consideration possible natural or man-made failures as well as
DDoS attacks. Our results show that increase in the number of mobile routers
improves the performance of the mobile network by reducing the mean delay and
drop probability while withstanding attack packets.
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We proposed a seamless handover scheme for NEMO exploiting the multihom-
ing feature of the mobile router. We have used experimental testbeds to measure
its handoff performance (throughput, round trip time, and handoff latency) and
compared it with basic NEMO. Our experimental results show that proposed multi-
homed scheme outperforms basic NEMO in terms of handoff delay, round trip time
and throughput.
We identified major security threats for the IPv6 network due to the inclusion
of mobility protocols. We have explained in details the security vulnerabilities and
their possible impacts on the Internet. We have also analyzed the existing defense
mechanisms along with their capabilities and limitations to prevent or mitigate these
security threats. Finally, we have proposed effective defense mechanisms for SIGMA
to protect against threats from malicious agents.
Finally, we have developed a mathematical model to derive various stochastic
properties of a realistic mobility model for mobile networks (onboard a vehicle). We
use the knowledge of the node mobility pattern for performance evaluation of host
mobility protocol in ns-2 simulations. The analytically derived properties have been
validated by simulations whose parameters have been taken from real street map
data. Our developed model can be used as a generic framework for the comprehensive
analysis of other mobility models.
In summary, we have performed a comprehensive evaluation of host and network
mobility protocols. Specifically, we have focused on the cost, scalability, survivabil-
ity and security analysis of mobility protocols. Our proposed dynamic scheduling
algorithm aims at protecting the mobility signaling message and maximizing band-
width utilization in multi-band system. Moreover, we have presented a mathematical
model to derive various stochastic properties of a realistic mobility model for mobile
networks. The analysis presented in this work can help network engineers evaluate
different mobility protocols quantitatively, thereby choose one that is more reliable,
secure, survivable and scalable.
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11.2 Future Works
Some future research works are listed as follows:
• All the analysis in this dissertation was performed on terminal-based mobility
protocols where the end node is involved in mobility signaling. To relieve low
end mobile devices, network-based mobility protocols, such as, Proxy Mobile
IPv6 [88] have been proposed where the infrastructure is responsible for mobil-
ity management. The analytical models developed in this dissertation can be
applied for network-based mobility protocols. Moreover, a seamless network-
based mobility protocol can be proposed and analyzed with respect to its total
cost, scalability, security and survivability.
• The mobility model proposed in Chapter 10 can be made more realistic by
incorporating importance factor for each destination (of a movement). More-
over, the total population of the city can be taken into account and average
mobility pattern of the population can be derived. This can also consider
peak-hour, off-peak, weekdays and weekends.
• In our analysis, we have assumed the correspondent node to be stationary.
However, both the communicating nodes may be mobile, such as, soldiers or
units communicating in the battlefield. Analysis of mobility protocols can be
performed considering such simultaneous mobility.
• Future research may focus on the issues and challenges when the mobile node
hands off between foreign networks operated by multiple service providers.
• Another issue is the survivability of location database. Survivability model
can be developed to compute the recovery time of the system and the average
number of packets lost due to the failure of mobility database.
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